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PROBLEM OF TIME AND TEMPORALITY IN SĀṂKHYA-YOGA AND ĀBHIDHARMA BUDDHISM

PROBLEM OF TIME AND TEMPORALITY IN SĀṂKHYA-YOGA AND ĀBHIDHARMA BUDDHISM

By

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: In this work, we have analysed the problem of temporality and its soteriological significance in the philosophico-religious traditions of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Ābhidharma Buddhism. The basic concern is to demonstrate the possibility of accounting for temporal determination without taking recourse to a reification of time category. An attempt is made to bring out the soteriological implications of such a perspective. The introductory section defines the problematic and methodological issues in the present study. This is followed by Part I, which is an expository section on Sāṁkhya-Yoga. Here, the problem of temporality is investigated against the background of the basic ontological perspective of the Samkhya-Yoga. Part II is a critical exposition of the problem of temporality in the Ābhidharma Buddhism. We have attempted to show how, according to the Ābhidharma Buddhism, temporal determination is a feature of reality. The concluding section looks at the problem in comparative perspective.

In this section we have tried to show how the two philosophico-religious systems, despite certain basic differences, have some common structural and thematic congruity.

ABSTRACT

In the present work an attempt is made to study the problem of temporality in the religious philosophies of the Sāmkhya-Yoga and Ābhidharma Buddhism. The two systems are studied in comparative perspective to determine the degree of compatibility of the two on the specific issue of temporality and its significance for the world-transcendence. The systems under investigation have been selected on the ground that both of them look at temporality as a characteristic built into the structure of things. Reification of time, as an abstract category independent of entities, is alien to both the systems. Temporality is conceived not in terms of time as a transcendent condition of our being and cognition. Rather it is conceived in terms of the changefulness and becomingness, characteristic of phenomena as such and its relationship to the cognizing consciousness. This indeed is the most important perspective that they share against other religious philosophies of India.

Our interest in the two systems' articulation of the problem emanates from the conviction that the systems under investigation, instead of being diametrically opposed to each other, complement each other and in some significant ways share certain basic perspectives. The fact of their complementarity has been ignored in the earlier studies. There are some occasional statements about the possibility of some similarities between

the two. But no study of significance, except that of Stcherbatsky, has been undertaken to see if there is any significant correlation between the two. Most of the time scholars have treated them as representing two diametrically opposed ontological perspectives, Murti being the most prominent proponent of this position. That there are certain important differences between the two cannot be denied. But it has been our concern to demonstrate that, despite important differences in their ontological perspectives, the two systems are in close company, specially in their articulation of the problem of temporality and its soteriological implications.

The body of the thesis is divided into three major parts. The first part is a critical exposition of the problem in the context of Sāṁkhya-Yoga. The second part deals with the problem with reference to Ābhidharma Buddhism. And the third part is an attempt to bring out the correlation between the two systems with special reference to the soteriological implications of their conception of the problem under investigation.

The following are the major findings of the present work:

1. Both the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Ābhidharma Buddhism relativize the category of time. This relativization is part and parcel of their non-cosmological understanding of the temporal process.
2. Temporality is defined as a feature built into the structure of change and becomingness and its subjective experience.
3. For explaining temporal determinations of past, present and future implicit distinction between real and existent is admissible. The present alone is considered existent, while past and future are real.

4. The realm of the temporal is conceived in contradistinction with Eternity, the two being dialectically related. The temporality is seen in opposition to Eternity and yet providing a link with Eternity.

5. The transcendence of temporality is a function of consciousness. Reflection (contemplation) as an act of consciousness is a temporal act. But reflection is seen as having a built-in structure of transcendence. This transcendence of the temporal process takes place in the present. Accordingly, both the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Ābhidharma Buddhism are the soteriologies of the present.

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I must acknowledge my deep gratitude to Professor T. R. V. Murti under whom I had the privilege of studying Vedanta and Buddhism. The present project was first conceived under his supervision and whatever insight I have into Abhidharma Buddhism I owe to Dr. Murti with whom I studied the difficult text of Abhidharmakosa.

I express my indebtedness to Professor Hans Mol who has opened up a new vista of looking at religious problems. I thank him for his kind help and cooperation and the interest that he has shown in my work. I must also thank Professor G. B. Madison of the department of Philosophy in whose seminars I was first introduced to the methods of Phenomenology. The problem of time and temporality was a primary concern of the seminar and he helped me a great deal in clarifying my own thinking on this specific issue.

I wish to record my deep sense of indebtedness to my friend Mr. K. N. Oh, who was kind enough to read some relevant Japanese materials and translate them for me. I also thank my friends, Miss Kausar Khan and Miss Bithika Mukerjee, for kindly going through the manuscript and checking typographical and other errors. I would like to thank my wife Manju for her love and patience without which it would have been difficult to complete this work.

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To

Ma and Babujee

with love and respect

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PART I

SĀṂKHYA-YOGA

CHAPTER I

AIMS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Introduction:

The subject matter of the present dissertation is the problem of time and temporality in the systems of Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Ābhidharma Buddhism. For the purposes of this study, it is crucial that we make a conceptual distinction between the categories of time and temporality. The category of time is used for reification of time as an absolute category with independent ontological status. Time is conceived independent of entities and somehow influencing and conditioning the mode of being of all entities. Temporality, on the other hand, is the expression used to indicate the fact of change which characterises entities as their mode. It is not what stands independent of them claiming a co-ordinate status in relation to them, but is constituted of their very mode of existing.

Neither Sāṁkhya-Yoga nor Ābhidharma Buddhism look at temporality as a feature or function of time conceived as reified category. Temporality is not the adjectival synonym of time understood as the transcendent condition of our being and cognition. More specifically, within the context of these two systems, temporality may be defined in terms of the changefulness and becomingness characteristic of phenomena as such and its relationship to the cognizing consciousness. Thus, in this study, the term temporality is used to connote both the fact of change and finitude of

phenomenal existence as well as its subjective experience.[1]

In this work we have used the hyphenated expression of Sāṁkhya-Yoga to bring out the close correlation in basic ontological perspective of the two schools of thought. The Sāṁkhya system under investigation includes the thought of Sāṁkhya Kārikā and Sāṁkhya Sūtra and various commentaries thereon. Yoga, in the present context, is used for the classical Yoga or Rāja Yoga as expounded in the Patanjali's Yoga Sūtra and the various commentaries on it. In using this hyphenated expression we have tried to zero upon substantial agreement in the basic ontological perspectives of the two systems.[2]

The expression Ābhidharma Buddhism is employed in this work to connote the 'school' of Buddhist thought whose ideas are systematically expounded in the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu and commentaries thereon. The use of the expression is preferred for various reasons and in the absence of a more adequate label indicative of the scope of this study. Vasubandhu himself uses the term in Abhidharmakośa as a proper name to refer to the philosophical standpoint which is the subject matter of the Abhidharmakośa. Moreover, both Vasubandhu and his commentator Yaśomitra seem to be in complete agreement in maintaining that the Abhidharmakośa presents in a concise and systematic manner the central ideas of the primary Abhidharma texts which are now lost to the Sanskrit tradition.[3]

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[1] See pp. 9-15.

[2] For further discussion see pp. 46-49.

[3] See pp. 150-152.

Setting of the Problem

The significance of time component in the religious symbolism of a cultural subsystem has been noted by scholars. The time element is an integral part, of no small consequence, of any developed system of meaning. The time component of the symbol system may be seen to provide an important clue to the pattern of meaning structures, their emergence and maintenance. A study of religion as a system of meaning cannot remain indifferent to this fact.

What is important, however, is not to look at symbol systems and meaning structures in unidimensional and unilinear terms. Ignoring the complex character and varieties of levels on which the symbol system operates will lead to oversimplification or undermining of the essential elements that go into the making of symbol system. This will also lead to neglecting the fact of intricate dialectical relationship between different elements and levels of meaning structures. Study of time symbolism in any meaning structure is no exception in this regard. A symbol system dealing with the temporal dimension of reality may, for analytical and heuristic purposes, be broken up and analysed on different levels. It may be analysed in terms of its function on mythic level, or as an element in the ritualistic participation in religious activities.[1] It

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[1]Eliade, Mircea, Myth and Reality, New York: Harper & Row, 1963.

may also as well be seen as a form of choice and commitment of faith.[1] And, it may likewise also be considered in the context of the reflective act of consciousness and its significance for world transcendence.[2]

It is important not to forget that these levels of meaning structure are not mutually independent; rather they interpenetrate. If we emphasise the level on which time symbolism is related to the reflective act of consciousness we do not intend to underestimate the value of the analysis which takes place on another level, nor do we tend to suggest that they do not have any bearing on each other. However, many studies of the problem of time in philosophico-religious thoughts of India have fallen prey to the temptation of underestimating the complexity of the meaning structure and the interpenetration of different levels. It may be profitable to analyse some of these tendencies to situate our own programme in a wider context.

Most studies of the problem of time in the specific context of Indian thought have concentrated on the fact of continual downplaying of the realm of the temporal.[3] Some scholars tend to [illegible]

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[1]Wieman, H., "Time and Man's Ultimate Commitment", The Journal of Religion, 34, 1954, pp. 173-186.

[2]Coomaraswamy, Ananda, K., Time and Eternity, Switzerland: Artibus Asiae Publishers Ascona, 1942. This is the perspective that we intend to develop in the present work. Here we will try to show this perspective in the context of Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Ābhidharma Buddhism.

[3]Reyana, Ruth, "Metaphysics of Time in Indian Philosophy", in Zeman Jiri (ed.), Time in Science and Philosophy, New York: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1971.

concentrate on the contrast between the Indian conception of time and the Judaeo-Christian understanding of time. The contrast has been brought out in two specific ways. The first in terms of cyclic and linear conceptions of time, the former considered characteristic of Indian religions, including Buddhism and the latter of the Judaeo-Christian tradition including that of Islam.[1] The other approach to the problem in comparative perspective emphasises the fact that while Christian evaluation of time places premium on its being the realm of divine creativity and beneficence, the Indian conception tends to zero on time being the realm of the operation of divine's destructive and world obliterating power.[2] Thus it is stated that the contrast of Indian conception of time "with the Christian evaluation of Time is virtually absolute. Instead of Time as the field in which God's beneficent purpose majestically reveals itself, Indian thought has here identified God with the obliterating force of Time."[3]

What these perspectives on the problem of time in Indian thought have missed is the fact that any system of meaning (and conceptualization about time is part and parcel of a system of meaning) involves intricate layers or levels of meaning. What may be obvious on one level of meaning structure may not be the case at another level and a generalization based

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[1]Samartha, S. J., The Hindu View of History, Banglore: CSIRS, 1959.

[2]Brandon, S. G. F., History, Time and Deity, New York: Manchester University Press, 1965.

[3]Ibid., p. 3.

on one level may not be applicable to another level. For a comprehensive understanding of the significance of time component in the meaning structures under investigation one must isolate these levels or layers and see them in their intrinsic character. The different levels may be seen in dialectical relationship, each of them influencing and moulding the other, and in turn being influenced and moulded by them.

As an instance of these tendencies to undermine the significance of different layers of meaning structures we may cite again S.G.F. Brandon.[1] Brandon, in his work overemphasised the transcendent character of time in Indian thought. This predisposition towards transcendent time led him to stress on the one hand the identity of time with the obliterating power of the divine and on the other of time being the receptum of all entities The inevitable result of such predisposition is a complete underestimation of the religious significance attached by the Indian mind to the temporal process itself. While some Indian systems do emphasise the transcendent character of time, that constitutes only one element of the meaning structure and holds true only partially. The other element of the structure remains opaque and consequently Brandon can only see "the Indian fear of time".[2]

On a different level of meaning structure, the level which seeks to exemplify the significance of the temporal process, the fear of time is counterbalanced by the hope of transcendence, the transcendence itself

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 35.

seen as a temporal act pointing to freedom (Moksa or Nirvāna). The temporal process which is seen as coincident with pain and suffering is also seen as providing a clue to transcendence. For the generality of Indian philosophico-religious system, the present in which the individual is situated at a specific moment, is the moment of transcendence.[1]

It is important to note that 'moment' (ksana or nimesa) refers both to the "brief moment" as to measure of time and also to the moment without duration, the ideal condition of freedom, or transcendence. It is in the latter sense that Nimisa ("Twinkling of an Eye") as a synonym for divinity, is implied by the term naimisiyah (people of the moment).[2] And it is in this sense that Vasubandhu's statement that the great awakening (abhisambodhi) is "single instantaneous" (eka-ksana) is to be taken.[3] The notion of "instantaneous awakening" (ekasanabhisambodhi) continues to catch the fancy of the sādhaka (aspirant). The Yogic emphasis on the contemplation of the moment (ksana) as the means of realising eternity within a single compass of a 'now' only reinforces our thesis that temporal structure is also conceived as the structure of transcendence.[4] It is stated in Kālacakratantra: "The birthplace of the Royal Conquerors is in one constant moment (ekasminsamayeksare)".

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[1] Coomaraswamy, op. cit., p. 47.

[2] Chāndogya Upanisad, 1 2.13.

[3] Obermiller, E., "The Doctrine of Prajñā-pāramitā as exposed in the Abhisamayālamkāra of Maitreya", Acta Orientalia, 11, 1933, pp. 81-82.

[4] Yoga Sūtra, 3.52.

The identification of time and eternity finds a prominent place in Upanisadic scheme of things.[1] A distinctions between two forms (dvi rupe) of Brahman is made in terms of "Time and Without Time" (kālaś-cākālaś-ca): "What precedes the Sun is Without Time (akāla) and undivided (akāla); but what begins with Sun is Time which has parts (sakāla) and its form is the Year."[2] Mircea Eliade interpreting this passage observes:

> The expression "what precedes the Sun" may be interpreted cosmologically as relating to the epoch which preceded the Creation.....but its application is above all metaphysical and soteriological: it refers to the paradoxical situation of him who obtains illumination, who becomes a jivan-mukta, who is "delivered in this life", and thereby transcends time in the sense that he no longer participates in it.[3]

Mircea Eliade has greatly enriched our understanding of the time symbolism in the Indian tradition. He attaches special significance to mythic symbolism and ritual re-enactment of a sacred temporal moment in the scheme of transcendence. In his thesis Eliade makes a distinction between two conceptions of Time, namely 'le temps sacre' (the sacred time) and 'le temps profane' (the profane time).[4] Myths and rites according to him are the mechanisms of transcending the painful and evil experiences of the profane existence. The rites are, thus, conceived as the mechanisms of re-enactment or renewal of the original act of creation

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[1] Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 2.3.1.

[2] Maitri Upanisad 7.2.8.

[3] Eliade, Mircea, "Time and Eternity in Indian Thought", Man and Time, ed. Campbell, Joseph, New York: Pantheon Books, 1957, p. 178.

[4] Ibid., p. 173.

and are supposed to possess the virtue of annulling history with all its misdeeds and misfortunes. Such a symbolic annulment of the past or history of the profane time synchronizes with the return to sacred time of the beginning.

Similarly, Myth too, according to Eliade is a structure of transcendence of the profane time. Through narration of myth, profane time is symbolically abolished. Thus:

> mythical or sacred time is qualitatively different from profane time, from the continuous and irreversible time of our everyday, desacralized existence. In narrating a myth, we reactualize, as it were, the sacred time in which occurred the events of which we are speaking. In a word, myth is supposed to take place in an intemporal time,..... in a moment without duration, as certain mystics and philosophers conceive of eternity.[1]

The importance of the above perspective cannot be overemphasised. Of special merit in his treatment is the recognition of the soteriological significance of time symbolisms. However, we find his treatment deficient in one specific way. While he puts great emphasis on the role of myth and rituals in the process of sacralization, he ignores other elements which may equally be operative in this process.[2] Reflection or contemplation along with commitment can play equally significant role in the process. Just as the narration of a myth or ritual enactment of a sacred act enables the individual to transcend the realm of temporality so does contemplation or reflection enable the individual to realize eternity. The soteriological significance of reflection as an act of consciousness consists in its being the structure of both world involvement and world

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[1] Ibid.,

[2] Mol, Hans, Identity and the Sacred, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976, p. 15.

transcendence. Reflection is basically a temporal act. It is a function of consciousness which reflects upon itself as the structure of temporal becoming. But it is by the same act that the consciousness or the subject also comprehends eternity. Transcendence through contemplation or reflection, at least according to the generality of the Indian philosophical tradition, is the primary and authentic mode of transcendence. While the non-reflective avenues of transcendence are not denied, the contemplative approach is singled out as the true mode of realizing eternity in its limitless and accomplished character.[1]

The Problematic

The central issue for the present work is the possibility of interrogating temporality in terms of its givenness as an objective fact and its relationship to the cognizing consciousness. The term temporality is used to connote both the fact of change and finitude of phenomenal existence as well as its "subjective" experience. It is our assumption that neither of the two can be conceived in isolation from the other. Temporality is a feature of existence as a structure of world involvement. Thus articulated, the problem of temporality then turns out to be the problem of subjectivity as what is implied in the structure of world involvement. It may then be asked: is not temporality a feature of existence conceived in terms of the relation of subjectivity to time? What is the relationship of time to the cognizing subject? or,

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[1]Further implications of this perspective for consciousness and the temporal process will be worked out in detail at a later stage. See infra, p. 256.

How is time related to the subject? But then, is time anything other than the relation itself, or to be more precise, the structure of relation of the things to things and things to subject. This aspect of time as the structure of relatedness of things and beings of the empiric world, is an undeniable fact. Neither Sāṁkhya-Yogâ nor Abhidharma Buddhism would deny the empiric reality of time conceived as the structure of temporal relatedness.

The basic issue, however, still evades us. Granting that the empiric time is the structure of the relatedness of things and beings which are perceived as constantly changing and in a relationship of priority and posteriority, we still have to ask the question of the relation of this structure to the subject as world-involved. Denial of the substantive reality of time as transcendental principle in favour of a conception of structure of temporal relationship does not exonerate us from seeking the answer to the question of the relationship of this structure to the subject which is intricably enmeshed in the structure.

Now the question of the relationship of the subjectivity to temporal structure can be approached in a variety of ways: The structure itself may be conceived in terms of a receptum in which the subject is situated; or the structure may be conceived as a function of a synthetic activity of the subject which is transcendent to it and constitutes the structure; or finally, that the structure of temporality is identified with the structure of subjectivity. In other words the alternatives open to us are either that the subject is contained in the time, or that the time is in the subject, or that the subject is time, i.e.,

subjectivity is the temporal structure.[1] Both Sāṁkhya-Yogā and Abhidharmika Buddhism would contribute to the third alternative on grounds which will become obvious in the sequel during the course of the treatment of the subject. But the following may be said by way of a critique of the other alternatives. Any attempt to grasp the essence of temporality as a phenomenologically given fact in terms of these two alternatives would lead to some inexorable difficulties and implications for the subject as the structure of world involvement. The first alternative has to be excluded as a philosophically viable alternative perhaps for the very reason that the position makes a philosophical questioning of the problem of temporality impossible. A subject which is essentially in time and is encased in it cannot, by the nature of case, reflect upon the structure of which it is an element. A subject which is contained in time, must of necessity be contained in the moment of present; while time is the structure of the relationship in which stand things and beings in the relationship of priority and posteriority, the subject which is exhausted in this relationship in the moment of present cannot comprehend past and future. If it necessarily and totally is contained in the moment of present, then it cannot contemplate on temporality as exemplifying the relationship of priority and posteriority of past and future. Subject, then, must not be conceived as that which is contained in time; it is necessary

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[1]For a detailed treatment of the three philosophical alternatives, see Sallis, John, "Time, Subjectivity, and the Phenomenology of Perception", The Modern Schoolman, 48, 1971, pp. 347-357. The treatment of the subject in this section draws up the conceptual apparatus proposed in this paper.

for the subject not to be himself situated in it, in order to be able to be present in intention to the past as to the future".[1]

The other alternative looks at temporal structure as a function of synthetic activity of the a-temporal subject. This alternative suggests that temporality is a constitutive activity of the subject which somehow "unfolds or constitutes time."[2] Now, the difficulty inherent in this position must be clear. A subject which is the transcendent condition of temporal constitution must of necessity remain external to the temporal structure. Total externality of the subject is an ideal condition of the subject that the Sāmkhya-Yoga proposes. The subject as transcendence must be free from all the vicissitudes of the temporal structure. But the subject which is totally external to the temporal structure cannot be the constitutive subject. In other words the constituting subject and the subject which is the transcendent condition of all constitution and reflection must be placed in two different realms.

However, the two subjects cannot be totally separated and be independent if the possibility of the transcendence of temporality as a function of reflective activity is to be retained. If the problem of transcendence is to be explained, instead of being explained away by declaring the realm of temporality as illusory, there is only one option open, namely to admit a dialectical contact between the two realms. The point of that

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[1] Merleau Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, (trans.) Colin Smith, New York, 1962, p. 414.

[2] Ibid.

contact, both for Sāṁkhya-Yogā and Ābhidharmika Buddhism, as we shall show, is the structure of reflection as an act of consciousness. This subject as the structure of temporal constitution must also retain a dialectical contact with the realm of transcendence, which in the case of Sāṁkhya-Yogā is Puruṣa, and in Ābhidharmika-Buddhism is Nirvāna.

The problematic of the relationship of the subject and the temporal structure can only be resolved if and only if we can show that subject as the structure of world constitution must be identical with the structuring of temporality. This is the intermediary position, a philosophical alternative which seeks to avoid the two extremes of situating subject in time or placing subject totally transcendent to time. The two alternatives, in a sense exemplify the two approaches to time which may be described in conventional terms, that of realism and idealism respectively. The first position is prepared to grant temporal structure an independent reality of its own, with the capacity of complete subsumption of the subject. The second alternative makes temporal structure a mere synthetic act of consciousness, denying the objectivity of temporal becomingness any reality status. In either case, consciousness of temporality becomes a problematic: in the first case because time is transcendent to consciousness, and in the second case because consciousness is transcendent to time. The philosophical position that we argue for takes its point of departure, not merely from the failings of these two positions, but also from the more positive ground of the possibility of dialectical interplay between the two.

The intermediary position operates with the datum of the temporal process as the datum for a cognizing consciousness. In that sense, it

partakes the character both of realism and idealism. It seeks to retain the significant element of the first alternative which in effect situates the subject in the present. This situating of the world involved subject in the present is a necessary condition for the temporal experience that the subject will have. It seems to be in answer to specifically to the requirement underscored in the following statement:

> The subject must in a genuine sense be in the present. Time exists for me because I have a present. If I am able to have access to a past or a future, such access must be gained not by abandoning my present but rather from out of my present.[1]

However, this situating of the subject in the present must be combined with an insight into the possibility of the subject performing the synthetic activity in the present. Only then the present can become the meeting ground of past and future. Only then temporal structure can truly be grasped as the structure of the manifestation of the becomingness of being. If subject is unable to perform this synthetic activity in the present then the subject will remain encased in a block universe with no experience of change and becomingness. Thus the third alternative seeks to identify the structure of subjectivity with the structure of temporality.

This position is considered extremely significant from the point of view of the present study. It seeks to retain the autonomy of the subject as consciousness. Without this autonomy the possibility of reflection or contemplation as structure of world transcendence will have to be ruled out. On the other hand, temporal process itself is not

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[1]Sallis, John, op. cit., p. 351.

dismissed as a fictitous construction of consciousness. It is an objective fact. Reality of the 'moment' is an objective reality which cannot be reduced to mere projections of consciousness. However, the subject through its synthetic activity enters into an intricate relationship with the world of change and becomingness. In this act of relating the subject assumes the character of temporality. Since this relatedness is intrinsic to the structure of world participation the empiric subject is essentially and intrinsically temporal. At the same time, through this very character of relating to the object the subject also examplifies transcendence.

A Note on the Method

The problem of method in investigating a theme pertaining to Indian philosophy is a subject of considerable obscurity. Without being unduly dogmatic one can formulate the requirement in this context as under: the method of approach or investigation must be adequate to the nature of the content. In the classical writings of Indian Philosophy this question has received a very careful consideration. The metaphysical differences between the rival philosophical points of view are foreshadowed in the context of a discussion of the problem of methods and criteria. Without going into these issues, and in the present case our task being interpreting Indian Philosophical themes in contemporary setting, we may conceptualize the method that is adopted in the present study as the method of critical reconstruction.

In stating that the method is primarily critical we do not intend to emphasise polemics or set an undue premium on arguments and counter arguments. The latter could by themselves be themes for investigation as part of the study of the logical structure of statements and their refutations as understood by the Indian thinkers. But this is not our concern. Critical method is employed with a view to locate, isolate and situate a particular concept or body of concepts or ideas in the context of the basic ontological perspective of the systems under investigation. As part of this enterprise surely it will be attempted to delineate the major argument of each system in an expository way by situating it against the major objections and challenges to which they are susceptible. Attention will be paid both to the structure and the language of the arguments but always in terms of its basic ontological orientation vis-a-vis their ontological positions pitted against it. Critical reconstruction is conceived to involve the imaginative task of letting the system speak for itself by weighing other positions at variance with it.

A critical investigation surely does not have to be an expression of ones own philosophical preferences or biases. But it is not also bias free and completely objective. In the present case it is intended expressly to bring out the bias of the systems under investigation. Our exposition of the problem in specific context will be an attempt to indicate the basic ontological "bias" of the systems that are taken up for consideration in terms or by means of an analysis of the directly relevant texts. It is our hope that it is only in that way that we will let the meaning of each system's argument emerge on its own.

To that extent the method of approach may be described as descriptive and non-judgemental, a method which has come to be identified in recent times as phenomenological. Nor are we confining ourselves to any specific form of the development of this method. We employ this method in its most generalized form whereby critical reflection, by enabling specific meaning structures to disclose themselves in the light of their intentionality, also enters into a specific kind of relationship with them. It becomes more acutely aware of the meaning structures which it intends to grasp, and by the same token, it becomes part and parcel of that. We can thus call our critical reflection phenomenological if we keep in mind that the phenomenological method is:

> a method for changing our relation to the world, for becoming more acutely aware of it. But at the same time and by that very fact, it is already a certain attitude vis-a-vis the world, or more exactly a certain attitude vis-a-vis our relation to the world. Phenomenology combines the most radical break with out ordinary and natural attitudes vis-a-vis the world (in this sense it is an ascesis of the mind) with the deepening or the consecration of this original attitude (in this sense, it is respect for the real and engagement in the world). Consciousness takes its distance with regard to things: it gives itself complete freedom in respect to them, but one realizes at once that this is in order to be more faithful to our essential insertion in the world..... The phenomenological method thus permits pushing on simultaneously and with one movement towards the roots of subjectivity and the foundation of the objective world. [1]

What is attempted in the following sections may be described as examplifying a phenomenological approach in a more limited sense of as reflection on the meaning structures with the express object of becoming more acutely aware of them.

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[1] Thevenaz, Pierre, What Is Phenomenology, (trans.) Courtney, Brockelman and J. Edie, Chicago: Quadrangle, 1962, p. 91.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL AND TEXTUAL SETTING OF SĀṂKHYA-YOGA

Pre-Classical Sāṃkhya-Yoga

The historical question is not the primary concern of this study. A precise historical investigation of the chronological relationship between the different stages of development of Sāṃkhya-Yoga thought, in itself one of the most intriguing chapters in the history of Indian thought, is beyond the scope of this study. However, drawing heavily upon the findings of previous researchers in this field we will try to present a systematic and hopefully coherent picture of the doctrinal development of the system under investigation. The object of the study is to identify, and delimit the area of Sāṃkhya-Yoga so that a proper perspective is gained for investigating the meaning of temporality within Sāṃkhya-Yoga.

There have been several sincere and partly fruitful attempts to trace Sāṃkhya to the earliest traditions of Indian philosophical speculations. True, any systematic exposition of Sāṃkhya system is not to be found in the earlier texts of Vedas, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads. But certain ideas and doctrines of these older philosophical literature might have

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[1] Larson, G. J., Classical Sāṃkhya, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969; Rao, K. B. Ramakrishnan, Theism of Pre-Classical Sāṃkhya, Mysore: University of Mysore, 1966; Sengupta, Anima, The Evolution of the Sāṃkhya School of Thought, Lucknow: Pioneer Press Ltd., 1959; Frauwallener, E. Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie, Salzburg: Otto Muller, 1953; Johnston, E. H., Early Sāṃkhya, London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1937; Dasgupta, S.M., A History of Indian Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922, Vol. I; Keith A. B., The Sāṃkhya System, Calcutta: Association Press, 1918; Van Buitenen, J. A. B., "Studies in Samkhya", Journal of the American Oriental Society, 77, 1957, pp. 15-25,88-107.

been appropriated and transmuted in the later Sāṃkhya philosophical tradition. Within Upaniṣadic tradition, earliest reference to Sāṃkhya-Yoga concepts may be traced to Kaṭha Upaniṣad.[1] However, the ideas and thought, which may specifically be called to belong to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition, are reflected in rather more discernible way in the Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad.[2] A more elaborate and distinctly Sāṃkhyan tradition with theistic tinge appears in the Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā[3] and the Caraka Saṃhitā.[4] The most discernible presence of a pre-classical sāṃkhya tradition is to be noted in the Mokṣadharma and the Bhagavadgītā which form parts of the great epic, Mahābhārata.[5] Both the texts have been recognized by scholars as providing a basis for an understanding of the earlier phases of the development of the Sāṃkhya thought. Though the later classical Sāṃkhya tradition can be differentiated from the tradition of the epic in significant ways, their close affinity cannot be minimized. It is here for the first time in the history of Indian thought, that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga concepts and ideas figure singificantly and abundantly and one may even suggest that these constituted the

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[1]Johnston, op. cit., pp. 81-82; also Keith, op. cit., pp. 5-19.

[2]Ibid.; also, see Rao, op. cit., pp. 297-339; and Johnston, E. H., "Some Sāṃkhya and Yoga Conceptions in the Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad", Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, 1930, pp. 855-878.

[3]See Dasgupta, op. cit., pp. 220 ff.; Sengupta, op. cit., pp. 103-110.

[4]Dasgupta, op. cit., pp. 213 ff.; Rao, op. cit., pp. 403-416; Sengupta, op. cit., pp. 112-119.

[5]Sengupta, op. cit., pp. 70-88; Rao, op. cit., pp. 139-197; Keith, op. cit., pp. 29-53; and Johnston, Early Sāṃkhya, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

immediate contexts for the formulation of classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga.

We have tried to spell out in briefest possible way, the pre-classical Sāṁkhya context of the later development. However, the classical Sāṁkhya tradition considers itself as growing out of the tradition of Ṣaṣṭitantra,[1] a text lost to the tradition long ago. The Sāṁkhya kārikā claims that it represents the ideas of the Ṣaṣṭitantra[2] and the Ahirbudhnya[3] saṁhitā gives an account of Sāṁkhya based on the Ṣaṣṭitantra. The Ahirbudhnya samhita and the Yuktidīpikā[4] assign the authorship to Kapila, the mythical sage, who is supposed to be the earliest teacher of the sāṁkhya school of thought. According to Jayamaṅgalā[5] Pañcaśikha was the author of this work. Vācaspatimiśra,[6] on the other hand, suggests that it is the work of Varsaganya. Just as the tradition is divided on the question of the authorship of the text, it also offers varying versions of the content. Nothing definite can be said about the text on the basis of available evidences, except that probably Ṣaṣṭitantra was an old Sāṁkhya-Yoga text which dealt with basic Sāṅkhya-Yoga thought and divided them under sixty categories or sub-headings.

For the purpose of this study, it is crucial to make a distinction

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[1]For place of Ṣaṣṭitantra within Sāṁkhya Tradition, see Dasgupta, S. N., op. cit., pp. 220-222; Keith, op. cit., pp. 59-65; Hiriyana, M., "The Ṣaṣṭitantra and Vārsaganya", Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, 3, 1929, pp. 107-112;V.M. Bedekar, "The Development of the Sāṁkhya and the Problem of the Ṣaṣṭitantra", Journal of the University of Poona, 11, 1959, pp. 37-49.

[2]The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, Kārikā 72.

[3]See Keith, op. cit., p. 74.

[4]See infra, pp. 28-29.

[5]See infra, p. 30.

[6]See infra, pp. 29-30.

between the Classical and pre-Classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga.[1] The line of demarcation consists of the systematic exposition of the Classical Sāṁkhya thought in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and of Classical Yoga in the Yoga Sūtra of Patanjali. The treatment of Sāṁkhya-Yoga in the literature pre-dating Sāṁkhya Kārikā and Yoga Sūtra is excluded from our purview.[2] On the other hand, later commentorial literature (Bhāṣyas and vyākhyās) on Sāṁkhya Kārikā and Yoga Sūtra are considered as representing a continuous tradition

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[1]In this work we have followed the classification laid down by Mircea Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. There have been other attempts at classification; S. N. Dasgupta makes a threefold classification of Samkhya: 1. the first stgte is a theistic one, details of which are lost, but is preserved in a modified form by the Patanjali School of Sāṁkhya (Yoga); 2. the atheistic Sāṁkhya as represented by Pañcaśikhā; and 3. finally the atheistic modification of Sāṁkhya in the orthodox Sāṁkhya System (see Dasgupta, S. N., A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951). S. Radhakrishnan tends to disagree with Dasgupta and maintains that both Asuri and Pañcasikhā adhere to a theistic Sāmkhya and believe in the supremacy of Brahman. According to Radhakrishnan there are important differences between Pañcaśikha and Sāṁkhya (see Radhakrishnan, S., The Indian Philosophy, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927, p. 252). In a recent study, J. G. Larson makes a fourfold classification: 1. the earliest speculations as contained in the speculative Vedic hymns and oldest prose Upaniṣads; 2. proto-Sāmkhya speculations, including the middle Upanisads, Caraka Samhitā, Buddha Carita, the Bhagavadgītā, Moksadharma and Mahabhārata; 3. Classical Sāmkhya consisting of Sāmkhya Kārikā, the Yoga Sūtra and the related commentaries; 4. and finally later Sāmkhya thought present in Samkhyapravacan Sūtra and the commentaries of Aniruddha, Mahādeva and Vijñanabhikṣu together with the Tattvasamāsasūtra. Larson, J. G., Classical Samkhya, Delhi: Motilal Bnarasidas, 1969.

[2]For a comprehensive study of pre-Classical Sāṁkhya see Johnston, E. H., Early Sāṁkhya, London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1937; Sen Gupta, Anima, The Evolution of The Sāṁkhya: A School of Thought, Lucknow: Pioneer Press Ltd., 1959; Ramakrishna Rao, K. B., Theism of Pre-Classical Sāṁkhya, Mysore: University of Mysore, 1966. Also see relevant portions of Dasgupta, S. N., op. cit.; Larson, J. G., op.cit.; and Keith, A. B., The Sāṁkhya System, Calcutta, Association Press, 1918.

of the Classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought. As integral to this classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition are considered other later texts and treatises following the first formulation of the basic tenets of the school of thought in the two primary texts mentioned, the justification being that they maintain allegiance to the basic ontological perspectives of the classical tradition.

The Sāṁkhya Kārikā and Commentaries

The Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa[1] is the earliest extent systematic formulation of the Saṁkhya thought. The Kārikā itself, however, does not claim to be the original work of the school. The text concludes by stating that the subject matter of the Kārikā is actually a concise statement of the thought of the Ṣaṣṭitantra.[2] The Kārikā does not provide much information on the identity of the author except that he belonged to the tradition of the Sāṁkhya expounded by Kapila and continued by Asuri and Pañcaśikha.[3] According to a Chinese tradition, Īśvarakṛṣṇa is supposed to have belonged to a brahmin family of Kauṣika.[4] Following the Chinese

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[1]All the references to the text are from the Sāṁkhya Kārika of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Gauḍpādbhāṣya, (ed. & trans.) Mainkar, T. G., Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1972. There are several excellent translations of this text.

[2]There is controversy among scholars on this Karika. The tradition itself is divided on the authenticity of this Karika. According to Suvarnasaptati, a commentary of Sāṁkhya Kārikā (see infra p. 30) the karika is an interpolation by some intelligent person (iha medhāvi Kascidāha aryam Yukti Dīpikā (see infra p. 28) too introduces the kārikā with 'āha ca' implying that the kārikā in question has been uttered by someone else, But all other commentators have accepted the kārikā to be the part of the original text.

[3]Sāṁkhya Kārikā, 71.

[4]Takakusu, M. J., "A Study of Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu", Journal of Royal Asiatic Society (London), 1905, p. 48.

tradition, based on Paramārtha-the Buddhist monk who translated the Kārikā in Chinese and also wrote a commentary on it during the 6th century A.D., Takakusu tends to identify Īśvarkṛṣana with Vindhyāvāsī.[1] Both A. B. Keith and Richard Garbe also identify the author of the Kārikā with Vindhyāvāsī.[2] Though a little cautious in his approach to the problem of the authorship of the Kārikā, Radhakrishnan too does not seem to disagree with this identification.[3] However, their contentions do not seem sustainable by the evidence from the Indian tradition. Guṇaratna in his Tarkabhāṣya considers Vindhyāvāsī and Īśvarakṛṣna as two different persons.[4] The author of the Yuktidīpikā too mentions Īśvarakṛṣna and Vindhyāvāsī as two different Sāṁkhya teachers.[5] Svapneśvara suggests that Īśvarakṛṣna was none other than the great poet Kālidāsa.[6] This contention of Svapneśvara also finds support in Ghanaśyāma who says that the name of the author of Raghuvaṁsa, Śākuntala, and Kumārasambhava was Īśvarkṛṣṇa Bhartṛmidha.[7] Kumārila points out that the Sāṁkhya teacher named Vindhyāvāsī did not accept the notion of

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[1]Ibid., pp. 47-51.

[2]Keith, op. cit., pp. 68-69; Garbe, Richard, Die Samkhya Philosophie, Leipzig: H. Haessel, 1917, pp. 77-83.

[3]Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., pp. 254-255.

[4]Guṇaratna in Tarkarahsyadīpikā, pp. 102, 104 (vide Ibid., p. 254, n. 8)

[5]Yuktidīpikā, (ed) Pandey, R. C., Delhi Motilal Bnarasidass, 1967, pp. 3 and 91.

[6]Īśvarakṛṣṇanāma Kālidāsena Kṛtah kārikāḥ, vide Radhakrishnan, op. cit., n. 1, p. 255.

[7]Ghanasyāma's commentary on Bhavabhuti's Uttararāmacarita, vide Mainkar, op. cit., p. 30.

subtle body, a concept so clearly mentioned in Sāmkhya Kārikā.[1] All these evidences from the Indian sources seem to run counter to the thesis of identification of Iśvarkṛṣṇa with Vindhyāvāsā. We do not, however, consider these evidences from the traditional Indian sources conclusive and incontrovertible. A final word on this matter will have to await further researches. Until a more thorough investigation of comparative nature of the writings of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Vindhyavāsi and Kālidāsa is undertaken we will have to remain in dark about the identity of the author of the Kārikā.

These conflicting claims about the identity of the author of the Sāmkhya Kārikā, however, does not disprove the antiquity of the work. It obviously belongs to a period prior to the 6th century when Paramārtha translated and wrote commentary on the Kārikā in Chinese. At the present stage of historical research any statement beyond that will be conjectural. But, while no positive statement can be made about the exact date of the Kārikā, the ideas as present in the Karikā seem to have been well known and assimilated by the scholars of that period. One can legitimately hypothesize that the ideas of the Classical Sāmkhya were already systematized and well articulated by the third century A.D.[2] Moreover, if we take the suggestions of

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[1]Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., p. 225.

[2]See Keith, op. cit., p. 69. He is of the opinion that the Karika belongs to the 4th century A.D. This, of course, is based on the assumption that Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Vindhyavāsi were identical persons and that Vasubandhu is supposed to have written a refutation of the Kārikā authored by Vindhyavasi. Radhakrishnan places the Kārikā in the third century A.D. He maintains that Iśvarkrṣna definitely preceded Vasubandhu , and date of Vasubandhu is now assigned by scholars to the 4th century A.D. Das Gupta also believes that the Kārikā was composed somewhere about 200 A.D. Suggestions of Belvalkar and others that the Kārikā belongs to an earlier period does not seem to carry much weight.

Keith and Dasgupta seriously then probably the date of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā should be placed between 200-300 A.D. Both of them are of the opinion that the Sāṁkhya Kārikā preceded the composition of the Yoga Sūtra which evidently presupposes the Sāṁkhya metaphysics as articulated in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā itself.[1] Even on the strength of the Chinese tradition it is reasonable to assume that Iśvakṛṣna was a senior contemporary of Vasubandhu and Vindhyāvāsi Date of Vasubandhu is now almost certaintly placed by the scholars in the 4th century A.D.[2] The Sāṁkhya Kārikā then cannot be a later text. Even though one cannot be very dogmatic on this point, but considering the significant similarities between the views of early Sarvāstivādin about the nature and structure of temporal determinations as recorded by Vasubandhu and the classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga, one is tempted to suggest that the early Sarvāstivādins like Dharmatrātā, Ghoṣaka, Buddhadeva and and Vasumitra had before them the Sāṁkhya-Yoga paradigm. Vasubandhu himself had indeed yielded to such a suggestion on the extreme congruity between their views and that of Sāṁkhya-Yoga.[3] If one accepts this argument then the date of the Classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga will have to be placed during the 2nd century A.D.

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[1]Both Keith and Dasgupta maintain that the composition of the Yoga Sūtra seems to have followed the crystalization of classical Samkhya thought as found in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā. The assumption seems to be well founded in as much the general ontological presuppositions of the Kārikā are clearly discernible in the Yoga Sūtra. See Keith, op. cit., pp. 54-59; also Dasgupta, op. cit., pp. 228-229.

[2]Fräuwallner, E., "On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu", Serie Orientale Roma, 3, 1951; Takakusu, J., "The Date of Vasubandhu, the Great Buddhist Philosopher", Indian Studies in Honour of Charles Rockwell Lanman, Harvard University, 1929, pp. 79-88; and Peri, N., "A Propos de la dak de Vasubandhu", Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme, Orient, Paris, 11, 1911, pp. 339-390.

[3]Abhidharmkośam, (ed.) Shastri, D., Varanasi: Bauddhabhāvati, 1972, p. 807.

Through all these confusions about the identity and the date of the author one fact remains unquestionable: the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* has continued as the principal work of the Sāṁkhya school of thought in known history. Several commentaries were written on it at different times. These commentaries, despite certain differences in their outlook and at times varying theological allegiances, have remained by and large true to the basic ontological perspective of the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*.

Gauḍapāda's Sāṁkhya Kārikā Bhāṣya[1] is the most important and probably the earliest commentary on the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*. For our own purposes we take his discussion of the role of *antaḥkaraṇas* in the appropriation of temporal determinations as providing an important link with the later explicit rejection of the transcendental reality of one, unitary and single Time. His elaboration of the Īśvarakṛṣṇa's distinction between the mode of functioning of the internal and external organs in terms of their relationship to temporal conditioning, merits special attention.

Regarding the identity of the author one need not take seriously the suggestion that he and the well-known Vedāntin Gauḍapāda were one and the same person.[3] Though there have been some attempts to find a connection

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[1]There are several editions of this text. All the references are to the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Gauḍpāda's Bhāṣya*, (ed. and trans.) Mainkar, T. G., Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1964.

[2]*Ibid*., p. 136-138.

[3]Radhakrishnan, *op. cit*., p. 255; Eliade, *op. cit*., p. 370; Keith, *op. cit*., p. 69; Ray, Amarnath, "The Māṇḍūkhya Upaniṣad and the Kārikas of Gauḍapāda", *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XIV, 1938, pp. 564-569; Krishnamurti, B. N. S., "New Light on the Gauḍapāda Kārikās", *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, Poona, Vol. II, 1931, pp. 35-56.

between this Gaudapāda and the Gaudapāda who wrote a Kārikā on Māndukyopanisad, it is well established that the two were different individuals. The latter shows definite Vedāntic leanings, while the former remains loyal to the classical Sāṁkhya position. The date of this work can easily be placed in the 8th century since Vācaspati Miśra shows acquaintance with this work in his Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudi which belongs to the 9th century.[1]

The Yuktidīpikā (authorship undecided)[2] is an extremely important work with special ramifications for this study. The commentator here has taken a specific stand on the problem of the nature and status of time and temporal relations. The text takes a decisive stand against Vaiśeṣikas by rejecting the theory assigning an independent ontological status to time as a transcendental principle. The authorship of the text remains clouded by vague claims from different editors of the text. P. B. Chakravarti thinks that it might have been written in response to Vasubandhu's Paramārthasaptaśati.[3] R. C. Pandey assigns the authorship to one Rājā (Bhojarāja) and identifies the work as the lost commentary called Rājavārtika mentioned and quoted by Vacaspati Miśra.[4] Both Chakrvarti and Pandey are inclined to accept that Yuktidīpikā predates Vacaspati Miśra's Tattvakaumudī and Gaudapada's Samkhya Kārikā Bhāṣya. We do not have any positive evidence either to support or

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[1]Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 255.

[2]Yuktidīpikā, (ed.) Pandey, R. C., Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1967; Also see Yuktidīpikā, (ed.) Chakrvarti, Pulinbehari, Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House, 1938. There are some differences in readings in the two editions.

[3]Chakrvarti, Pulinbehari, Origin and Development of Sāṁkhya System of Thought, Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House, 1951, pp. 160-162.

[4]Pandey, R. C., op. cit., p. xv.

contradict these contentions. Value of the work cannot be over-emphasized specially as a source of informations on different schools and teachers of Sāṁkhya system as well on certain intricate points of debate between Sāṁkhya and Buddhist philosophies.[1]

The Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī by Vacaspati Miśra[2] is a work of special significance for the present study. The author of the text takes specific stand against the Nyāya-Vaisesika's postulation of the reality of a single, undivided and unitary time as the transcendental reality independent of the act of cognition and experience. Against the Vaisesikas the text suggests that the temporal differentiation can be accounted for by reference to activities and events themselves. The category of Time is an unwanted reification to explain temporal determinations.[3] Modern scholarship is generally unanimous in holding Vacaspati Miśra to be the author of this text.[4] He is supposed to be the disciple of Mārtandatilaka Swāmin. A well-known treatise on Sāmkhya philosophy Tattvakaumudī itself has been subject of several commentaries on it.[5] The date of the text is fixed beyond doubt to be the 9th century A.D. on the testimony of the author himself.

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[1]Ibid., pp. 68, 73, 132.

[2]The Tattva-Kaumudī, (ed. and trans.) Jha, Ganganath, Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1965.

[3]Ibid., pp. 112.

[4]Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 255; Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 212; and Keith, op. cit., p. 70.

[5]For different commentaries on Tattva-Kaumudī see Mainkar, T. G., op. cit., pp. 6-7.

There is another minor commentary on the Sāṁkhya Kārikā called the Jayamangalā.[1] This is supposed to have been written by Śaṁkara. This Śaṁkara is not to be confused with the great Vedāntic thinker, Śaṁkarācharya. The commentary in certain respects follows the Yuktidīpikā reading of the Kārikā and differs from both Gauḍapāda and Vacaspati Miśra on certain points.[2] It is one of the minor commentaries of lesser doctrinal and philosophical value.[3]

The Suvarṇasaptati[4] is a commentary on Sāṁkhya-Kārikā. It is not available in original Sanskrit. It has been recently restored to Sanskrit from its Chinese translation by Professor N. Aiyaswami Sastri. Belvalkar suggests that Suvarnasaptati is the same as the Māṭharvṛtti.[5] Professor Sastri on the other hand is inclined to give it an independent status.[6] But R. C. Pandey finds some striking similarity between the Suvarṇaspatatī and Māṭharvṛtti and agrees with Belvelakar in holding that the two texts are identical.[7] One important point to be noted in this commentary

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[1]Jayamaṅgalā, (ed.) Sharma, H., Delhi: Betab Printing Works, 1926.

[2]Pandey, R. C., op. cit., p. xvi.

[3]Eliade, op. cit., p. 369.

[4]Infra, note 6.

[5]Belvalkar, S. K. The Mātharavṛtti and the Date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, in Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1917, pp. 171-184.

[6]The Suvarnasaptati, (ed.) Sastri, N. Aiyasvami, Tirupati: Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Series, 1944.

[7]Pandey, op. cit., p. xvii.

is the absence of the karika 63 (rūpaih Saptabhireva tu etc.) from the text.[1] It also suggests that the karika 72, which says that the Sāṁkhya Kārikā presents the basic doctrine of the Sastitantra, is interpolated by some intelligent person (iha medhāvi kaścidāha).

Mātharavrtti[2] is yet another original commentary on Sāṁkhya Kārikā on which scholars have made contradictory claims about the authorship of the work. According to Belvalkar this is probably the original sanskrit text of which the Paramārtha's commentary in Chinese is only a translation.[3] It has been suggested that Gauḍapāda's bhāṣya is an abridgement of this text. But Radhakrishnan differs from this contention. He points out that Mathra's is a vrtti which traditionally is preceded by a Bhāṣya.[4] Moreover, it is important to note that Gauḍapādabhāṣya does not comment on the last three kārikas whereas Māṭharavṛtti does. It is conceivable that the Māṭharavṛtti is a later work.

The Sāṁkhya Sūtra and Commentaries

Sāṁkhya Sūtra by Kapila:[5] Besides Sāṁkhya Kārikā and commentaries on it enumerated above the Sāṁkhya Sūtra or the Sāṁkhya Pravacana Sūtra and

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[1] N. Aiyaswami Sastri maintains that the Kārikā 63 is not genuine since it has not been translated by Paramārtha. See Sastri, N. Aiyaswami, op. cit., p. xliii.

[2] Māṭharavṛtti, (ed.) Sharma, V. P., Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1922.

[3] Balvalkar, S. K., op. cit., p. 171-184.

[4] Māṭharavṛtti is a work of Sāṁkhya philosophy of which Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya is reported to be an abridgement. But as a rule, vṛttis come later than the bhāṣyas, and that the Māṭharavṛtti comments on the last three verses of the S.K., makes for its later date." Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 255, n. 2.

[5] Sāṁkhya Aphorism of Kapila, (ed. & trans.) Ballantyne, J. R., Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series edition, 1963.

commentaries on it are our chief sources of important philosophical issues that concern the Sāṁkhya school of thought. Tradition attributes the authorship of Sūtra to Kapila which for reasons to be seen presently need not be taken seriously. Nor do we think that the claim of Svapneśvara is well grounded when he assigns the Sāṁkhya Pravacana Sūtra to Pañcaśikha and traces its attribution to Kapila to the fact that the latter initiated the tradition.[1] The authorship of the Sāṁkhya Sūtra remains a mystery and subject to educated guess only. The text has generally been assigned to 14th century A.D. Various considerations have weighed in dating the text during this period. Guṇaratna, writing in 14th century, does not refer to the Sāṁkhya Sūtra although he takes into consideration most of the existing Sāṁkhya literature.[2] Vācaspati Miśra does not show any acquaintance with the Sūtra literature. Alberuni, who did most of his work in India during the second half of 11th century, shows familiarity with works of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Gauḍapāda but is totally unaware of Sāṁkhya Sūtra. Madhava in his Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha does not make any reference to Sāṁkhya Sūtra and bases his account of Sāṁkhya thought exclusively on the Sāṁkhya Kārikā.[3] Equally important is the fact that no bhāṣya (commentary) on the Sūtra appears before 16th century. Moreover the text shows unmistakable familiarity with most of the existing philosophical systems against which it also takes stand. This goes to show its lateness.

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[1]Svapneśvara in Kaumudiprabhā, vide Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 255, n. 3.

[2]Vide Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 222, and Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 255, n. 4.

[3]Keith, op. cit., p. 90-91; also Radhakrishnan, op. cit., pp. 255-256.

The work itself contains six chapters. The first three chapters are essentially expositary and are concerned with articulating basic Sāṁkhyan position. The fourth chapter contains some illustrative stories and parables, fifth chapter is basically polemical directed towards other schools of thought; and sixth chapter offers a summary of the basic position. On the basis of this structure of the text Dasgupta tends to suggest that the text may be based on a late edition of the Ṣaṣṭitantraśāstra mentioned in the last but one verse of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā. Dasgupta writes:

> It is said at the end of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa that the kārikās give an exposition of the Sāṁkhya doctrine excluding the refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the parables attached to the original Sāṁkhya works - the Ṣaṣṭitantraśāstra. The Sāṁkhya Sūtras contain refutations of other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable that these were collected from some earlier Sāṁkhya work which is now lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition of the Ṣaṣṭitantra.....[1]

The lateness of the text, however, does not minimise its value as an important sourcebook of the basic Sāṁkhya position. It is true that this text does show some leanings towards Upaniṣadic thought, but in essential it has preserved the classical Sāṁkhya ontological perspective. Even the glimpses of Upaniṣadic monism in Sāṁkhya Sūtra are only minimal and marginal and emmanates from its concern to relate itself to earlier Brāhmnical scriptures. But still it does not accept the scriptural injunction uncritically and unequivocally. It is only in the commentarial literature on the Sūtra that these concerns are more conspicuously present. There too the commentators on the Sūtra face the uphill task of reconciling the

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[1] Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 222.

distinctly atheistic position of Sāmkhya with the theistic Vedānta. As Dasgupta points out about Vijñānabhikṣu, who wrote his commentary on the Sūtra, that he "could not avoid the distinctly atheistic arguments of the Sāmkhya Sūtras, but he remarked that these were used only with a view to showing that the Sāmkhya system gave such a rational explanation that even without the intervention of Iśvara it could explain all facts."[1] We will have more to say on Vijñānabhikṣu when dealing with his Sāmkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya.

It is true that the cosmological interests of the pre-classical Sāmkhya find themselves reiterated in the Sūtra literature. But despite these concerns with the doctrine of the periodic creation and destruction of the universe the Sūtra does not look at the Sarga doctrine in cosmological terms alone as it has been suggested by some scholars who have based their arguments solely on the authority of Vijñānabhikṣu's commentary on the Sūtra.[2] We will be adverting to this topic later on.

In the Sāmkhya Sūtra itself we can distinguish two distinct tendencies: a concern with the cosmological evolution and involution and a truthful allegiance to Sāmkhya Kārikā's conception of Buddhisarga as non-cosmological understanding of man's world. Here again commentarial literature display significant differences. On many issues the two major commentators, Vijñānabhikṣu and Aniruddha, give quite different interpretations; and one is left in confusion as to whose words are to be taken to

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[1] Ibid., p. 223.

[2] Keith is a case in point. His entire account of Sūtra literature is primarily based on Vijñānabhikṣu. See Keith, op. cit., p. 92 ff.

represent the classical Sāmkhya tradition. The only plausible norm by which to resolve the issue is by the extent of its compatibility or congruity with the Sāṁkhya ontology as developed in the Kārikā. Using this criterion one can hope to see whether the commentator on the Sūtra is expounding a classical Sāṁkhya position or whether he is succumbing to the temptation of providing a rationalization for some other metaphysical or theological tradition to which he may be predisposed. For the purposes of this study, we have considered Sūtra literature as constituting a continuum with the classical Sāṁkhya of the Samkhya Kārika. This is not to suggest that there are no important differences between the Sāṁkhya Kārikā and the Sāṁkhya Sūtra. We have already made allusions to some of the points of disagreements. However, the degree of agreement on the issues of fundamental importance weigh heavily against the points of divergences. Accordingly, in our evaluation of the philosophical and doctrinal value of the Sūtra literature we, therefore, tend to agree with Dasgupta when he observes: "there is no reason to suppose that the Sāṁkhya doctrine found in the Sūtra differs in any important way from the Sāṁkhya doctrine as found in the Sāmkhya Karika.[1] It is equally reassuring to note that Keith too, despite his reservations about the claim of the Sutra being a pure exposition of Sāṁkhya concedes that "the Sutra is a source of considerable importance and may contain a good deal of old matter."[2]

Coming to the commentatorial literature on the Sāṁkhya Sutra we have

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[1]Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 223.

[2]Keith, op. cit., p. 92.

information about at least four commentaries on the Sāṁkhya Sūtra:

1. Aniruddha's Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti belonging to the fifteenth century;
2. The Sāṁkhya Vṛtti Sāra of Mahadeva Saraswati also known as Vendānti Mahādeva of 1600 A.D. This is primarily an abridgement of Aniruddha's work and contains some original remarks by the author;
3. The Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya written by Vijñānabhikṣu sometime during the 16th century A.D.;
4. Laghusāṁkyasūtrvṛtti by Nagesa Bhatta Upadhhyaya. This is an abstract of Vijñānabhikṣu's work and is not of much philosophical value.

Aniruddha's[1] commentary along with Vijñānabhikṣu's Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhasya[2] are the two most important works on Sāṁkhya Sūtra that we have taken into consideration in the present study. Vijñanabhikṣu, as it is well known, inclines with deliberation in his understanding of the doctrine toward a theistic Sāṁkhya or Yoga. In the words of Radhakrishnan he tends to "minimize the distinction between the Sāṁkhya and the theistic Vedānta, which he regards as the genuine Vedānta, while the Advaita Vedānta is its modern falsification".[3] The theistic leaning of Vijñānabhikṣu accounts for some important differences between his interpretation of Sūtra and that of Aniruddha's.

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[1] The Sāṁkhya Sūtra Vṛtti, (ed. and trans.) Garbe, Richard, Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1888.

[2] The Sāṁkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya, (ed.) Garbe, Richard, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943.

[3] Radhakrisnan, op. cit., p. 256.

It may be instructive to refer to one significant example of the differences between their approach to the Sūtra. Sūtra 3.10 reads: "there is distinction of individuals, through the diversity of dessert (Vyaktibhedah karmviśeṣāt)."[1] Commenting on this Sutra from Vedanta position Vijñānabhiṣku observes: "Although, at the beginning of the creation, there was but one Subtile Body in the shape of that investment Hiranyagarbha, still subsequently, moreover, there becomes a division of it into individuals, a plurality, partitively in the shpe of individuals....."[2] Thus Vijñānabhikṣu finds in Sutra an occasion to legitimate his own Vedāntic leanings and his hope to reconcile the Sāmkhya-Yoga with the scriptural utterances. Annirudha, however, does not find the Sūtra problematic at all;[3] and he contents himself with simply reading in Sūtra what is in conformity with the classical sāṁkhya position - that the differences among the individuals may be accounted for by the differences in the karma (actions) of each individual.

The point at issue is that in approaching the Sūtra literature one has to exercise a certain amount of discretion and has to be extra cautious in interpreting them. It is for these reasons that in the present study we have subjected the commentatorial literature on the Sutra to a more **rigorious** analysis and have refused to accept the statements of the

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[1]Sāṁkhya Aphorism of Kapila, op. cit., p. 231.

[2]Sāṁkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya, op. cit., p. 90; "yady api sargādau Hiraṇyagarbha- pādhi-rupam ekam eve liṅgam, tathā 'pi tasya paścād vyaktibhedo vyakti-rūpeṇā 'naśto nānātvam bhavati....."

[3]Sāṁkhya Sūtra Vṛttih, op. cit., p. 112.

commentators simply at their face value. In each case, the operating criterion had been the reconcilibility of the statement to the classical Samkhya ontological perspective as presented in Sāmkhya Kārikā.

The Yoga Sūtra and Related Literature

Coming to the Yoga literature we find ourselves, luckily, in a less controversial region. Both the tradition and the modern scholarship is unanimous in regarding Patanjali to be the author of the Yoga Sūtra.[1] While the text is the earliest attempt to systematize the principle of Yoga, it would, be wrong to assume that Patanjali was the initiator of this school of thought. Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu, who have extensively commented on the Vyāsabhāṣya on Yoga Sūtra, are in agreement in considering Patanjali to be the codifier of the Yoga Sūtra. According to Dasgupta, an analysis of the sūtras also brings the conviction that the sūtras do not show any original attempt, but a masterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented by fitting contributions. "The systematic manner also, in which the first three chapters are written by way of definition and clarification, shows that the materials were already in existence and that Patanjali only systematized them".[2] It is important to note that Patanjali himself describes his work as "Anuśāsana" implying that his work is not the earliest or the first formulation of the system.[3] The text itself is divided into four sections or parts. The first

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[1] Pātanjala Yogadarśanam, Tattvavaiśāradisamvalit-Vyāsabhāṣyasametam, (ed.) Bhattacharyah, Ramasamkara, Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakasana, 1963. All references are from this edition.

[2] Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 229.

[3] Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 341.

three sections are purely expository in nature, describing the doctrine of the Yoga system with little polemical material. First section deals with the nature and goal of concentration or contemplation (Samādhi); the second part discusses the ways of attaining this goal (sādhanā); and the third section describes the supernatural powers (vibhūti) that the incumbent or the practitioner of Yoga may achieve. The fourth section deals with the nature of liberation (kaivalya). It is here that we find the polemical strands, an attempt to deal with other systems of Indian thought on the terms of Yoga's own metaphysical position.

It is interesting to note that the word "iti', implying the end of the work occurs at two places in the text; first at the end of the third section and secondly at the end of the fourth section. On the basis of this and the fact that most of the criticisms of other schools of thought take place in the fourth section, Dasgupta suggests that the fourth section on liberation is a later addition, and does not constitute an integral part of the text. According to Dasgupta, "the most legitimate hypothesis seems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a hand other than that of Patanjali....."[1]

Be as it may, we do not find any reason to dismiss the significance of this section for the excellent reason that we find the general slant of Sāṃkhya-Yoga ontology is strictly maintained. Moreover, the discussion relating to the problem of time in this section is in continuity with the position spelled out earlier. Sūtra 4.12 and 4.13 is in thematic continuity with the sūtra 3.13; and sūtra 4.33 is a re-affirmation of the sūtra 3.52.

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[1]Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 230.

The possibility of it's being a supplementary to the original work by the same author cannot be ruled out unless a very precise analysis of the style and the content proves to the contrary.

Date of the work as well as the identity of the author has been the centre of great controversy especially in view of the celebrated author of the grammatical work in Mahābhāṣya of Pāṇini Sūtra being also known by the same name. Woods is of the opinion that the two are not the same. He convincingly shows that there is no evidence to show any significant congruity between the language or the doctrinal position of the two Patanjalis.[1] Keith too has expressed his reservations about the possibility of the two Patanjali's being identical persons.[2] Radhakrishnan agreeing with Woods maintains that there is no incontrovertible evidence to prove the identity of the grammarian Patanjali with the author of the Yoga Sūtra.[3] Dasgupta, however, is inclined to admit the possibility that the two Patanjalis were the same person. Thus he writes: "I have not been able to discover anything .... which can warrant us in holding that the two Patanjali's cannot be identified".[4]

The following finding made in the course of our study could have some significant bearing on this issue. On the issue of the identity of two Patanjali's the present author would like to present an important

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[1]Woods, J. H., The Yoga System of Patanjali, Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1966, pp. xv-xvii.

[2]Keith, op. cit., p. 57.

[3]Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 341, n. 4.

[4]Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 232.

evidence against the possibility of the two Patanjalis being identical. While Dasgupta and others have based their case on claims made by some later Indian writers[1] that the two Patanjalis are identical, we have found evidence going back probably to the 7th century where the tradition does not identify Patanjali the grammarian with the author of the Mahābhāṣya. We would like to distinguish this evidence from the already noted fact that the great grammarians like Bhartṛhari, Kaiyata, Vāmana and Nāgeṣa do not refer to grammarian Patanjali as being also the author of the Yogasūtra.[2] While both Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta noted this they somehow overlooked a significant fact within the tradition of the Bhartṛhari which tends to distinguish between the two Patanjalis. In Helaraja's commentary on the celebrated work of Bhartṛhari, the Vākyapadīya, we find that he maintains a distinction between the traditions of Patanjali the grammarian and of Patanjali the expounder of Sāṃkhya-Yoga thought. In his commentary on Kālasamudeśa, which is the ninth section (sammudeśa) of the third part (kāṇda) of the Vakyapadīya, Helāraja, while analysing and elaborating the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view of time refers to the views expressed in the Yoga-Sūtra-Bhāṣya as that of the tradition of Patanjali.[3] But in the same work, when

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[1]Dasgupta, op. cit., pp. 230-231; Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 340; and Woods, op. cit., p. xii-xv.

[2]Dasgupta, Ibid., p. 231; Radhakrishnan, Ibid., p. 341.

[3]Vakyapadīyam Helarājakṛtaprakāśākhyaṭīkāyuktam, (ed.) Sastri, G.D., Varānsi: Krishna Das Gupta, 1928, pp. 361 and 365. It may also be noted that while introducing the karika 54 as presenting the view of Samkhya-Yoga, Helaraja uses the term "matāntare". This reading has been found in Varanasi edition. The Trivendra edition gives it as referring to the opinion of Mahābhāṣya. We tend to think that Varanasi edition gives a correct reading on this (p. 362), for no where else the commentator identifies Patañjali's tradition as that of Mahābhāṣya (on Pāṇini).

referring to Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini he desists from using the name of Patanjali altogether. He always refers to it as Bhāṣya or Mahābhāṣya,[1] almost as if taking special precaution not to confuse between the two Patanjalis This may not be in itself very decisive but it clearly shows that the confusion between the two Patanjalis is perhaps only a creation of later period.

Regarding the controversy on the date of the work the findings of historical research seems to weigh heavily against Woods, who is inclined to place this work towards the close of 14th century.[2] Woods' main argument rests on the assumption that Vasubandhu's thought is criticised in the Yoga Sūtra and that Nāgārjuna does not make any reference to Yoga in his Kārika. Dasgupta opposes Woods on this point. He points out that:

> .... the supposed Buddhist reference is found in the fourth chapter which .... is a later interpolation; even if they were written by Patanjali it cannot be inferred that because Vacaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vijñānavāda type we are to infer that the sutras refer to Vasubandhu or even to Nagarjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the sutras had been developing long before the time of Nāgārjuna.[3]

Concurring with Dāsgupta on this point Radhakrishnan has conclusively shown that the text definitely belongs a period earlier than 300 A.D.[4] He points out that since Umāsvāti, who seems to have carried his work during third

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[1]Ibid., p. 373, 375.

[2]Woods, op. cit., p. xix.

[3]Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 233.

[4]Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 341, n. 3.

century A.D., refers to Yoga Sūtra 3.22 the text in question must have been in existence before that. Moreover, on the question of Nagarjuna's unawareness of Yoga, Radhakrishnan points out that Woods' argument does not carry us very far in view "of the admitted fact the Chinese translation of Nagarjuna's Upāyakauśalyahrdayśāstra mentions Yoga as one of the eight schools of Philosophy."[1] This argument is cogent, provided, of course, that the Nāgārjunas are the same. To all these evidences against Woods, we would again like to point out that Bhartṛhari, who is generally assigned to 5th century A.D., is well aware of the Yoga theories of time and temporality determinations. He makes clear reference to the views of Yoga on time distinctions and seems to consider them as integral to the general slant of Sāṁkhya thought.[2] Thus by the 5th century, views of Yoga Sūtra were well known and clearly assimilated by the philosophers of that period.

Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Yoga Sūtra[3] is the earliest commentary on Yoga Sūtra and of inestimable value in providing an intelligible understanding of the thoughts of the author of the Sūtra. Vyāsa is unanimously accepted as the author of this work. His date has been assigned to fourth century A.D.[4] Like the Sūtra itself the Bhāṣya too assumes the general metaphysical slant of the Sāṁkhya Karika and interprets the Yoga Sūtra within this framework.

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[1] Ibid., p. 341.

[2] Vākyapadīyam, op. cit., Karikas 49-61.

[3] All references are to the Pātanjali Yogadarśanam, (ed), Bhattacharya, Ramasamkara, Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakasana, 1963.

[4] See Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 342.

Of course, there are important differences between Yoga Sūtra and Sāṁkhya Kārikā, and the Bhāṣya only accentuates those points on which they tend to differ. But in its presentation of the classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of the time and temporality we do not find evidence of their fundamental difference. It accepts the basic Samkhya position that the Buddhi has a siginificant role in the constitution of temporal order, and that the transcendental reality of time does not have any independent objective status. These and allied points shall be the subject matter of the following chapters. In our treatment of these problems we have chosen to rely on the Bhāṣya and the Yoga Sūtra as well as on the Sāṁkhya texts, for the views expressed in the bhasya are both in congruity with and a continuation of the classical Sāṁkhya Yoga tradition.

Vacaspati Miśra's Tattva Vaiśāradī is a commentary written by Vacaspati on Vyāsa Bhāṣya. We have already noted the significance of the contributions of this great commentator to the classical Samkhya-Yoga tradition. There is general concensus among scholars about his identity and the period to which he belonged.[1] In essentials he tends to agree with Vyāsa's understanding of the constitution of temporality or the subjective experience of the temporal order. He agrees with Vyāsa that "moment" alone is real and that a sequence of moments do not have an objective reality. It is a product of rational construction through abstraction. His interpretation of the "omniscience" resulting from concentration on the "moment" is of special significance. His distinction between omniscience implying a

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[1]See Supra, p. 29.

"knowledge of all without remainder" and omniscience as "the knowledge proceeding from discrimination" is particularly illuminating.[1] It is in this qualitative distinction between omniscience and the knowledge resulting from contemplation on the "moment" consists the true import of the soteriological significance of Sāṁkhya-Yoga conception of time and temporality.

Vijñānabhiksu's Yoga Sāra Samgraha is a very useful manual of Yoga thought. Both Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta have recognized Vijñānbhiksu's contribution to Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition in general and to Yoga thought in particular.[2] As noted earlier he belongs to 16th century A.D. and displays an unmistakable leaning towards theistic Vedanta, especially as expressed in the Upaniṣads. He tends to disagree with Vācaspati on certain specific issues and makes heroic efforts to reconcile Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought with the monistic theism of Upanisads.[3]

On the specific question of time and temporality we find some contradictions between Vijñānabhiksu's Yoga Sāra Samgraha[4] and his Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya. While in the later work he suggests that Sāṁkhya admits a distinction between eternal and empirical time, in the former he clearly maintains that Sāṁkhya expressly denies transcendental or eternal time. Moreover, in

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[1]Tattvavaiśāradī in Patanjala-Yogadarsanam, (ed) Bhattacharya, op. cit., pp. 150-152.

[2]Dasgupta, op. cit., pp. 223, 229; Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 342.

[3]Radnakrishnan, op. cit., p. 342.

[4]Yoga Sāra Samgraha, (ed. and trans.) Jha, Ganga Nath, Adyar, Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1933.

the Yoga Sāra Saṃgraha he also tends to make a distinction between Sāṁkhya and Yoga conception of time and temporality.[1] However, we tend to disagree with his interpretation on this point. In the present work we incline to accept, based on careful study of the relevant texts, the homogeneity of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition on the issue of time. On the fundamental ontological questions, it is a common place that they agree, and the question of time and temporality is no exception in this regard. We have advanced our arguments for not accepting Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation at its face value at the appropriate place. This is, however, not to gainsay the important place that Vijñānabhikṣu occupies within the Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition The specific brand of theological affiliation in particular must not be lost sight of in any interpretation drawing upon Vijñānabhikṣu.

Over the question of the homogeneity of Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition which is the presupposition of the present work, it may not be out of place to make some comments. True, the exact relationship between the pre-classical Sāṁkhya and Yoga remains a matter of pure conjecture. While Sāṁkhya itself contains the two trains of thought: theistic and non-theistic, Yoga always seems to retain the theistic slant. There is no such a thing as atheistic Yoga. However, it is our contention that despite its unmistakable theistic leaning the classical Yoga did not differ fundamentally on the basic question of the nature of Purusa and Prakṛti and their interrelationship. The present investigation concentrates primarily on this dimension of Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems. The question of temporality, i.e. the determination

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[1] Ibid., pp. 73-74.

of man's existence by the consciousness of the temporal distinctions and its consequences for the reflecting self, falls within the realm of the interrelationship between Purusa and Prakrti. And in this respect the differences between the two systems is inconsequential. Radhakrishnan, after a careful analysis of the evolutionary scheme of the two schools came to the conclusion that the "distinction between the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga account of evolution is not a serious one".[1] Dasgupta finds the congruity between the two schools extremely significant:

> The affinity of the systems of Sāṁkhya thought generally ascribed to a mythical sage, Kapila, to that of Yoga of Patanjali is so great on most important points of theoretical interest that they both may be regarded as two different modifications of one common systematic ideas.[2]

The internal evidence within Yoga Sūtra too weighs in favour of considering it as a continuum with the basic philosophical postulates of classical Sāṁkhya. The fact of fundamental convergence between the two systems was accepted by Vyāsa who wrote his commentary on Yoga Sutra. He concludes his commentary on the Yoga Sutra by acknowledging at the end of the Bhāsya that Patanjali's Yoga system indeed is expressive of the words of Sāṁkhya. (iti śrī Pātanjale Yoga-śāstre sāṁkhya-pravacane). The description of the Vyāsa Bhāṣya on the Yoga Sūtra as Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya "brings out the intimate relation between the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga."[3]

Basing their conclusions on historical evidences available on the

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[1]Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 342.

[2]Dāsgupta, S.N., Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, Delhi: Motilal Banarasideass, 1973, p. ix.

[3]Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 342.

date of the compilation of Yoga Sūtra both Keith and Dasgupta conclude that the probability of Patanjali having modelled his Yoga Sūtra on Sāṁkhya Karika of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is extremely high. Keith writes:

> It is, however, not at all unlikely that the production of the Yoga Sūtra was more or less directly motivated by the revival of the Sāṁkhya and its definite setting out in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Isvārakṛṣṇa who was an earlier contemporary...[1]

Concurring with this statement of Keith, J. G. Larson maintains that "the final redaction (of Yoga Sūtra) is roughly contemporary with the composition of the Kārikā, and .... its final compilation may have been occasioned by the appearance of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's work."[2] Dasgupta goes even to the extent of suggesting that the Yoga as presented by Patanjali is basically Sāṁkhyan in character. He even labels the Yoga as the "Patanjali school of Sāṁkhya":

> Of the Pātanjala school of Sāṁkhya, which forms the subject of the Yoga.....Patanjali was probably the most notable person for he not only collected the different forms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which were or could be associated with the Yoga but grafted them all on the Saṁkhya metaphysics, and gave them the forms in which they have been handed down to us.[3]

For purposes of this study we have justifiably considered the systems of Sāṁkhya and Yoga as integral and have not addressed ourselves to the question of the possibility of the differences which may be derived from terminological or nominal distinctions. The Sāṁkhya system under investigation includes the thought of Sāṁkhya Kārikā and Sāṁkhya Sūtra and various commentaries thereon. This is what has generally been considered

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[1]Keith, op. cit., p. 57.

[2]Larson, op. cit., p. 167.

[3]Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., p. 229.

by scholars as representing the Classical Sāṁkhya. Yoga, in the present study, refers primarily to the classical yoga or Rāja-Yoga as developed in the Patanjali's Yoga Sūtra and the various commentaries on it. Historically, the philosophy of Sāṁkhya as a systematic exposition of the main tenets of the school must have preceded the systematic exposition of Yoga. While surely there is a general paucity of historical evidence in this area the close connection in the classical period of their development is transparent to keen and diligent students of Indian Philosophical thought.[1]

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[1]The position or point of view that is here adopted is in conformity with the vogue of modern expository writings on the subject, to treat the two as embodying 'differentiations in what was originally a single doctrine' (Hiriyanna, Outlines, p. 268). The Gita advocates the idea of oneness of Sāmkhya and Yoga as representing true insight (ekaṁ sāṁkhyam ca yogam ca yaḥ paśyati sa paśyati, V, 5) though it is true that the terms do not so much refer to the scholastic versions of the two schools of thought as to their respective stress on gnosis and action. However, for a very detailed analysis of the difference between Sāṁkhya and Yoga in specific terms, i.e. inter alia of will and its place in spiritual life, see Bhattacharya, K. C., Studies in Philosophy, Calcutta, Progressive Publishers, 1956, p. 221. The difference is carefully delienated starting from the differential stress on buddhi and ahaṁkāra, through a difference in the presentation to consciousness of becoming and in the understanding of 'becoming' itself as continuing of the cause into the effect in a finalised form, and finally, how their difference about the understanding of causality is reflected in their views on the nature of time. The treatment is at its best plausible and even illuminating but lacks in textual support. So far as the Sāṁkhya account goes, it is mostly an argument from silence aside from the problematic posed by Yukti Dīpikā in this regard through suggesting that time is the causal process itself (karaṇa parispanda) II, 8-9, and Vijñāna Bhiksu's very debatable reconstruction of one Sāṁkhya Sūtra: II, 12. As for the yoga account, the textual basis is the reference in the Yoga Sūtras and the Bhāsya wherein there is a clear statement of the two aspects of time viz. kṣaṇa and krama, i.e. constant and sequence of instants: III, 52; IV, 32. All these textual materials are utilised and explored at appropriate places in the body of our present study but we have tended, in the absence of clear textual mandates against it, to imply a homogeneous understanding of the issue of temporality in relation to consciousness.

CHAPTER III

SĀṀKHYA-YOGA ONTOLOGY AND THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The present analysis is primarily concerned with articulating the basic ontological perspective of Sāṁkhya-Yoga, which is of crucial significance for developing an understanding of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga analysis of the structure and constitution of temporality. What we understand by the structure and constitution of temporality and how we are to relate it with the nature and structure of consciousness as such is a question that will constantly be present as part of our investigation. Indeed, this is by no means, conceivably, a settled question for the enterprise of philosophical thinking. Its elusiveness for conceptual clarity constitutes both the rationale for and the impetus of the present analysis.[1]

However, it is our contention that a systematic articulation of Sāṁkhya-Yoga's exposition of this dimension of the problem will help to put certain basic concerns of the philosophical thinking in their proper perspective and will be of immense help in developing a philosophical understanding of this crucial problem. More specifically, Sāṁkhya-Yoga's

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[1]Problem of time has been one of the urgent concerns of philosophical investigation in both the western and eastern traditions. For a concise but comprehensive analysis of the problematic of time in the history of western thought refer to Fraser, J. T., "The Concept of Time in Western Thought", Main Currents, Vol. 25, Mr-Ap 72, pp. 115-124.

For an excellent and insightful approach to the problem of Time within India philosophical tradition see Pannikkar, Raymond, Philosophy:. East and West, Vol. 24, No. 2, April 1974, pp.

contribution to the understanding of the problem of temporality and its relationship to the transcendental consciousness will constitute the subject matter of our discussion in the concluding section of this part.

Given this understanding of our task we have to spell out at the very outset what tends to be the distinguishing feature of Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology. It is only then that a methodologically valid and philosophically sound investigation of the problem of temporality can be undertaken. Such an attempt will inevitably involve delimiting the ontological problems[1] that we consider to be significantly related to the problem of temporality.

Though in one sense the Sāṁkhya-Yoga figures among the earliest of the 'metaphysical' endeavours of Hindu system-building, it is our assumption that Sāṁkhya-Yoga, also transcends the limitations of the traditional Hindu metaphysics[2] by focusing its investigation to that realm which may conveniently be described as the realm of immanent experiences.[3]

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[1]The present work does not look at philosophical investigation as an attempt at compartmentalization of issues. Rather, the metaphysical, epistemological and ontological problems are seen in an intricate and complex interrelationship. The ontological problems are seen to play an important role in aritculating the basic issues which revolve around the Sāṁkhyan delimitation of the realm of consciousness and the world. See Larson, G. J., Classical Samkhya, Varanasi: Motilal Baranasidas, 1969, p. 230.

[2]The Nyāya Sūtra of Gautama and the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of Kaṇāda may be cited as examples of providing categorial schemes typifying 'Hindu' metaphysical traditions. The ontic approach characteristic of these traditions may be contrasted with the existential-ontological nature of the enquiry with which Sāṁkhya-Kārikā commences its treatment.

[3]Expressions and notions like Svatahgrāhyatva (spontaneous apprehension of validity), Sen Gupta, Anina, Classical Sāṁkhya, Lucknow: United Press Ltd., 1969, p. 70, are instances in point.

Of course, in making this claim the present author asks for a critical understanding of Sāṁkhya-Yoga's philosophical investigations demanding a radical departure from the commonly accepted interpretation of Sāṁkhya-Yoga's analysis of the basic issues of human existence. It is the author's conviction that Sāṁkhya-Yoga is primarily an attempt at a transcendental analysis of the facts of human experience:[1] As an analysis it steers clearly away from the issues which demand either an *a priori* decision about the nature of reality or alternately ask for a mere speculative understanding of the status of being. What is accepted as the point of departure is only the fact of human experience. From this is set out a programme leading to an understanding of the essence of being precisely in the context of the realm of consciousness. The concern here is with (what may be described in phenomenological idiom) the eidetic structures of being or its essences which are universally valid and are openly available to the reflecting consciousness which cares to reflect upon itself. The phenomenological overtones of this understanding of the basic task of Sāṁkhya-Yoga is not entirely a superimposition of modern mind; they may be seen to emanate from the basic ontological concerns of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophers.

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[1]Here attention is drawn to the underlying supposition of the introductory *kārikās* Proceeding from the fact of suffering as an integral part of the world of experience, the *kārikās* point to that which is beyond the givenness of experience. Experience presupposes the experiencer and the experienced. The experienced world is constantly undergoing change. This changing world of experience finds its ground in something which is of fundamental nature and is the transcendental basis of the experience of the world. It is not the existence of the world as such that is the concern of Sāṁkhya-Yoga analysis. Rather it is the world given in our experience that is the point of departure. (dṛṣṭavadānuśrāvikāh sa hy avisuddhikṣayātiśayayuktah tadviparītāh śreyān vyaktāvyaktajñavijñānāt), *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, *op. cit.*, *Kārikā* 2.

With these observations regarding the basic assumptions and the direction that the present analysis will tend to follow, we may now embark upon the task of a comprehensive understanding of Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology. However, we look upon our task not merely as an attempt at cataloguing these tenets of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought which seem to coroborrate our understanding of the basic philosophical task. Our interpretation of Sāṁkhya-Yoga will seek to bring to the fore the meaning-structures and thought patterns of Sāṁkhya-Yoga literature in tune with the demands of the logic of the system itself. Such being our concern the enterprise will inevitably involve certain amount of conceptual clarification especially in view of the confusions and the mystique that seem to surround the meaning of Sāṁkhya-Yoga. This will also involve re-constructing Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought in the light of our findings by providing the missing links. We do not look upon philosophical analysis and investigation as an anatomical autopsy which is primarily interested in identifying the specific fissures or elements of the organism. Indeed, philosophical investigation is a living, ongoing process of creative understanding directed towards a better comprehension of the problems of human existence.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga analysis of the problem of the existence and nature of being proceeds from a recognition of the contradictions involved in the natural or the phenomenal realm, i.e. that which is immediately perceived (dṛṣṭvad). Both the perceptible world (dṛṣṭvad) as well as the one grounded in testimony are equally inadequate in resolving the basic contradictions. To Sāṁkhya-Yoga way of thinking both belong to the realm of impurity, destruction and excesses (aviśuddhi-kṣayātiśaya-yuktaḥ). The reflecting consciousness is required to renounce this mode of understanding and rise to

a more radical understanding or a discriminative awareness of the manifest (vyakta), the unmanifest (avyakta) and the knowing one or knower (i.e. puruṣa).[1]

> The revealed (testified means) are like the visible (i.e. inefficient), for they are connected with impurity, destruction and excess. A contrary method is better, and this consists in a discriminative knowledge of the Manifested (forms of world), the Unmanifested (prakriti), and the knowing (self).

This demand for a radical departure from the pre-conceived notions and prevalent conceptions of reality occurs on the level of cognitional analysis conceived as an analysis of the structure of experience. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga prefers to shift the focus of philosophical investigation from the question of the status and being of the world as such (of the seen variety as well as of the one accepted on trust) to the question of the status and being of the world that is given to us in direct experience. The first datum for the self-reflecting self is nothing but the fact of consciousness which constitutes the ultimate point of departure and the basis, as well as the existential foundation, of our understanding of the real world. The real world is not denied but is accepted as existing side by side with consciousness.[2]

The express concern of Sāṁkhya-Yoga, therefore, is not to ascertain

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[1] dṛṣṭavad ānuśravikah sa hy aviśuddhikṣayātiśayayuktah tadviparītah śreyān vyaktavyaktajñavijñānāt. The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., Kārikā 2.

[2] mūlaprakṛtir avikṛtir mahadādyāḥ prakṛtivikṛtayaḥ sapta ṣoḍaśakas tu vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ. Ibid., Kārikā 3.

the mode of being of the real world and its objects whose existence it does not question but takes for granted. Its primary concern is rather to conduct a transcendental inquiry into the domain of pure consciousness in order to determine (1) the mode of being of pure consciousness and (2) to discern the mode of the givenness of the world in immediate experience. This aspect of Sāṁkhya-Yoga investigation we call transcendental. Now an enquiry is transcendental precisely in the sense that,

> It does not resolve the question of the existence of the world through its being directed towards the characteristics of the world, but in that it takes the domain of pure experience as its point of departure, and attempts, as if by an indirect route, to find the cognitive foundation for the admission of the existence every object - of the real world in particular in the actual state and in the essence of the course of and activities of consciousness.[1]

It is important to note that it is by contrasting both the regions of being (world and consciousness), and discovering concurrently that one of them, the pure consciousness, is given in immanent perception, which guarantees its existence completely beyond doubt, Sāṁkhya-Yoga also points to the method by which the whole question of ontology should be discovered. Ontological and epistemological problems are not two disparate problems. The problem of the existence and nature of being is not derivative in relation to the cognitional considerations; rather both constitute a continuum whereby one overlaps the other and cannot be considered in isolation from it. The _raison-de-etre_ for Sāṁkhya-Yoga's involvement with epistemological problems is to be found in its acceptance of both the existential and

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[1] Ingaradenen, Roman, _Time and Modes of Being_, Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1964, p. 15.

operational priority of consciousness over the world. Sāṁkhya-Yoga correctly looks at the ontological and epistemological questions in their intrinsic relationship. For the sake of methodological clarity the system attempts to delimit the two realms and discuss the epistemological question as a way back to the fundamental question of ontology which seem to have been obscured by the metaphysicians.

To our way of thinking, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, in and through a radical approach to the problem of being attempts to comprehend the essence of being in the immediate givenness on the level of consciousness. In interpreting the system in this way, we are not departing from the spirit and motivation underlying the basic formulation of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought. The evidence on which we propose to base our understanding is so conspicuous that one may even say that it is the vogue of an excessive metaphysical tradition of long and reputed standing associated with its name that obscures the original motivation of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga thought.

One striking evidence that readily suggests to our mind in this regard relates to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga doctrine of Sarga.[1] The Sāṁkhya

[1]The term Sarga is derived from the root sṛj (to create) which is also the root of Sṛṣṭi the sanskrit term for world or universe as creation. The term carries with it the cosmic connotation. But within the Sāṁkhya-Yoga scheme of things the meaning of Sarga loses its strict cosmic reference and the term is used in a rather specific sense.

philosophy admits 25 categories (tattva), which can be grouped into two broader categories, the Self (Purusa) and the not-Self (Prakrti). It is through the Purusa's coming together (samdhi) with the Prakrti that the process of Sarga involving the emanation of the 23 categories originates. The Prakrti along with that which is seen to be the modifications of the Prakrti constitute the 24 categories:

Prakrti (the primeaval ground of manifestation);
Mahat or Buddhi (the principle of intelligence);
Ahamkāra (the principle of egoity or I-ness);
Five Tanmātras (five subtle elements);
Manas (the mind);
Five Jñānendriyas (five organs of sense);
Five Karmendriyas (five organs of action);
Five Mahābhuttas (five gross elements).

The 23 categories (tattvās), which are also called modifications (vikrti), are said to issue from the unmanifest ground (avyakta Prakrti), when the Prakrti comes in contact (sannidhi) with the Purusa, the principle of consciousness.

The Sāmkhya-Yoga explication of this process of Sarga has usually been referred to, both in the traditional and modern understanding of the system, as an account of the description of the process of evolution in cosmological terms. The doctrine of Sarga, according to the generality of such understanding, invariably refers to 'evolution' understood in strictly cosmological sense.[1] Thus, Sarga has been seen as a process of 'evolution',

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[1]See Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927, p. 266; Das Gupta, S. N., A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Cambridge: The University Press, 1951, pp. 245-248; Mookerjee, Satkari, "The Samkhya-Yoga" in History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, (ed.) Radhakrishnan, S., London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1952; Hiriyana, M., "The Samkhya" in The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. III, (ed.) Bhattacharyya, Haridas, Calcutta: The Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Culture, 1969, pp. 41-52; Sen Gupta, Anima, op. cit.; Hiriyana, M., Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy, Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1952, p. 55.

leading through successive stages (emergence of 23 tattvas being a product of these stages), to the final emergence of the manifest world (Vyakta). However, we submit that the understanding of Sarga doctrine in strict cosmological terms is susceptible to the charge of misinterpretation. The following considerations may be offered in support of the possibility of a non-cosmological interpretation of Sarga doctrine:

1. What is required is what may in contrast be termed as phenomenological understanding of the process. The emphasis should not be on the various stages in the evolution of the cosmos or the world but on the structure of the consciousness in and through which the world is manifested.[1] Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of Sarga acquires a new meaning and a somewhat different orientation if approached from this angle. It is a description of the structural arrangements of the field of the consciousness (kṣetra) which the knower of the field (ksetrajñā) discovers when it reflects upon itself. The world is perceived as world only as consciousness reflects as what is aware (kṣetrajña) of the world.

2. If Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of Sarga is to be interpreted as a theory of cosmological evolution then we run into the problem of explaining quantitative multiplicity of evolution. Since there is a plurality of Puruṣas and since evolution starts if and only if the Puruṣa comes into contact with the Prakṛti,[2] there must be a multiplicity of the world that so evolves because

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[1]Larson, G. J., op. cit., p. 193.

[2]tasmāt tat samyogād acetanam cetanāvad iva liṅgam/guṇa kartṛtve 'pi tathā kartea bhavaty udāsīnaḥ//puruṣasya darśanārtham kaivalyārtham tathā pradhānasya/paṅgvandhavad ubhayor api saṁyogas tat kṛtaḥ sargaḥ// The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., Kārikās 20 and 21.

there will be different evolution for each Purusa. But obviously this is not the case according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga. While Sāṁkhya-Yoga accepts the plurality of Purusas it does not subscribe to the view asserting a similar plurality of universes; instead it admits one common cosmos as the common referential point of all Purusas.

3. Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of the Vyakta-Avyakta appears somewhat baffling if seen in terms of the evolutionary interpretations of the Sarga doctrine. Prakrti is the (unmanifest) Avyakta, the material ground of all manifestations of the world and its object (Vyakta). According to this interpretation the Avyakta-Prakrti includes in itself the potentiality of all things in the manifest world, both mental and physical. Thus Avyakta-Prakrti is not looked upon as the world but the ground of this manifest world. The 23 principles evolved from Prakriti are considered as constituting the actual manifest world (Vyakta).[1] In this way of looking at Prakrti in relation to the world one important circumstance which accounts for the precise difference between what is unmanifest and its manifestation seems to be overlooked. The distinction is one of not-being or being in relation to consciousness. Prakrti as Avyakta refers to the world of objectivity which has not opened itself up to the presence of consciousness, (Purusa). And Vyakta is the manifest world precisely in the sense that it is the correlate of consciousness. Vyakta does not mean the world that is present out there as opposed to the witnessing consciousness but it is precisely the world of the witnessing consciousness. All the so-called evolutes

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[1]Mookerjee, op. cit., p. 244.

are not the product of the prakṛti in the usual sense of product. They are to be understood in a very special sense of being the structure of manifestation, the mechanisms through which the world unfolds itself in terms of increasing differentiation to the witnessing consciousness.

4. The first category in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga scheme is Mahat or Buddhi which is the locus of I-ness or Ahaṁkāra. To conceive the Sāṁkhya-Yoga analysis of Sarga in cosmological terms will necessitate an assertion of a Cosmic Intelligence or Buddhi as the first principle of the manifest world of transcendent objectivities. To be sure such an assertion has been ascribed to Sāṁkhya-Yoga in certain sections of scholarship.[1] But such assertions imply overlooking of Sāṁkhya-Yoga's basic concern with the individual nature of consciousness. Consciousness, for Sāṁkhya-Yoga, is always individual and not an abstract or Absolute principle transcending the individual consciousness. While pure consciousness or Puruṣa is individual but not personal, ego or I-consciousness is included in the Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure. Thus what is commonly considered to be self-consciousness or ego is understood in Sāṁkhya-Yoga to be other than the "puruṣa". Neither of the two, the pure consciousness and the Ego, need be conceived in mere cosmological terms as referring to some world-soul or an Absolute consciousness. The element of individuality is integral to the meaning of consciousness.[2]

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[1]See Bhattacharya, K. C., Studies in Philosophy, Vol. I, Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1956, p. 195-196.

[2]Mahat tattva, the Great Principle, is intelligence in an individual sense which contains the possibility of the next evolute viz. Ahaṁkāra, the sense of personal individuality which in turn preceeds man's psychic-empiric

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The important question that arises in this context is: what is the exact nature of pure consciousness or Purușa and in what way is it related to empirical consciousness or the psycho-physical conglomeration in the conception of the I-principle. For Sāṁkhya, Purușa or pure consciousness is what is precisely not characterized by the dispersions and the atomisms characteristic of the world and of the empirical consciousness in which the world is present. Instead of being the agent of action and volition, it is a mere witness or spectator of the drama involving willing and activity. It is in a condition of intrinsic isolation from all the manifestations of the world both mental and physical.[1] The best way to comprehend the essence of Purușa is to look at it as a mere fact of consciousness.

> It (Purușa) is the fact of man's experience which is apart from all of his feeling, inclinations, impulses, etc. It is the fact of man's experience which provides the basic for his freedom precisely because it is not a part of or determined by the world. By referring to Purusa as the simple fact of consciousness apart from all thought, feeling, etc., this also brings to mind such terms as transparent or translucent. It is only by the 'light' of Purusa that one sees the world, and it is only the fact of the world which renders Purușa aware of itself. The fact of

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life consisting of the working of his senses and manas which is the precursor of the world of matter. The world of experience is the outcome of the 'Purusa' confronting himself with the 'Prakriti', i.e. the permanent possibility of pleasure, pain and dullness of knowledge, action and even inertness (contrary to the belief that the world issues from prakriti as effect does from cause and that purusa as a teleological factor comes into picture as an after thought).

[1] tasmāc ca viparyāsāt siddhaṁ sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya kaivalyaṁ mādhyasthyaṁ draṣṭṛtvam akartṛ-bhāvaś ca. The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., Karika 19.

consciousness and the fact of the world are two irreducible realities.[1]

Buddhi along with Ahaṁkāra and Manas constitute the principle around which the whole personal world is centred.[2] This is the 'I'-principle in the proper sense of the term. And it is this 'I' or the empirical Ego that according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga is the active willing subject of our conscious state.[3] It is this 'I' that posits an attitude and relates itself to the world around itself precisely because the emergence of this 'I'-principle coincides with the moment of the encounter of the world and pure consciousness. Apart from the active spontaneous willing dimension there is also the passive aspect, as may be seen in the circumstance that it is also the recipient of sense data to which it reacts.[4] The personal or the empirical ego is then both 'spontaneous' and 'quiescent', but in both the aspects it retains the intentional dimension of consciousness since it remains the subject of reference or the subject of intentionality. In the last analysis this empirical subject is essentially the subject of all intentionality and is not to be confused with what is given within the field of its consciousness.

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[1]Larson, J. G., op. cit., p. 185.

[2]Antaḥkaraṇam trividhamiti buddhyahaṁkāramanasām grahaṇam/ etat trividhamantaḥ karaṇasaṁjñitam. The Maṭharāvṛtti, op. cit., p. 49; sāntaḥkaraṇetyādi buddherupāttatvāccesamahaṁkāro manaścāntaḥkaraṇam/tābhyām yuktā buddhiḥ. The Jayamangalā, op. cit., p. 41.

[3]Antaḥkaraṇasya tadujjvalitatvāllohavadadhiṣṭhātṛtvam. The Sāṁkhya Pravacana Sūtra, op. cit., I.99

[4]The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., 35, 23 and 26.

Thus the empirical consciousness is related in cognition to its surrounding world to things and beings which it experiences. The subject bears a necessary reference or relation to object, just as the object stands defined by being in relationship to the subject. The subject is in passive or active relation to object, which is present to the subject as the terminal point of reference. Thus in relation to the personal subject of intentionality, the object in the environment functions as "object" for it. This relation itself is, of course, not external, i.e. as between two terms in relationship, but one of intentionality. Viewed from the side of the object (<u>prakṛiti</u>) it signifies that the intended object (<u>prayojya</u>) motivates the subject (<u>prayojaka</u>).

It may thus be seen that the personal subject, i.e. the 'I', is world-involved by definition. It is the subject and the agent in actual or potential relation with the "object", which is either the object of knowledge or 'acquisitive' of action. The question that arises here may be: how does the world-involved 'I' stand in relation to pure consciousness? What is the relation between consciousness which may be called the transcendental subject (<u>Puruṣa</u>) and the personal subject (<u>Buddhi</u>-<u>Ahaṁkāra</u> structure)?

We have seen that the empirical ego for Sāṁkhya-Yoga constitutes the essence of the 'I'-ness which is the centre of all positing of attitudes. What is significant about this dimension of existence, i.e. existence of empirical ego, the 'I'-ness is that it serves as the pole which exercises specific acts of positing, and also what is posited, i.e. the object of such positing. So far as this personal Ego is the 'I' of the positing attitudes[1]

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[1] <u>The Sāṁkhya Kārikā</u>, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., Kārikā 23 and 24.

the world that is posited by the I also proves to be the result of the decision of the subject.

But then the question arises: are the empirical ego (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure) and the transcendental subject (Puruṣa) two mutually exclusive and distinct principles? The immediate answer seems to be "yes" for the two are supposed to belong to two different realms. But, on closer examination, it appears that the distinction is more of operational nature than one of the thematic. "I" as a person, and as such belonging to the world of fellow-being and having a world around is in point of essence, the same "I" as the transcendental subject. It is the point of view concerned that separates the two kinds of approaches to the self-same principle. On purely transcendental analysis, the ego sets itself as the "transcendental ego", as the final point of reference which on further analysis may be seen to be the absolute region of pure consciousness, the source of all meaning of being. But when the position of the same transcendental subject is sought to be determined from the point of view of fact or actuality - the position in terms of concrete man and his surrounding world - the same transcendental ego appears to assume the form of the personal, empirical ego. Seen from the perspective of the actual existing person, so far as the latter consciously posits itself in positing attitudes, it is the empirical ego considered in itself, without the perspective it is promoted to the level of transcendental subject. In the mode of discriminative awareness (viveka) the world involved person, i.e. the one who acts, motivates and refers to the world, himself is what may be called the transcendental ego (Puruṣa). It is not a case of transformation of the one into the other.

There are no two existentially distinct entities. The world-involved person in his unreflective attitude proves to be the centre of all positing of attitudes. But the same one in his reflection, i.e. when he reflects on his world involvement, instead of positing attitude towards the world, is the transcendental subject. Thus it may be seen that the personal empirical ego itself provides the key to the transcendental ego-hood of the subject. 'I', namely the person (<u>Ahaṁkāra</u>) is given as the object of reflective self apperception in the very wake of the development of the empirical perception of 'I'-ness (the <u>Sarga</u> being the process of this development). The stream of experience as pure consciousness is also at once the process by which the pure subject assumes the apperceptive form of the personal ego.

This way of looking at the relationship between the transcendental subject and the empirical ego may be questioned from the perspective of a purely cosmological approach to the meaning of Sāṁkhya-Yoga. It may be asked: how the two subjects respectively referred to as pure consciousness and the one which is an evolute of <u>Prakṛti</u>, be in principle one and the same? The two belong to the two radically different and opposed realms of being[1] so that it is not conceivable that they are identical. The objection rests on the traditional understanding of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga as embodying a doctrine of evolution. The empirical ego is a product of real evolutionary process in the course of which it emerges from the womb of undifferentiated mass called <u>Prakṛti</u>. What seems overlooked in this

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[1]Radhakrishnan, S., <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 287-291; also, Mookerjee, Sat-Kari, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 242-257.

interpretation is the emergence of empirical subject as a specific moment in the dialectical relationship between the fact of consciousness and the fact of the world. The so-called evolution or the Sarga is a figurative way of contemplating the fact of the givenness of the world in the immediate or original experience. Of course this fact remains dormant till consciousness stands in a reflective relationship to itself. It is only in and through objectification of consciousness that the true structure of the givenness of the pure consciousness can be grasped. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga has made this point very clear.

The Sāṁkhya Kārikā is quite specific on the question of the functional difference but substantive identity of the empirical subject and the transcendental ego. The fact of the substantive identity is clearly assumed in the passages enlisting the grounds for the existence and plurality of selves (Puruṣas). A careful reading of the text shows that the transcendental subject and the empirical ego are existentially determined by the same set of factors. It is on the same considerations that the existence of Puruṣa as the transcendental ground of all conscious willing and activity is established.

To explain. The argument offered by the Sāṁkhya in favour of the existence of the Puruṣa runs as follows:[1]

1. Since the combinations (things existing as aggregation of three guṇas) must have another as the one whose purpose is served, and since

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[1] saṅghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyayād/ puruṣo'sti bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārthaṁ pravṛtteśca. The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., Kārikā 17.

there must be something different from the three guṇas, there exists Puruṣa as this other (samghāta - parārthatvāt - triguṇādi - viparyayād).

2. Since, there must be control (of the world of things constituted of guṇas) there must be a presiding power or controlling being, that being is Puruṣa (adhiṣṭhānāt).

3. Becuase there must be someone to experience and enjoy, that experiencer is Puruṣa (bhoktṛ-bhāvāt).

4. Since there is the activity for the same of isolation or freedom there is Puruṣa who is free (kaivalyārtham).

The arguments adduced for the plurality of the Puruṣa must be read in conjunction with what has been stated earlier. There is plurality of Puruṣas;[1]

1. because there is separate regulation of birth, death and faculties;

2. because activities or functions (of beings) do not occur simultaneously; and

3. because beings differ on account of varying guṇas (attributes).

Thus, the main argument for plurality is based on the fact of natural diversity inherent in three guṇas (attributes or aspects). Vācaspati Miśra puts it in these words:

> The diversity or differentiation due to the distribution of the guṇas in the various entities, could not be explained

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[1]jananamaraṇakaraṇānām pratiniyamādayugapatpravṛtteśca puruṣabahutvaṁ siddhaṁ traiguṇyaviparyayāccaiva. Ibid., 18.

if the Puruṣas were one and the same in all. On the hypothesis of plurality, however, there is no difficulty.[1]

It is interesting to note that in all these arguments offered for the existence and plurality of the Puruṣa, the transcendental subject, it is assumed as if it were existentially identical with the empirical ego.[1] Not only this, but Sāṁkhya-Yoga also goes even to the extent of implying admission of Sukṣma Śarīra (subtle body) constituted of the empirical subject as the vehicle of the transcendental ego.[2] Moreover the existential equation of the transcendental ego and the empirical ego is further assumed in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga postulation of dialectical understanding of their relationship. While empirical ego or Buddhi is regarded as mirroring the luminosity and the consciousness structure of the transcendental subject,[3] the Puruṣa, it in its turn also may be said to depend on the self-reflection of the Buddhi to understand and comprehend the essential difference between itself and the world of Prakṛti.[4] It seems to us that

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[1]Tattva Kaumudī by Vācaspatimiśra, op. cit., p. 66.

[2]The Sāṁkhya Kārikā distinguishes between three kinds of bodies: subtle (sūkṣama), born of parents (mataprṭṛjaḥ) and the body of gross elements (prabhutais). Only sūkṣama body is constant or permanent, i.e. which passes from birth and acts as the vehicle of consciousness. Others are perishable. See The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., Kārikā 39; also the Sāṁkhya Pravacana Sūtra, op. cit., 3.16; Jayamangalā on Kārikā 39, op. cit., p. 44; and Matharāvṛtti on Kārikā 39, p. 53.

[3]Catalina, F. V., A Study of the Self Concept of Sāṁkhya-Yoga Philosophy, Delhi: Munshirama Manoharlal, 1968, p. 68.

[4]sarvaṁ pratyupabhogam yasmāt puruṣasya sādhayati buddhiḥ/saiva ca viśinaṣṭi punaḥ pradhānapuruṣāntaraṁ sūkṣmam. The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., 37; kṛtsnaṁ puruṣasyārtham prakāśya buddhau prayacchanti. Ibid., 36.

this orientation of Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of reality with respect to the question of existence necessitates conceiving of the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical subject in dialectical terms.[1]

Sāṁkhya-Yoga does not concern itself with the absolute rupture between the world and the self; its point of departure is always the self in the world, the one that experiences the contradictions of the world, but at the same time is capable of transcending them by remaining neutral to it.

In viewing the personal ego (Buddhi) in the context of its development the other moment of the ego besides that of the higher stage of free transcendental subject, i.e., the subject of free act of witnessing, has also to be considered. The character of this so-called "unfree ego" is grounded in the passivity of sensuousness, i.e., natural dispositions, etc. Thus the transcendental subject or the spiritual 'I' - in the specific sense of the subject of autonomous acts of witnessing - finds itself dependent on a dark background of natural dispositions.

Here we should take note of the fact that Sāṁkhya-Yoga makes a clear distinction between the neutrality of Puruṣa and the passivity of Mánas. Spirit or Puruṣa is the foundational ground of all conscious acts and Prakriti exists for the sake of Puruṣa, for it is to the transcendental subject that the world orients itself and for which the world exists.[2]

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[1]See commentaries on Kārika 36. .... puruṣaṣyārtham sukṣmasthūla viṣayalakṣaṇam prakāśyābhivyaktim nītva .... tasyām ca viṣayopādhāno-paraktāyam buddhau puruṣa upalabhate. taṭredamucyate - buddhyadhyavasitam-artham puruṣaścetayata iti. Jayamangalā, op. cit., p. 42.

[2]itya eṣa prakṛtikṛto mahadādiviśeṣabhūtaparyantaḥ/pratipuruṣavimokṣārtham svārtham iva parārtha ārambhaḥ// (continued on bottom of next page)

As such it stands ever against Manas (mind) at the lower stage of sensibility. It must however be noted that at the same time, for Sāṁkhya-Yoga the Manas or mind of the lower sense level is one with the empirical subject of attitude, the Buddhi. Both form an unbroken empirical unity. And it is precisely at this level that the problem of temporality becomes enigmatic.

Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, is both created and creative. It is the structure of world-involvement as well as the possibility of world-transcendence.

It is temporal, both in the sense that it has a beginning and an end as well as that it is the basic condition for the cognition of things in their temporal mode of being. In and through cognition the Buddhi-Ahamkara structure constitutes temporality as well as it is constituted as temporal. The temporal order on the phenomenal level is a conscious creation of the empiric subject (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure). Time-order as the principle of continuity is constituted by the empiric subject (Buddhi parikalpita). Time is nothing but the relational mode of being (sambandhamātropakāri); and as such is a function of Buddhi (the empiric subject). But in the constitution of the temporal structure the empiric subject does not act as a principle independent of the objective flow or the flux of events characteristic of the world of change. The empiric subject, in the world involvement, is out and out-temporal.

(continued from previous page)
vatsavivṛddhinimittaṁ kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttirajñasya/ puruṣavimokṣanimittaṁ tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya// autsukyanivṛttyarthaṁ yathā kriyāsu pravartate lokaḥ/ puruṣasya vimokṣārtham pravartate tadvadavyaktam// The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., 56, 57-58.

What we see in the empiric subject as the principle of change and creativity (vikrta) is an essential drive, a lived tension and a continuous turning to new events and activities. As temporal, the empiric subject does not merely observe the flow of temporal events, but it participates in it. Thus the empiric subject (Buddhi-Ahaṃkāra structure) both constitutes and is constituted in and through temporal becoming. However, essentially temporal, the empiric subject is also the basic condition for the transcendence of temporality. Transcendence of temporality is a function of Viveka (discriminate knowledge). Viveka is the mode of cognitive awareness of the essential 'thisness' of Purusa (pure consciousness as unchanged and unmoved) and Prakrti (the permanent ground of all change and movement.

The transcendence of temporality is possible through viveka (the discriminative knowledge), a function of Buddhi. Viveka is the mode of cognitive awareness of the 'thisness' of Purusa (pure consciousness as unchanged and unmoved) and Prakrti (the permanent ground of all change and movement). Thus, Buddhi is both the structure of world involvement as temporal as well as the condition of world transcendence as eternity. More on this later.

CHAPTER IV

TIME AND TEMPORALITY IN SĀṀKHYA-YOGA

The Category of Time: Grounds for its Rejection

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology can be best grasped in the context of the relationship of mutual otherness between the real world and the cognising subject. Real objects belonging to the real world are distinguished by the fact that they can be, at least in principle, given originally to the cognising subject. This subject knows them through a number of conscious acts of a determinate kind, namely through acts of direct "experiencing". Direct experiencing remains the touchstone of objective reality in Samkhya-Yoga understanding of the world.[1] Time as a single, all-pervading

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[1]The whole analysis of Buddhisarga in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā bears testimony to Sāṁkhya's preoccupation with the realm of human experience, as it is immediately and directly available to the reflecting self. The very point of departure for the Sāṁkhya Kārikā is the fact of suffering or pain as an integral part of man's life experience. Yoga too is in total agreement with the basic Sāṁkhya postulation on this specific question. Rather, in Yoga, the analysis of the realm of experience is even more rigorous than in Sāṁkhya. For both of them the analysis of the cognitive experience is the basic modus operandi in approaching the ontological and metaphysical issues:

"A thorough analysis of human experience is also the starting point of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy. Experience is the felt result of the operating of the subtle tattva which is ordinarily imperceptible.....Experience is not possible unless there are objects of experience, body, organs, ego-sense, mind, etc., which will constitute the instruments and objects of experience.....these are also not enough to bring about experience. Experience presupposes consciousness...the fundamental principles and categories of Sāṁkhya were not dogmatically postulated, but they were discovered and accepted after proper analytical study of experience".

Sen Gupta, Anima, Classical Sāṁkhya: A Critical Study, Patna: The United Press Ltd., 1969, pp. 74-75.

objective reality, if it were to be admitted, must be experienced directly. The question that Sāṁkhya-Yoga asks is: where is the experiential basis for admitting a single infinite all-pervasive time? What is given in direct experience is the fact of change. While admitting the reality of change in the real world, and also granting that the fact of change is universal, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophers do not find it necessary to admit the existence and independent reality of time as the ground of all change.[1] The postulation of Time as an independent reality is based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of change. According to Sāṁkhya-Yoga the acceptance of time as an independent reality, providing the ground for continuity and succession accounting for the relation of priority and posteriority, is gratuitous. There is no such thing as an infinite all-pervasive time.[2] The notion of an infinite dimension extending through the phases of past, present and future, without beginning and end is a fictitious construction of Buddhi.[3]

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[1] The Tattva Kaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra, op. cit., p. 112.

[2] Here it must be borne in mind that in Sāṁkhya system there is no category called Time.....Time and space are only relations between events and events. There are only the events and not something external to them to relate them to one another. Raja, C. Kunhan, The Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa: A Philosophical Exposition, Hosiarpur: Vedic Research Institute Publications, 1963, p. 123.

[3] sa khalavyam kālo vastuśunyo buddhinirmāṇaḥ. Vyāsa Bhāṣya on the Yoga Sutra of Patanjali, op. cit., p. 151.
"The appearance of kāla as a separate entity is a creation of our Buddhi (buddhinirmāṇa) as it represents the order or mode in which Buddhi records its perceptions." Das Gupta, S. N., History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., p. 310.

According to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the idea of a transcendental or objective time is not the constitutive ground of all temporal determination in our cognition of an object. On the contrary, it is the very product of our experience or cognition of "limitedness" intrinsic to all the objects present within the field of the experiencing subject. Thus the idea of time must be conceived in the context of the 'finitude' or the 'limitedness' of actions or events. Whatever has a beginning and end, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, is finite or limited. We find that various events that take place within the purview of the experiencing subject, are essentially limited in this specific sense. Thus according to Yuktidīpikā "time is the means of conceiving such limited existence or persistence of events" (kriyānām viśiṣta-avadhi-svarupa-pratyaya-nimittattvam).[1]

The denial or non-acceptance of the so-called transcendental time as the eternal background of all temporal determinations remains the running theme throughout the deliberations of Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophers. The reality of an unitary time is only a thought construct whose essential unreality is disclosed to the reflective self only in the moment of self-reflection. Accordingly, then, the discriminative self comprehends the true essence of the moment, and in the process also knows what it is that the self in the natural setting tends to identify as the transcendental

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[1] na hi nah kālo nāma kaścida (padārtho) asti, kim'tarhi kriyamāna kriyānāmeva (ādityagatigodohaghatastanitadinām) viśiṣta avadhisparūpa pratyaya nimittattvam; The Yuktidīpikā, op. cit., p. 73.

kalpyat iti kālah, viṣaya evatīto'nāgato vartamanaścocyate na tadyavatirekeṇa kālo'sti; The Jayamangala, op. cit., p. 40.

background of all temporal determinations.

It comes to see that it is the sequence of the moments that gives rise to the notion of a continuous time, ubiquitous and one. As Vyāsa puts it:

> The continuous flow of these (moments) is a sequence (karma). Moments and the sequence of these cannot be combined into a real (vastu). Thus time being of this nature does not correspond to any thing real, but is a product of mind, and follows as a result of (knowledge) by words; but the moment is objective and rests on the sequence. The sequence (karma) has for its essence an uninterrupted succession of moments which is called time (kāla) by experts.[1]

To argue that pure time notions are ultimately dependent on our experience of finitude or limitedness is another way of saying that time does not have an independent status. It is not admitting the independent status of time. Without subscribing to the metaphysical position of accepting an independent reality of time Sāṁkhya-Yoga remains confined to its original intention of clarifying basic epistemological or cognitional problems as a way of explicating an original ontological perspective. Without positing the reality of time as the explanatory factor, how do we explain our temporal concepts? What is the origin of our temporal concepts, and not positing reality of time, is the task to which it addresses itself:

> For our knowledge of anything we must ultimately refer to our experience. In our experience we find events or actions but never time as such. Therefore, we may say that pure or empty time as such is nothing nor is non-existent.

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[1]tatpravāhāvicchedastu kramaḥ. Kṣaṇatatkramayonāsti vastusamāhāra... ....sa khavalyam vastuśūnyo buddhinirmāṇaḥ śabdajñānāupātī.....kṣaṇastu vastupatitah kramāvalambī. Kramaśca kṣaṇanantaryātma taṁ kālavidaḥ kala ityācakṣate yoginaḥ: Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Yoga Sūtra, 3.52.

It is nothing apart from actions or events that are revealed in experience. If it is anything it is one with them.[1]

The position stands in radical contrast to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's[2] acceptance of time as an eternal substance existing by itself, extending from the past through the present to the endless future.[3] True to their metaphysical realism, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy accords independent status to time. Time is considered as essential to the concrete changes of nature, such as production, destruction and persistence of things. Arguing from the facts of motion and change in the perceptible world, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concludes that since the discrete things are devoid of any power of self-improvement, the fact of change and motion requires positing an independent reality as the ground of the ordering of change and motion.[4] Thus, time is posited by Nyāya Vaiśeṣika as the independent real, pervading

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[1]Sen, Sanat Kumar,"Time in Sāṁkhya-Yoga", Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 8, September, 1968, p. 412.

[2]Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are the realistic-pluralistic Hindu darśanas, independent in their origin, but because of their common ontological outlook have come to be amalgamated in the course of history by their exponents. The formal synthesis of the two systems seems to have taken place around 10th century. See Hiryana, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy, London: George Allen Unwin, 1956, p. 225.

[3]Kālakhātmadiśam sarvagatatvaṁ paramam mahat; The Kiraṇāvalibhāskara, Padmanabha Miśra, Varanasi: Saraswati Bhawan texts, 1920, p. 137.

[4]Idānīm gacchatītyādipratītistu idānīm ravitityādipratītivat kālikasambandhāvacchinnādhārādheya bhāvamavagāhate na tu samayasambandhavacchinnamiti. The Vaiśesika Sūtra, 5.2.26.

the whole universe and rendering ordered change and movement possible. The relations of priority and posteriority, simultaneity and non-simultaneity, as well as the notions of before and after have their basis in kāla.[1] For there is only one time which is omnipresent as possesses the character of individuation and the quality of conjunction and disjunction.[2]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika looks at time as a substantive reality which is the eternal basis of all our experiences. Though time is never given in our perception it constitutes the objective ground of all our cognitions. Thus:

> According to Vaiśeṣika, time is said to have as its characteristic sign (by which its existence can be proved) the relation 'prior', posterior', etc., (Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra 2.2.6), it is all-pervading, single, formless and for this reason, because it is not produced, eternal, different from activity, the dividing factor of things by means of activity such as creation, etc. (creation, existence, transformation, growth, decay, and destruction).[3]

It is in their understanding of the nature of change and its cognitions that the Sāmkhya-Yoga and <u>Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika</u> systems disagree fundamentally.[4] While both of them agree that the distinguishing feature of time

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[1]<u>Ibid.</u>, 2.2.6.

[2]<u>Ibid.</u>, 7.1.25.

[3]<u>The Kālasamuddeśa of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya</u>, (ed. and trans.), Sharma, Peri Sarveswara, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972, p. 43.

[4]Vaiśeṣika matvat trikālamābhyantaraṁ karaṇa mityanena sāṁkhyācāryaiḥ kālaḥ tattvāntaram svīkriyate iti nāśaṁkanīyam tasyopādhāva ntarbhāvāditi darsajyati - kālaśceti; <u>The Kiraṇāvali</u> on the <u>Tattva Kaumudī</u>, Haran, Swaminarayana, Varanasi: Joytis Prakasa Press, 1937, p. 321.

determinations is the action or the activity that characterizes each moment of existence, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards association of activities with time as a limiting adjunct or a superimposition on the essentially unitary, indivisible reality of time. Against the Sāṁkhya-Yoga conception of the temporal determinations the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would maintain that the distinction in time such as moments, etc., depends on some adjuncts (kṣaṇādiḥ syādupādhitaḥ).[1]

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga point of view involving a rejection of the position of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is best maintained by Vyāsa. Vyasa points out that the moment itself is conceivable as the absolute and irreducible unit and that

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[1]Vaiśeṣikas postulate following as adjuncts that constitute temporal limitations.
1. Upādhibhedātakṣaṇādivyavahāraviṣayaḥ: The first adjunct consists of the moment of Time that characterizes the interval between the action or activity and the resulting appearance of disjunction in time. Contributing the theory of Asatkāryvāda Vaiśeṣika maintains that the limiting action is the cause or the reason for the production of the previous non-existent disjunction in Time.
2. Upādhistu Svajanyavibhāgaprāgabhāvācchinnam Karma: The disjunction so produced by an activity becomes the cause of the destruction of the previous conjunction. The interval between the disjunction and the dissolution of the conjunction is the second moment of Time produced by the activity constituting the limiting adjunct on the unitary Time. In other words, the disjunction determined by the antecedent conjunction is the second limiting adjunct.
3. Purvasaṁyoganāśavacchinnottarasaṁyoga-prāgabhāvo-vā: As the conjunction so produced ceases, this cessation of the conjunction becomes the cause of the subsequent conjunction. As such there must be an interval between the two. Thus there is the previous non-existence of that conjunction, and this constitutes the third moment in the activity constituting the limiting adjunct of the one unitary Time.
4. Uttarasaṁyogāvacchinnaṁ Karma: Again, subsequent conjunction arises, and the time associated with the action in this moment is further limited in interval in terms of the limiting function of the activity in the question. Siddhāntamuktāvalī, Visvanatha, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1940, 46. Kalastvako'pi upādnibhedātkṣaṇādivyavahāraviṣayaḥ upādhistu svajanyavibhāgaprāgabhāvacchinnam karma, purvasaṁyogānāśavacchinottara-saṁyoga-prāgabhāvo vā, uttarasaṁyogāvacchinnaṁ Karma. Ibid.

apart from the reality of those moments, there is no infinite time. True, these moments are always presented to us together with the activity, admits Vyāsa, but it does not follow from this that they are determinations of unitary time in conjunction with this or that activity.[1]

It would be wrong to argue that moments determined by activity's association with time exists as parts existing in a whole. It is wrong because, as Vyāsa says, the two moments, by their very nature, cannot co-exist and hence a series of moments does not exist in reality. What constitutes the essence of order in time is not an unitary indivisible reality, nor is it the fact of antecedence and subsequence between the moment that is existent and the moment that has just ceased to be. Thus, a series of moments is an ideal construction. The intellect pieces together these discrete moments. There exists only one moment, the moment of present, which contains in it the moments of past and future, which are real but inexistent.[2] Vyāsa says:

> Just as atom is the smallest particle, similarly the moment (ksana) is the smallest limit of time. (Moment) is the period of time taken by an atom to traverse the span between one point of space and the other. The continuous flow of these (moments) is a sequence (krama). However, there is no real (basis) for the combination of the moments and their sequence.....(Thus), time has no real (objective) existence, it is only a creation of buddhi, and follows on account of knowledge by words.....(However), the moment is objective (it has a basis in the real) and it is the basis (of ground)

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[1] Vyāsa Bhāsya on the Yoga Sūtra of Patanjali, op. cit., pp. 150-151.

[2] Tasmādvartamānaḥ evaikaḥ kṣano na purvottarakṣaṇāḥ santiti tasmānnāsti tatsamāhāraḥ. Ibid.

of sequence; the sequence (krama) consists in the continuous (uninterrupted) succession of moments, and it is this that is called time (kāla) by yogins who know time (its real nature).[1]

Now for Samkhya-Yoga, activity instead of being an external adjunct giving rise to our conceptions of temporal determinations, is the very mode of temporal being.[2] To be determined temporally, i.e., to be given in momentary existence is a special kind of being that constitutes the essence of autonomy of a temporal moment. The autonomy in this context refers to the fact that the cognition of a temporally determined being does not depend on the independent existence of unitary time as the eternal background of all such cognitions. Rather the existential autonomy of the moment consists in the very activity that constitute each moment of existence. In other words, temporal determinations are self-constituted in the process of cognition.

Objection may be raised that if temporal determination of moments is constituted in and through our cognitive process then how can one

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[1]yathāpakarṣaparyaut dravyaṁ paramaṇurevaṁ paramākarṣparyantaḥ kālaḥ kṣaṇah. yāvatā vā samayena calitaḥ parmāṇuḥ purvadeśaṁ jahyāduttaradeśamupasaṁpadyate sa kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ, tatpravāhā vicchedastu kramaḥ. kṣanatakramayornāsti vastusamāhāra.....sa khalvayaṁ kālo vastuśunyo buddhinanirmaṇaḥ sabdajñānānupātī.....ksaṇaṣtu vastupatitaḥ kramāvalambi. kramaśca kṣaṇānantaryātmā. taṁ kalavidaḥ kāla ityācakṣate yoginaḥ. Yoga Bhāṣya 3.52, op. cit., pp. 150-151.

[2]kim tarhi kriyamānakriyānāmevādityagatigodohaghatāstanitādīnām viśiṣtāvadhisarūpapratyayanimittatvam. We owe this clarification to Yuktidīpikā, The Yuktidīpikā, op. cit., p. 73.

legitimately hold that the moment is the time taken by an atom to traverse its own unit of space as indeed Vyāsa clearly maintains. It is important to remember that in Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding space does not refer to the objective space existing independently and transcendent to consciousness. Indeed both Time and Space as transcendent realities are mere abstractions. Space, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, is another name for the phenomenon manifesting itself in our immanent perceptions. The atom too, here, does not refer to physical atoms as such but to subtle elements (tanmātrās) as it were appearing to the consciousness.[1]

The problem with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that it sees activity as somehow externally related to existence, so that it appears as an external adjunct. On the contrary, activity for Sāṁkhya-Yoga is the very mode of temporal existence. Existing temporally and being active are not two different modes of being, but are one and the same. If we accept the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika interpretation of activity as separate from existence and thereby standing in an independent relationship to existence then we are forced to postulate another category as the relational term that relates the activity with existence. This will inevitably lead us to an regressus-ad-infinitum. However, Sāṁkhya-Yoga by insisting on the ultimate inseparability of existence and activity is able to underscore a sharp-edged polemic against a realistic reification of time as transcendent to change and activity.

The Question of Eternal and Empirical Time: Some commentators on Sāṁkhya-Yoga literature seem to suggest that the Sāṁkhya-s theoretical position admits a distinction between eternal and empirical time. That, in other words, (at least according to some interpretations) Sāṁkhya also reifies time. Vijñānabhikṣu in his commentary on the Sāṁkhya Sūtra have suggested that the distinction between the eternal and empirical time has been accepted by Sāṁkhya-Yoga. Thus he writes:

> Eternal space and time are of the form of prakṛti, or the root-cause of ākāśa, and are only the specific modification of prakṛti. Hence the universality of space and time is established. But these, space and time, which are limited, are produced from ākāśa through the conjunction of this or that limiting object (uphādi).[1]

Thus, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, there is a distinction between the eternal and omnipresent (all-pervading) Space and Time and the empirical space and time which appears to be limited and finite. The former appears to be of the nature of ākāśa, and are nothing but particular modifications of Prakṛti. On the other hand, the empirical Time which is limited and finite is produced from ākāśa and as such is an effect of ākāśa. The empirical Time is essentially ākāśa itself, but as particularized by this or that upādhi. Thus, the finite space and time are conceived as the qualities of Prakṛti and to be all-pervasive and eternal. The eternal time and space are conceived as the eternal background of our empirical notion of

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[1]nityāu yāu dik-kālāu tāvākāśa prakṛti bhūtāu prakṛterguṇa viśeṣāveva. ato dikkālayorvibhutvopapttih; (ākāśa vat sarva gataś ca nitya) ity ādi śrutiy uktaṁ vibhutvaṁ cā 'kāśasyo' papannam. Yāu tu khaṇḍadik kālāu, tāu tutattadupādhi saṁyogād ākāśad utpadyete ity arthaḥ. The Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya of Vijñānabhikṣu, op. cit., p. 77.

space and time.[1]

However, there is hardly any evidence in the classical Sāṁkhya-Yoga literature to lend support to this classification of Vijñānabhikṣu. Text does not offer any basis for introducing the category of eternal time and much less for an omnipresent, self-identical one to be contrasted from a limited and finite time due to the particularization of the former. We tend to agree with A. B. Keith when he maintains that any such distinction between the eternal and empirical time is inconsistent with the basic Sāṁkhya position. Expressing his disapproval of this approach he writes,

> "in the empiric world both (space and time) appear as limited, and are explained in a quite inconsistent way by origination from either (Ākāśa) through its qualification by the masses of corporeal nature on the one hand, in the case of space, and by the movement of the heavenly bodies in the case of time."[2]

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[1]Concurring with this way of looking at the Classical Sāṁkhya understanding of the problem of time Radhakrishnan maintains that the Sāṁkhya assertion of the infinite eternal time as a thought construct is a mere attestation to the fact that we do not have any perception of the infinite time. He seems to suggest that there is no real denial of the eternal time by Sāṁkhya-Yoga. All that Sāṁkhya has to say that since we have no perception of infinite time or infinite space, so they are said to be constructed by the understanding. Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., p. 277.

[2]Keith, A. B., The Sāṁkhya System, Calcutta: Association Press, 1924, pp. 121-122; While concurring with Keith in disregarding the distinction between the eternal and empirical time one may have reservations regarding the explanation adduced. It is extremely doubtful of the Akasa of which time is taken to be differentiation by Vijñānabhikṣu refers to the bhūta. It is more likely that he means by it an aspect of Prakṛti itself, in which case nitya kāla would be another name for eternal becoming of Prakṛti. However, on the basis of the text we are not quite sure about the exact import of his statement. For a philosophical estimation of Vijñānabhikṣu's view on time refer to Bhattacharya, K. C., Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 1, Calcutta: Progressive Publication, 1956, p. 235.

It may be appropriate to look for the textual context in which the distinction between the Eternal and the Empirical time is proposed by Vijñānabhikṣu. It is in his commentary on the Sāṁkhyasūtra 2,12 that Vijñānabhikṣu proposes the above distinction. The Sūtra states that the (notions of) "direction and time (arise) from Ākāśa" etc. (dikkālāu ākāśādibhyaḥ). Aniruddha proposes a less radical interpretation of this Sūtra than Vijñānabhikṣu, when he explains it in the following way: "It is Ākāśa itself which, by different Upādhis or external conditions, is denoted by the term Space and Time. They are therefore included in Ākāśa."[1] The explanation lacks in conviction as it does not sound plausible. Aside from the obscurity of the notion of upādhi, it fails to explain what these upādhis are that constitute such limitations on the Ākāśa causing it to give rise to space and time.

It seems to us that both Vijñānabhikṣu and Aniruddha tend to look at Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of tattvas in cosmological terms. The notion of eternal time is invoked to account for the cosmological procession of tattvas from the Prakṛti. It is perhaps this pre-occupation, one which he shares with many of his predecessors, responsible for concluding that the sūtra in question is concerned with the origin of the transcendental or eternal space and time. What the Sāṁkhya-Yoga seems really concerned with, in our way of understanding, is explaining the origination of the sense of time. The Sūtra under consideration can be

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[1]tattadupādhibhedādākāśameva dikkālaśabdavācyam tasmādākāśe'ntarbhūtau, The Sāṁkhya Sūtra Vṛttiḥ by Aniruddha, op. cit., p. 94

understood as an attempt to explain at what specific moment in reflective consciousness the essence of the idea of space and time shows forth.[1]

The reflective self, reflecting on the given structure of extension[2] as what is implied in the idea of ākāśa, also recognizes that extension gives rise to the idea of space and time. The emergence of the idea of Ākāśa is the specific moment in the reflective consciousness when the true essence of temporality as the finitude of moments and their sequence (krama) is disclosed to the reflective self. The reflective self comes to see the structure of the sequence (krama) of moments as they are, i.e. as mere sequence of moments without any extension or duration, which it sees as being the essential mode of the being of ākāśa. It is precisely in this sense that the Sūtra seems to refer to ākāśa giving rise to the idea of Time and direction.

This fact is disclosed to the discriminative self only when it has come to grips with the essential structure of ākāśa as extension. Discrimination (viveka) is as much a reflective activity as the arising of the notion of time and space as a function of the Buddhi. Thus emergence of Viveka in the Buddhi is the termination of the process of Sarga. We will return to this point later. One final exegetical comment in this

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[1]This exegesis is in conformity with the general standpoint taken by us from which to approach the problematics of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga. For arguments and defense see Supra, pp. 58 ff.

[2]The term extension is used in the sense of 'Prakṛti' in its aspect of omnipervasiveness, the contention being the part of the basic Sāṁkhya doctrine that the Prakṛti persists along with the tattvas.

connection should not be out of place. The expression, etc. (ādi)[1] in the aphorism cited above, though insignificant, may be of some exegetical import. It refers to the fact that according to the author of the sūtra it is only when the discriminating self has reflected upon the nature of the phenomenal world in terms of its essential structure being constituted of other (ādi) tattvas along with the specific dimension of Ākāśa that the true understanding of the essential nature of space and time can arise. This way of looking at the sūtra in question seems to us to be more plausible and more consistent with the basic Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology. It goes without saying that to our way of understanding the problem of two times in Sāṁkhya-Yoga as envisaged by Vijñānabhikṣu[2] is a fictitious problem arising from a misinterpretation of sarga as cosmological evolution.

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[1]Aniruddha dismisses the term 'ādi' as occuring by accident in the Sūtra; ādiśabdah sampātāyātah, etc. The Sāṁkhya Sūtra Vṛttiḥ, op. cit., p. 98; Vijñāna Bhikṣu maintains that the expression 'ādi' in the sūtra means that from the apprehending of this or that limiting object (the notion of relative space and time arise): ādiśabdenopādhigrahaṇāditi, Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya, op. cit., p.77.

[2]It is important to note that Vijñānabhikṣu himself in his Yoga-Sāra-Saṁgraha admits that the Sāṁkhya does not accept a separate entity as infinite time (Mahākāla) as the one all-pervading reality or the basis of temporal determinations of moments, etc. Moreover, Vijñānabhikṣu goes to a great length even to criticise the views of Sāṁkhya expressed in the Sāṁkhya Sūtra. We are also aware of his Vedantic leanings and his occasional attempts to reconcile Sāṁkhya-Yoga with the mainstream of Vedantic thought. This leads us to approach cautiously his interpretation specially when it seems to go against the basic ontological perspectives of the system under investigation.

Ksana rūpah kālo vyavasthāpyate.....Sāṁkhyistu 'dikkālāvākāśādibhyaḥ' iti sūtrānimahākālo vā kṣaṇādirvāpṛthakpadārtho nāsti, kiṁ tvākāśamevopādhibhirviśiṣṭaṁ kṣaṇādimahākālānt vyavahāraṁ kurut iti manyate. The Yoga-Sāra-Saṁgraha of Vijñānabhikṣu, (ed. and trans) Jha, Ganganath, Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1933, pp. 73-74.

Our contention that the notion of transcendental time is inadmissible in the Sāṁkhya-Yoga scheme of things is further substantiated by another important consideration. It is significant to note that within Sāṁkhya-Yoga scheme of things the element of eternity in this sense of non-finitude or trans-temporality is applicable only to Puruṣa as the transcendental consciousness and to prakṛiti as the transcendental ground of all phenomenalization.[1] Apart from Puruṣa and Prakṛti, no other tattva is accepted as infinite and trans-temporal.[2]

The Constitution of Moment and the Status of Past, Present and Future.

Having established the reality of 'moment' and discerning it as the ground of all temporal determinations, Sāṁkhya-Yoga is now faced with the problem of explicating the material and the formal structure of the moment in terms of which alone one can comprehend the temporal determinations of past, present and future. The problem that Sāṁkhya-Yoga faces is: if the

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[1]In view of the above stipulation regarding the trans-temporality even to cosmological way of understanding the sarga doctrine, the problem of two times (eternal and empirical) in Sāṁkhya-Yoga is inappropriate. Sen, who seems to accept a cosmological interpretation of sarga, also considers the anamolous character of the situation:

> In fact, since the Sāṁkhya admits the possibility of regression (pratisancāra) of all the evolutes (the entire universe) into their ultimate ground, Prakṛiti, nothing save Prakṛiti and Puruṣa can be called eternal (in the accepted sense of being without beginning and end). Thus if even Ākāśa is not eternal, how can time, which is no distinct entity at all be so. Sen, op. cit., p. 410.

[2]On the Sāṁkhya-Yoga conception of eternity, see infra, pp. 119-120.

moment alone is real and that an entity is always given only in the moment of existence then how do we distinguish between the moments of past, present and future? What is there in the moment that will distinguish it as present in relation to the moments of past and future? In other words, is there anything in the structure of moment which enables us to grasp the relationship between the moment determined as past and present or future? Does the moment depend on something external to itself for these temporal designations? Denying the reality of transcendental or cosmological time, Sāṁkhya-Yoga is faced with the problem of accounting for temporal determinations.

To begin with, it must be acknowledged that Sāṁkhya-Yoga does not deny the reality of the distinctions of past, present and future. Thus temporal distinctions indeed have an ontological basis. What grounds them or provides basis for them being the reality existing as moment? Thus observes Vyāsa on the reality of past, present and future:

> The past and the future exist in reality since the qualities of things manifest themselves in these three ways. The future is the manifestation which is yet to be. The past is that form which has alreayd been experienced. The present is that which is still active. If these three did not exist in reality, then knowledge would not have been possible. Knowledge is not possible in the absence of the object of knowledge.[1]

It would be wrong to assume that Vyāsa here is endorsing the views

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[1] atītānāgatām svarūpato'styadhvabhedāddharmāṇām, Yoga Sutra, op. cit., 4.12; Bhaviṣyadvyaktikamanāgatam, anu bhūtvyaktikamtītam, svavyāpāropārūḍham vartamānam trayam caitadvastu jñānasya jñeyam. Yadī caitatsvarupato nābhaviṣyannedam nirviṣayam jñānamudapatsyata, tasmādatītānāgatam svarūpato 'stīti, Vyāsa Bhasya on Yoga Sūtra, 4.12, op. cit.

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of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who also grants that past, present and future possess objective reality. According to the latter these moments are characterized by an independent existence which is mutually exclusive. Past, present and future surely are different modes of being. But, as Sāṁkhya-Yoga would put, these modes do not exclude each other materially. They coincide and comingle in the same being.[1] Past, present and future are not three points of time in which things exist. They are the three ways in which things pass from unmanifest to manifest and *vice-versa*. Since being of a thing is not different from the moment in which things exist and since there is no coming of being from non-being it will be wrong to assume as the Vaiśeṣika does that the three moments of being imply their mutually exclusive existences. It is this existential inseparability and functional distinguishability of the three moments that is recognized and asserted by Vyāsa when he maintains that past, present and future exist in reality.

The fundamental difference between Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika lies in the latter's acceptance of the reality of non-being (*Abhāva*) as a self-subsisting mode of existence. For Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika past and future

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Also see Samkhya Karika 33 and commentaries on it: trikālamābhyantaram mano'haṁkārabuddhirūpam karaṇam pravartate buddhirvartamānam ghatam buddhyate atītam bhaviṣyantam ca smarati.....yat evam tasmāducyate trikālamābhyantaram karaṇam iti; *Māṭharavṛtti*, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
triṣvapi kāleṣu vyavasthitam viṣayamavagāhate gṛhṇāti yasmāt, tasmāt trividhamantaḥkaraṇaṁ buddhyādi dvārī bhavati.....ebhirdvārabhūtairantaḥkaraṇaṁ viṣayān gṛhṇāti. *Jayamangalā*, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

[1] tadetkālatattvasya padārthāntarātakhaṇḍanārthamaḥ santu ta iti; Svaminarayan's *Kirnāvali* on the *Tattva Kaumudī*, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

possess reality in the mode of non-being (abhāva). However, Sāṁkhya-Yoga convincingly argues that such existence in the mode of non-being is inconceivable precisely because there is no non-existence, in a literal sense, of an existing being. The present is nothing else but the manifested form of the unmanifest past. The future, which has not yet come to be manifested exists in the present in unmanifest form. Thus the past subsists in the body of the present and future also is contained there in the fullness of being. Supporting this existential comingling or the dialectic of past, present and future it is pointed out by Vacaspati Miśra:

> If the past and future (the existence of being in sublatent and unmanifest form) are non-existent because they are not in the present, then the present (existence of being in the manifest form) also would be non-existent, because it is not in the past or future. The existence is applicable or characteristic of all the three forms, for it is real irrespective of the characteristics of these.[1]

A more comprehensive and clear understanding of Sāṁkhya-Yoga position on this important issue warrants a somewhat lengthy but extremely important citation in the same tenor as above from Vyāsa where he has tried to present the Sāṁkhya-Yoga position in a very clear way. Vyāsa puts his views in the following words:

> ...And the mutation of time-variation is the restriction having the three time-variations, (that is) connected with the three time forms (adhvan). This (restriction) one may say puts aside the first time-form whose variation is yet

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[1] yadi tu vartamānatvābhāvādātītā nāgatayorasattvaṁ hanta bho vartamānasyāpyabhāvotītānāgatvābhāvāt, Vācaspati Miśra, Tattva Vaiśāradi, op. cit., p. 166.

> to come, and passes into the present time-variation, without however passing out of its state as external aspect. But in this (condition) it becomes manifest as being what it is. This is its second time-form. And it is not completely severed from past or future time-variations. Likewise emergence has the three time variations; it is connected with the three time-forms. Having put aside the present time-variation it passes over into the past time-variation, without however passing out of its state as external aspect. This is the third time form. And it is not completely severed from the future and the present time-variations. In the same manner, emergence completing itself again (as a phenomenalized form) having put aside the the future time variation, and not having passed out of its state as external aspect, passes into the present time-variation. <u>In which (time), since this (emergence) manifests itself as it is, it obtains its functional activity</u>. This is the second time-form of this emergence. And it is not completely released from the past and future time-variations.[1] (emphasis added)

Thus, according to Vyāsa what distinguishes the present mode of being from the past and the future is not existence in the mode of being (<u>bhāva</u>) and non-being (<u>abhāva</u>) as the Vaisesika maintains, but the "functional activity" (<u>vyāpārah</u>) that characterizes the present moment of existence. Now, we have seen that according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga activity and existence are identical in the strictest sense of the term. If the two are identical, what is the justification for asserting that the functional activity belongs only to the present mode of existence? At this precise

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[1]Woods, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 212-213.

Lakṣaṇapariṇāmaśca nirodhaḥ trilakṣaṇah tribhiradhvabhiryuktaḥ. Sa khalvanāgatalakṣaṇamadhvānaṁ prathamaṁ hitvā dharmatvamanatikrānto vartamānlakṣaṇaṁ pratipanno yatrāsya svarupenābhivyaktiḥ. Eso'sya dvitiyo'dhvā na cātitānāgatābhyāṁ lakṣaṇābhyāṁ viyuktaḥ.

tathāvyutthānam trilaksaṇaṁ tribhiradhvabhiryuktaṁ vartamānaṁlaksaṇaṁ hitvā dharmatvamanatikrāntamatitalakṣaṇaṁ pratipannam. eso'sya tṛtiyodhavā. Na cānāgatavartamānābhyāṁ laksaṇābhyāṁ viyuktam. Evam punaḥ vyutthānamupasaṁpadyamānamanāgataṁ lakṣanam hitva dharmatvamanatikrāntaṁ vartmānam lakṣaṇaṁ pratipannam. yatrāsya svarūpābhivyaktau satyāṁ <u>vyāpāraḥ</u>. Eso'sya dvitīyo'dhvā na cātītānāgatābhyāṁ lakṣaṇābhyāṁ viyuktamiti. <u>Vyāsa Bhāṣya</u> on the <u>Yoga Sūtra</u>, 3.13, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 110-111.

point that a careful understanding of the two kinds of activity or change that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga speaks of seems in order.

The Sāṁkhya-Yoga distinguishes between two kinds of change that the being undergoes. (1) Svarupa Parināma (homogeneous change) and (2) Virupa Pariṇāma (heterogeneous change). The being in its unmanifest stage (Prakṛiti) undergoes the first kind of change. It is the stage where being has not entered the realm of consciousness, i.e. it remains unmanifest. Changes or activity that characterizes this mode of existence does not involve encounter with the cognizing self. As such existence in this mode remains inoperative or functionally neutral. It is only when existence assumes the present form, i.e. enters into the field of consciousness (kṣetra) that it becomes functionally active.

An objection may be raised at this point with regard to the existence of being in the mode of past moment which is described as devoid of functional activity. The problem here, as it is stated by a classical commentator, is:

> If only the being, which performs efficient activity alone is real, or ultimate, then how can (a being remaining in the past course) be real, for it (the efficient activity) is absent in the past course.[1]

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[1]nanu yadevārthakriyākārī tadeva paramārthasadityatīte'dhvi tadabhāvātkatham sattvam; The Vakyapadiyam by Bhaṛtrhari with a Commentary by Helarāja, Varanasi: Benarasa Sanskrit Series, 1928, 3.9.55, p. 363.

Sāṁkhya-Yoga answer of the dilemma consists in their assertion that the existence of thing is not contingent upon their performing a purposeful action or possessing the quality of functional activity. Sāṁkhya-Yoga does not consider the existence of a thing on account of the purposeful action that it performs. Rather they understand activity in its purest form as characterizing the existence of a thing per se. It is the principle of activity discernible in a thing in its purest state (pralaya) that ultimately constitutes the ground for functional activity in the manifest world.

The existence of material objects according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga possesses three strata namely sattva, rajas and tamas. Thus:

> Just as the three gunas, characteristic of serenity (sattva) activity (rajas) and inertia (tamas), though existing simultaneously on account of their eternity, acquire the subordinate and principal relation and give rise to peculiar modifications in a way of their own splendour, same way, (the three) time divisions, by the magnificence of their own power, effect sequence in the difference (of beings).[1]

Thus, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are considered as the three powers constitutive of the very existence of being.[2] It is on account of these powers that a being is capable of maintaining itself as existent in both

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[1]This discerful understanding of the tri-gunas relating it to the three divisions of time is attributed to Kapila by Helarāja in his commentary on Vakyapadiyam: Pāramarṣanye satatapariṇāmisu sattvarajastamasām śaktimātramātitadikālabhedasamākhyam, tathā ca sarveṣām bhavanam gunatryarūpattvācchaktitrayayogitve yathāyatham śaktyudbhavānubhyam sadasattvena vyavahārah.

[2]'Being' here is used in the sense of objective being, i.e. Prakṛti. When we speak of existence being characterized by sattva, tamas and rajas, we, of course, refer to the existence of the being which is existentially grounded in Prakṛti. Purusa or the transcendental consciousness is in principle untouched or unaffected by these guṇas.

the manifest and the non-manifest states. Past and future moments of being, on account of the preponderance of tamas are responsible for the enclosing of Enclosing is the nature of inertia precisely because it is discerned as the one which is heavy and obstructing (guru varaṇakam eva tamaḥ).[1] The present moment is equal to illumination that shows or manifests being and as such is characterized by sattva, for sattva is considered to be the principle of illumination (sattvam laghu prakāśakam iṣtam).[2] But it is activity which is characterized by rajas (upastambhakam calaṁ ca rajaḥ)[3] and as such belongs to all the three moments of existence. As Helarāja comments in this context: "It (rajas) is a peculiarity of time and it is connected with everything. Rajas, being the inciter through suspension and permission, conformable to function is indeed the soul of time."[4] Further it is pointed out that the temporal status of the moment is determined by the predominance of the powers of the gunas. Thus:

> Just like the three ingredients, having the characters of serenity (sattva), activity (rajas) and inertia (tamas), though existing simultaneously due to their eternity, acquire the subordinate and principal relation and effect

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[1] The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., 13.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Rajastu pravṛttisāmānyamkālasvarūpam sarvatrānvayi pratibandhābhyanujñābhyām pravarttamānam preraṇārūpam rajaḥ kālātmakameva. Helarāja in the Vakyapadīya, op. cit., p. 361.

> beings through their peculiar evolution, in a proper manner in the splendour of their own course of action, so also, these (three) time-divisions, by the magnificence of their own power, (become) capable of effecting sequence in external aspects (lit. in the difference of beings)."[1]

However, Helraja insists that this position of Sāṁkhya-Yoga reflects inconsistency in as much as it tends to differentiate between the external aspects (Dharma) and the possesser of the external aspect (dharmi). Basing his argument on Patanjali's Yogasūtra stating that the "external aspects possess three courses (dharmas tryadhvānaḥ)" Helarāja concurs with Bhartṛhari that Sāṁkhya-Yoga too like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is susceptible to the charge that temporal determinations have as their referrent the external limiting adjuncts.[2] However, it seems to us that the charge is not quite fair and even tends to obscure Sāṁkhya-Yoga's basic theoretical position.

It may be appropriate at this point to reproduce the passage on which the aforesaid charge of Bhartṛhari is based. The passage under consideration reads as follows:

> The bearer of the external aspect (dharmi) does not possess the three courses, the external aspects (dharma) possesses the three courses; they (i.e. the external aspects) characterized by them (i.e. the three courses) and obtaining different states, are referred to as different. (And this reference is)

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[1] Tadyathā trayaḥ sattvarajastamolakṣaṇā guṇo nityatvādyugapadavasthāna api.......yathāyatham svavṛttyullāse vicitrapariṇāmān bhāvānāmuparacayanti , tatheme kālabhedāḥ svaśaktimāhātmyādbhavabhedeṣu kramoparacanacaturā ityarthaḥ. Ibid., p. 361.

[2] Ibid.

due to the alien state (of external aspects) and not due to the alien substance. Likewise (an external aspect), having forgone its future character, obtains the present character. But (it is) not separated from (its) future and past (characters).[1]

It is in the statement that "it is not separated from the (its) future and past (character)" that the clue to the basic position of Yoga-Sūtra lies. If Vyāsa were to agree that temporal determinations have as their referrent the external limiting adjuncts then he would not be able to hold the position that the present moment is inseparable from the moment of past and future. The statement that the dharmas tryadhvānah must be read in the context of their discussion as to the origin and ground of sequence perceptible in the phenomenal world. It is true that the dharmas seem to pass through three courses and that as such they give rise to the notion of sequence in objectivities. But it is precisely this appearance of sequence in the phenomenal world that the Sāmkhya-Yoga tradition tend to question. The point is made in the Bhāṣya 3.13 and is further clarified and illustrated in 3.52 where it is pointed out by Vācaśpati that the succession as such is only a conceptual product without any ground in reality.

In the present there is a single moment and there are no earlier or later moments. There is no combination of them. But those moments which are past and future are to be explainted as inherent in the mutations. Accordingly, the whole world passes through a mutation in a single moment.[2]

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[1]Na dharmī tryadhvā dharmāstu tryadhvānaḥ. te lakṣitā alakṣitāśca tam tamavasthām prapnuvantonyatvena pratinirdiśyante 'vasthāntarato na dravyantaratah. Vyāsa Bhaṣya on the Yoga Sūtra, op. cit., 3.13.

[2]Tasmādvartmana evaikah kṣaṇo na purvottarakṣanāh santīti. tasman nasti tatsamāhārah. ye tu bhutabhāvina kṣaṇās te pariṇāmanvitā vyākhyeyāḥ. tenaikena kṣaṇena kṛtsno lokaḥ pariṇāmam anubhavati. Ibid., 3.52.

According to Sāṁkhya-Yoga there is no togetherness of moments and there is no synthesis of them with succession either; a moment and its succession do not co-exist. It hardly makes any sense to speak of the succession of a single moment. Succession does not belong to any moment.[1] It is rather the relation (of priority and posteriority) or order of moments. But the relation is here no part of the relata. Moments do not possess succession as their constituent. Succession, therefore, is conceptual rather than real.[2] Each moment is real, which is neither a combination of moments nor their combination with succession. For combination is possible only of co-existing entities, and co-existence here, from the very nature of the case, is impossible.[3]

Grounds of Temporal Determinations

A realistic philosophy, which Sāṁkhya-Yoga is, denying the reality of one independent, transcendental unitary Time and accepting the reality of the Moment (kṣaṇa) alone is faced with the problem of explicating conceptually the ontological status of the moment as Now and its relationship to the moments which are described as the past and the future.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika advocates the fundamental oneness and conditional

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1 .....tasmānnāsti tatsamāhāraḥ.....*Ibid.*

2 .....ayam kālo vastuśunyo pi..buddhinirmāṇah śabdajñānanupati...*Ibid.*

3 Kṣaṇastu vastupatītaḥ kramāvalambī, kramaśca kṣaṇānantaryātmā... na ca dvau ksnau asahabhavataḥ. Kramaśca na dvayoḥ sahabhuvoh asambhavāt, pūrvasmāduttarasya bhāvino yadānantarya kṣaṇasya sa kramaḥ. *Ibid.*

manyness of the Time.[1] Time according to them, is one, unitary and indivisible in its essence but it acquires temporal distinctions on account of its association with external limiting adjuncts. However, these temporal determinations far from being unreal possess a conditional or relative reality and are to be located within Time constituting its perceptible limitations from which alone the reality of a single unitary Time is to be inferred. Bhartṛhari and Helarāja, find it difficult to concede to their acceptance of the reality (even conditional or relative) of temporal determinations. According to them, these temporal determinations are not constitutive of time, even though they are consequent to Time's association with extraneous factors. Kāla by its own power by 'hindrance' (pratibandha) and 'let' (abhyanujña) produces the semblance of time-succession in action.[2] Hence Time though essentially one appears as many. Kāla

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[1] There is only one time which is omnipresent in dimension, individual in character, and has the qualities of conjunction and disjunction. Conventional notions, as moment, minute, hower, etc. are derived by abstraction from concrete time. According to the Vaiśeṣika time is an eternal substance and the basis of all experience.....

Temporal relations are dependent on the terms related. There is no sooner or later, before or after, apart from events and actions. Time is perceived as a qualification of objects, and is therefore a substantive reality. Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., p. 191.

[2] tamasya lokayantrasya sutradhāram pracakṣate pratibandhabhyanujñābhyām tena viśvam vibhajyate //4//

pratibaddhāś ca yās tena citrā viśvasya vṛttayah tāh sa evānujānāti yathā tantuḥ śakuntinaḥ //15//

pratibandhābhyanujñābhyām vṛttir yā tasya śaśvatī tayā vibhajyamāno 'sau bhajate kramarūpatām //30//

Bhartrhari, The Vākyapadīya, op. cit., pp. 343, 347, and 352.

according to them is a power (Śakti)[1] of Brahman. This Time (Kāla) as the power of Brahman is one, independent and indivisible, and all-pervasive. Bhartṛhari declares unequivocally that all other generated, dependent subject forces are pervaded by Kāla, which alone is independent and follow the operation of this Śakti in their working.[2] It is further maintained that "Kāla is the instrumental cause in the creation, persistence and destruction of all things that have an origin, etc. ... Kāla seems to be itself diversified by the diversity of limiting adjuncts, (but) things are diversified in conjunction with it."[3]

Thus the fundamental difference between Bhartṛhari and Nyāya Vaiśeṣika lies in their understanding of the nature and structure of temporal determinations. While Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits that it is because of the conjunction with the external adjuncts such as the solar motion, activity and change that the one, undifferentiated time becomes differentiated into mutually exclusive determinations. For Bhartṛhari, Time though itself

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[1]Kalākhyā svàtantryaśaktirbrahmaṇa itiḥ, tatra Bhartṛharerabhiprāya..... Helaraja, Ibid., p. 365.

[2]Kālākhyena hi svātantryena sarvaḥ paratantra jamavtyaḥ śaktayaḥ samāviṣṭaḥ kālaśaktivṛttimānupatanti. Ibid.

[3]Utpattau ca sthitau cāpi vinaśe cāpitadvatām nimittam kālamevāhur vibhaktenātmanā sthitam //3//
Saṁsargiṇām tu vo bhedo viśeṣās tasya te mataḥ saṁbhinnas tairavasthānām kālo bhedaya kalpate //8//
Ibid., pp. 343 and 344.

unchangeable, is the cause of all change, motion and order. Thus he writes: "The division of the "Sun's" progress to the north and to the south (āyana), the fixed movement of the heavenly bodies and the destruction and creation of all beings are due to time."[1] Commenting on this Kārikā Helarāja elucidates:

> Why the sun rises and sets at regular hours, why the moon shines for the night and not for the day, why the sun moves for six months along the southern path (dakṣiṇāyana) and for six months along the northern path (uttarāyana), why the planets and stars move in particular order - all these can be explained as being due to the all-pervasive and all-powerful nature of Kāla. The coming into existence and passing out of existence, the appearance and disappearance of all objects is caused by time alone.[2]

Thus the solar motion, activity and change the so-called external adjuncts which are ascribed the function of limiting the infinite dimension and constituting the Time determinations as part and parcel of Time according to Vaiśeṣika are conceived by Bhartṛhari as the very product of the power of Time. It is equally important to note that only after having established the nature of the adjuncts which in association with the unitary Time give rise to the semblance of multiplicity and further by articulating the status of these temporally distinct adjuncts that both Bhartrhari and Vaiśeṣika embark upon a conceptual clarification of the nature and status of temporal determinations comprehended as past, present and future.

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[1] Ayanapravibhāgaśca gatiśca jyotiṣām dhruvā nivṛttiprabhavāścaiva bhūtānām tannibandhanāḥ //43// Ibid., p. 357.

[2] Dakṣiṇāyanamuttarāyaṇamiti, kālakṛtamaryādāyattaḥ pravibhagaḥ, nakṣatrāṇām ca niyatā gatirudayāstādirūpā kālamanupatati, mahābhūtānām ca sargapralayasamaye janmavināśāvāvirbhāvatirobhāvalakṣaṇau kālayattāviti... Helaraja, Ibid., p. 357.

Sāṁkhya-Yoga questions the validity of the assumption that temporal determinations are the product of conjunction of Time with external adjuncts.[1] Activities, change or motion which are supposed to be the external limiting adjuncts by the Vaiśeṣikas giving rise to the notion of temporal determinations themselves, Sāṁkhya-Yoga would say, cannot be conceived in any other way except in terms of their identity with the moment in which that said activity or change takes place and is cognized. What is given in our perception is the activity or the change as such taking place in one specific moment. No activity or change can be conceived in abstraction from activity or change.

Yuktidīpikā maintains that all activities or change is constituted of a series of events or uninterrupted flow of events, each moment of the series containing in itself the previous moment in its sublatent form and the forthcoming moment in its potential form.[2] These moments in the series do not depend on any substantial reality of Time. The moments in themselves are the ultimate unit existing independently of any substantive reality conceived either as an infinite ubiquitous substance or as an ubiquitous power. It does not have a secondary or derivative reality as the Vaiśeṣikas maintain.

The Vaiśeṣikas are mistaken when they maintain that change cannot be explained without the postulation of Time as the eternal background of

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[1]The Tattvakaumudī of Vacaspati Miśra and also Swaminarayan's Kirṇāvali; op. cit., p. 351.

[2]The Yuktidīpikā, op. cit., p. 74.

change. For them the postulation of an eternal background of change is a necessity for accounting the continuity and succession for the reason that it is of the nature of the effect to arise anew. All events and actions, according to Vaiśeṣikas, have a totally fresh origination and are liable to total annihilation. As such they need the category of Time to account for continuity and succession. But, for Sāṁkhya, Time is not a factor which brings change in any entity. All entities are subject to change every moment; for the entity in itself contains the potentiality of the would-be state of itself. Change is only the manifesting of what is unmanifest. In and through change the thing is constituted in its diverse phases.[1]

Thus, Sāṁkhya-Yoga rejects the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas acceptance of Time as the material cause which in conjunction with external adjuncts give rise to temporally determined or distinct entities, a sequence or succession which is regarded by them characterizing the process of change. "According to the Vaiśeṣika time is one and cannot account future (distinctions) etc. Accoridng to them division of future, etc., is caused or originate from the superimposition of the distinction of adjuncts. According to Sāṁkhya teachers, (these distinctions of adjuncts alone can be the cause of future, etc., (divisions) etc., in need for another

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[1]See Das Gupta, S. N., <u>History of Indian Philosophy</u>, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 310.

tattva in the form of time."[1] The author of <u>Yuktidīpikā</u> emphasises this point when he maintains that time is not a factor which brings any change in any entity. If at all it may only be conceived as a concept enabling or helping the intellect in comprehending the relation among the moments of change, but not as a reality or entity existing for the sake of change, i.e. causing change (kālastu sambandhamātropakārī na vikrīyahetuḥ).[2]

Up to this point, our analysis of Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of change has enabled us to see the theoretical inconsistencies inherent in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas postulation of the absolute reality of Time and limited or relative reality of the moment of change conceived as a product of the external limiting adjunct. But we have not succeeded in meeting the challenge posed by Bhartṛhari and Helarāja who, instead of ascribing a relative status to the moment of change, totally deny any status of reality independent of time, whatsoever. Their challenge to Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of the reality of the moment is of a more serious order and has far reaching consequences. It is in their criticisms of Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of change and causation that Bhartṛhari and Helarāja's greatest merit lies and it is on Sāṁkhya-Yoga's success or

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[1]kālaśca vaiśeṣikābhimata eko na anāgatādivyavahārabhedaṁ pravartyitumaharti tasmādāyaṁ yairupādhibhedairanāgatādibhedaṁ pratipadyate santu ta evopāyāḥ, ye'nāgatāvyavahārahetavaḥ, kṛtamatrantagaḍunā kālēneti.sāṁkhyācāryāḥ. tasmānn kālarūpatattvāntarabhyupagamaiti. <u>Sāṁkhya Tattvakaumudī</u> of Vācaspati Miśra, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 112.

[2]<u>Yuktidīpikā</u>, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 74.

failure in defending its theory of change and the reality of the moment that the viability of the theoretical foundation of Sāṁkhya-Yoga depends.

Bhartṛhari tends to agree with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga criticisms of the Vaiśeṣika proposition that the ground of temporal determinations is to be located in the external conditioning factors. Bhartṛhari unequivocally declares that any attempt to explain the reality of temporal determinations on the basis of the conditioning factor is bound to land itself in self-contradiction.

However, despite this initial agreement as to the untenability of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of the conditioning factor being the ground of temporal differences, Bhartṛhari and Sāṁkhya-Yoga part company on the further question of the ground of such temporal differentiations. While both of them agree that the locus or the source of temporal differentiations, change and activity must not be sought in the external conditioning factors, they radically differ in their discernment of the locus.

For Bhartṛhari, the locus of the temporal differentiation is Time itself. According to Bhartṛhari Time possesses the power of pratibandha and abhyanuja through which it gives rise to the semblance of temporal differentiations. But despite the fact that it is Kāla itself which is responsible for the temporal differentiations it also remains the eternal background of continuity and permanence. For Bhartrhari this Kāla Śakti is identical with Brahman which alone is the transcendental ground of all phenomenalization.[1]

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[1]Kālākhyā svātantryāśaktirbrahmaṇa itiḥ; tatra Bhartṛharerabhiprāya... And also.....brahmatattvaṁ vidyāmayaṁ kālakalitamavidyāvaśātkramarūpopagrahena..... Helarāja, op. cit., pp. 365 and 366.

This interpretation of the ground of temporal determinations is in congruence with the Sabda Brahmanvadins understanding of the nature of causation and change. While agreeing with Sāṁkhya's Satkāryavāda that it is the cause itself that undergoes change and the entity retains its essential identity through change, Bhartṛhari modifies the Satkāryavāda to assert that the change as such can only be an appearance (vivarta), since the reality remains essentially identical in and through change. All the temporal differentiations then are nothing more than an appearance of it precisely because in and through these temporal differentiations it is the permanence of Time as the Kāla-Śakti of Brahman that is revealed. Moreover, since for Bhartṛhari and Helarāja dharmi is not different from dharma,[1] Brahman is not different from his power and as such it is Brahman that constitutes the ground of all change and causation.

Now, Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophers would find this understanding of causation and change quite unacceptable. Starting from the datum presented to the cognizing self, Sāṁkhya-Yoga thinkers conclude that the fact of change and causation becomes intelligible only in the context of the reality of the entities undergoing change. The permanence or the continuity

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[1] Bhartṛhari, op. cit., 3.9.54, p. 362; Helarāja, Ibid., 362.

through the moments of change that Bhartṛhari and Helarāja seek to account for by postulating Time as the eternal background of change actually is inherent in the very nature of things, for nothing which is existent can cease to be and the non-existent can never come into being. That which provides the continuity and permanence through change is nothing but the being itself which is undergoing change, and which retains its identity in and through change.[1] The entity which is constituted in and through its non-manifest and manifest phases itself is the ground of continuity and permanence. Temporal differentiations conceived by Sāṁkhya-Yoga as moments of existence do not imply a transcendental reality of Time as the ground of this change and the basis of permanence and continuity.

Some Concluding Observations

There are fundamental points of disagreements between Sāṁkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Bhartṛhari on the question of the reality of Time and the ground and nature of temporal sequence and change. There is, according to the Saṁkhya, no unitary, transcendental and single entity which is given to us in our cognitions as the ground of all temporal change and succession. There is no such thing as a transcendental time which in conjunction with some external factors, conditions change and sequence

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[1]Vyāsa Bhāṣya on Yoga Sūtra, 3.13.

Change is inherent in the very nature of things and the continuity or permanence through change is accounted for by the persistence of that which changes. Thing or the being itself is the ground of both the change and permanence.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, maintains that it is plausible to speak of transcendental time. Time is essentially indivisible and unitary. Temporal differentiations or multiplicity of the empirical time notions are product of some external factors or adjuncts that somehow limit the unitary, single and essentially indivisible time. These external factors are the facts of change and activities such as solar motion that operate as the limiting adjuncts on Time and therefore give rise to a temporal experience of change and continuity. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, while the transcendental Time is essentially unitary and indivisible, temporal differentiations and succession are introduced into its structure on account of its conjunction with the external limiting adjuncts. These temporal determinations are accorded a limited but independent reality.

Bhratṛihari is in agreement with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in accepting the reality of one, unitary, indivisible and transcendental time. However, he disagrees with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on one important point. Temporal differentiation according to Bhartrihari is not a product of external adjuncts which tend to constitute a limitation on one and essentially indivisible Time. Change or activities are not independent realities over against the reality of Time. They cannot constitute any limitation on Time. How then are we to account for the fact of change and continuity in the

manifest world? Bhartrihari's answer is that Time has certain powers on account of which it gives rise to the appearance of change. Continuity is accounted by the fact that through all the changes Time continues as the eternal and transcendental background of all activities.

The Sāṁkhya differs from both Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Bhartṛhari fundamentally. It does not accept the reality of one, unitary indivisible Time as the transcendental background of all change and continuity. Against both of them it maintains the reality only of the moment of change. The idea of change does not necessarily involve the notion of Time. Postulation of Time as the transcendental background of all change and motion is only a construction of intellect. More specifically, against Bhartṛhari it would argue that we do not need the category of Time to account for continuity either. Ground for continuity and permanence through all changes and motion is present in the very structure of being or thing. The thing itself persists through all change and motion, and that explains the element of continuity.

Significantly, for Sāṁkhya-Yoga existence and activity are not two different things. Existence is invariably characterized by change, and even in the so-called Pralayāvasthā Prakṛti (the world) is constantly undergoing change. Change is the very nature of objective being and as such temporal determinations as various moments of change are not adventitious to its being. It is wrong to look for continuity and permanence outside the structure of change. Our notions of one eternal unitary indivisible Time is a product of such misconceptions.

The confusion of permanence with the Time arises from one's inability to see the possibility of change being inherent in the very structure of bieng. But Sāṁkhya-Yoga proposes a strictly dynamic conception of reality where change is the very mode of objective being. In consonance with this conception it is quite feasible to conceive of 'timeless change' or change without Time. Sen in a recent article has successfully argued in favour of Sāmkhya-Yoga that time is not a necessary component in our notion of change and that the concept of 'timeless change' is not self-contradictory: He makes the following point:

> We are interested to know whether the concept of change (which signifies a very common and well-known phenomenon) invariably or necessarily contains the idea of time. Change as such means any kind of alteration and transformation, which may be said to be one of the commonest facts of experience. It may be thought that the mere idea of alteration or transformation need not necessarily include the concept of time. Time may be thought to be necessary for the understanding or explanation of change, but that would be going beyond change to the intellectual comprehension of its possibility.[1]

Our discussion of Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of the problem of time and temporality, thus far, attempted to comprehend the objective element in the experience of temporality. We tried to show that for Sāṁkhya-Yoga temporality is intrinsic to the structure of change as examplifying essential finitude of phenomenal existence. However, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, finitude and change are only one aspect of reality, the other is infinitude or eternity of pure consciousness being the dialectical counterpart of the sphere of objectivity characterized by change and transformation. How is

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[1] Sen, S. K., op. cit., pp. 410-411.

this principle of pure consciousness or eternity related to the sphere of objectivity and change? What is the exact nature of their relationship? What are the implications of this relation for the subject or pure consciousness? These are the questions to which we will address ourselves in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V

TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TEMPORALITY

Subject and Subjectivity

We have reached a stage in our analysis where the question of the relationship of the transcendental subject (Puruṣa) and the subject as world-involved (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure), which is the ground of all temporal constitutions, demands our immediate attention. Within Sāṁkhya-Yoga frame of reference, Puruṣa may be described as the pure subject or the transcendental consciousness which is the formal, ontological ground of all conscious acts and experiencing.[1] This pure subject is not the experiencer or the agent of any activity or willing. However, in its embodiment (Śarīrī)[2] as the subject which is at the same time world-

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[1]It is important to note that according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga agency does not belong to the Puruṣa. Agency and activity belongs to the antaḥkaraṇa (the internal organs). But agency and activity, in as much as it involves conscious reflection, choice and decision, is contingent upon the antaḥkaraṇa's reflection of the consciousness that is Puruṣa. Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure seems to involve the form of consciousness on account of its proximity to the transcendental subject. Equally important to remember that even though Puruṣa is not the agent or actor, it remains the bhoktā (enjoyer) of the results or effects ensuing from these acts. Thus it is said: Akarturapi phalôpabhogo'nnādyavat, The Sāṁkhya Sūtra, op. cit., 1.105; ahaṁkāraḥ kartā na puruṣaḥ, Ibid., 6.54; also, buddhyādhyavasitamarthaṁ puruṣaścetayata, The Jayamaṅgalā, op. cit., p. 42.

[2]The empiric subject, the subject which is the agent of all activity and willing is always associated with a body. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga makes a distinction between three kinds of body. The empiric subject (Buddhi-Ahaṁkara) cannot be conceived in isolation from subtle body or the Sukṣma Śarīra.

involved, it is none other than the agent of all activity and willing. As such the world-involved subject is essentially 'subjectivity'[1] (subject as activity). Subjectivity as embodiment is essentially the existent. Pure subject or transcendental consciousness is real, but is not exhausted by existence. The existent is that which is both real and active.[2] Actuality (being existent and active) is the mark of subjectivity. Pure subject (Puruṣa) however transcends the mode of actuality. The mode of being of pure subject or transcendental consciousness (Puruṣa) is, thus, inherently to be distinguished from that of subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure).

The Empiric Subject and Temporality

To maintain this essential difference in the mode of bieng of subject as embodiment (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure) and of being of pure subject (Puruṣa) is important within Samkhya-Yoga ontological frame of reference. For Sāṁkhya-Yoga the former constitutes the core of our empiric

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[1] The distinction between subject as subjectivity and the transcendental subject is an important distinction. Transcendental subject is that which essentially is not involved in the world. Subject as subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure) is, the subject that orients itself to the world. To be more precise, world is the project of this subject, for it is the principle of activity and agency. Pure subject (Puruṣa), on the other hand, transcends the realm of activity and agency. It is pure consciousness, without any subject-object distinction.

[2] We consider this distinction between real and existent to be central for an intelligible articulation of the temporal mode of being. Temporality is constitutive of existent whereas it is not intrinsic to the real. Existent is always real, but real is not necessarily existent. The distinction, it may be noted, is not (contra Advaita Vedanta), as between real and what is not-real, but between different grades of reality. There is no ontology of counter reality in Sāṁkhya-Yoga.

being as the manifold of world-experience (adhyavasāya)[1] and is what is pre-thematically aware of itself.[2] It is in and through the mode of reflection that Buddhi comes to be self-aware and constitutes as such the core of the I-ness (Ahaṁkāra).[3] It declares its essential I-ness (Ahaṁkāra) as that which is possessed of thematizing capacity and is aware of itself as such (self-awareness). It is in this mode of reflection that it also discovers itself as that which is world-involved through its 'faculties' (Manas and Indriyas).[4] Thus subjectivity as existent is the structure of world-involvement which has its material ontological basis in embodiment. The empiric subject (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra) is, definitionally, world-involved and includes both bodily acts or behaviour and different forms of acts of consciousness as modified by the structure of embodiment. Subjectivity, (subject as activity) then, is neither more nor less than these bodily acts and modes of consciousness as they are experienced by

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[1]adhyavasāyaśca niścayākhyastasyāsādhāraṇī vṛttirityarthaḥ..... asyāśca buddhermahattvaṁ svetarasakalakāryavyāpakatvan-mahaiśvaryacca mantavyam; The Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya, Vijñānabhikṣu, op. cit., 2.13

[2]Buddhi is the structure of the emergence of consciousness without any self-awareness. It has innate possibility of all merits as well as the opposite. But it is not aware of its own possibilities nor does it identify itself as such. That is the function of Ahaṁkāra.
dharmajñānavairāgyaiśvaryāṇyapi budhaupādānakāni, nahaṁkārady-upādānakāni; budhereva niratiśayasattvakāryatvādityartha , Ibid., 2.14

[3]abhimāno ahaṁkāraḥ; The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., 24; ahaṁ karotītyahaṁkāraḥ.....buddhyā niścita evārthe 'haṁkāramamakārau jayete; Vijnanabhiksu, The Sāṁkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya, op. cit., 2.16.

[4]In the use of the term there is no suggestion of a psycholgocial understanding involved. The use of the expression faculty is to indicate functional differences within one psyche. The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit. 24-26; The Sāṁkhya Sūtra, op. cit., 2.16.

the "I" (Ahaṁkāra), as they are 'lived' concretely and immediately by the subject aware of itself as such (self-aware).

It is true that our bodily existence is not devoid of awareness. A certain amount of awareness is built into the very mode of our being as an embodiment. However this awareness in itself (being of Buddhi) is pre-thematic and pre-reflective, but constitutes the phenomenal condition of thematization and conscious reflection. An implicit, non-thematic awareness attends experiential behaviour and acts of reflective consciousness (self-awareness) belonging to subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra). A more explicit act of self-consciousness is conditioned by an experiential priority of the non-thematic awareness (the being of Buddhi).

However, it is precisely in the subject's act of reflection (the being of Buddhi) that the possibility of the recovery of the transcendental subject (subject transcending the act of self-consciousness and the realm of subjectivity) opens up. The mode of being of self as reflection (Buddhi) is also the mode of acquiring the discriminative awareness (Viveka) by the self-reflecting self.[1] In the mode of self-reflection, the self-reflective self makes the pre-thematic awareness of bodily acts and conscious acts thematically conscious, i.e. as object to the self-reflecting self. This is the mode of transcendence or objectification

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[1]kṣaṇatatkramayoḥ samyamāvivekajaṁ jñānam, The Yoga Sūtra, op. cit., 3.52; See Vyāsa's Bhaṣyas and Vacaspati Miśra's Tattva Vaiśaradī on the aforesaid Sūtra; ".....when by true wisdom the gunas are perceived as they are both the illusory notions of time and space vanish." Dasgupta, S. N., Indian Philosophy, op. cit., 256-257, n.2.; For a comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms of reflection and the different planes on which it operates see Dasgupta, Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, op. cit., pp. 150-165.

(making other) of the realm of subjectivity. This structure of transcendence by reflection (being of Buddhi) has its phenomenological correlate in the discriminative awareness (viveka) which is the condition for the recovery of the transcendental consciousness. Reflection is the rational mode of otherness. The relationship of otherness of the pure subject to the realm of subjectivity (subject as embodiment) is also the primary mode of the being of pure consciousness or the transcendental subject (Purusa) as a 'relation' of no relation bereft of all contents.[1]

Thus, the relationship of the transcendental consciousness (Puruṣa) to the things and being of the world (including the being of Buddhi and Ahaṁkāra as constitutive of subjectivity) is of a peculiar kind, i.e. it is a relation of no-relation or otherness (anyayoga) - it is precisely what things of the world are not.[2] The relationship is not external but dialectical.[3] It is a relationship of mutual opposition and cooperation,

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[1]The paradoxical expression of relation of no-relation or otherness is employed to suggest that even total otherness is given to reflection as a species of relation, rather than as no relation at all. In the discriminative self-reflection pure subject is understood with the help of the notion of the inoperative presence (sannidhi) which constitutes the condition of the bondage and its absence which marks its freedom. Either way for reflection it is a mode of relation.

[2]See Sāṁkhya Sūtra, op. cit., 2.8; Larson, J. G., op. cit., p. 188; Radhakrishnan, S., op. cit., pp. 287-291; Dasgupta, S. N., History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 238-241.

[3]See Jayamangala: etāni kimātmārtham svāṁ svāṁ vṛttim pratipadyante, kimanyārthamitāyaḥ-puruṣārtha eva heturiti, puruṣasyārtho visayopabhogah kaivalyam ca sa vṛttihetuḥ, Jayamaṅgalā, op. cit., p. 38; Also see Māṭharvṛtti: kim svārtha viṣayaṁ pratipadyante āhosvit parārthamityat rocyate. pararthamgamyate yasmādāh-puruṣārtha eva hetuḥ purusārthaḥ kartavya eva iti guṇa nām pravṛttih, p. 48.

of thematic exclusion but operational dependence.[1] Transcendental consciousness or the pure subject is not internally and necessarily related to the world of subjectivity, rather it is a relation of no-relation (or otherness). It is this relationship of otherness that gives rise to the emergence of subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure) as a specific moment in the dialectical relation between the world and pure consciousness. This subjectivity, the principle of I-ness, also constitutes the core of temporality.[2] It is a being which is essentially temporal. The actuality of our concrete experiential existence also provides the mode of the discernment of temporality. Herein we discover that the past is my past in my present. This synthesis of temporality as the mine-ness of subjectivity

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[1]The point emerges very clearly in the Sāṁkhya Kārikā itself. Karika .55 expresses the contradiction and pain suffered by Puruṣa on account of its association with the body:

> tatra jarāmaraṇa kṛtaṁ duḥkhaṁ prāpnoti cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ liṅgasyāvinivṛtteḥ tasmād duḥkhaṁ svabhāvena, The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., Kārikā 55.

Kārikā 56 brings out the element of cooperation by stating that it is on account of prakṛti that puruṣa can gain liberation:

> ityeṣa prakṛtikṛto mahadādiviśeṣbhūtaparyantaḥ pratipuruṣa vimokṣārthaṁ svārtha iva parārtha ārambhaḥ, Ibid., Karika 56.

The same idea of the thematic exclusion and operational dependence is continued in Kārikās 57, 58, 59, 60, 20 and 21.

[2]Temporality is defined as a function of internal organs which are the structure of the manifestation of the unmanifest prakṛti. These are Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra and Manas. Thus Sāṁkhya Kārikā says:

> antaḥkaraṇam trividham.....trikālamābhyantaram karaṇam, The Sāṁkhya Kārikā, op. cit., Karika 33.

Gauḍapādabhāṣya on the Kārikā reads as follows:

> trikālamābhyantaraṁ karaṇaṁ. Buddhyahaṁkāramanaṁsi trikālaviṣayāni buddhirvartamānaṁ ghaṭaṁ budhyate atītamanāgatam ceti. ahamkāro vartamane 'bhimānam karoti atīte 'nāgate ca. tathā mano vartamāne saṁkalpam kurute atīte 'nagate ca. evam trikālamābhyantaraṁ karaṇamiti, The Gauḍapādabhāṣya, op. cit., p. 132.

(Ahaṁkāra structure) is an ontological relation which unites the past to the present. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology would not claim that the past and present are identical. Evidently past is not present, i.e. there is a radical distinction between the two dimensions of temporal existence. But despite this fact that they are not identical, they are internally related through my subjectivity as my past and my present, i.e. they manifest a lived unity.[1]

The Transcendental Consciousness and the Temporal Structure

What then is the relationship of the transcendental subject (Puruṣa) which is, ontologically speaking, other than the world-involved subject (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure), to the temporal structuring of this world-involved subject? Within the Sāṁkhya-Yoga framework time and temporal relations of past, present and future cannot, ontologically speaking, be grounded in pure-consciousness or the transcendental subject (Puruṣa) which is intrinsically non-temporal.[2] Any attempt to locate the ontological ground of temporal relations in the transcendental subject (Puruṣa) which is essentially non-temporal will imply the reduction of the temporal dimensions of being to pure duration or, not-endurance which is not a case of endurance, but will be a thorough past, present and future, or trans-temporal unity. In such an event one will have to face the question of

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[1]The three internal organs of Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra, and Manas operate as unity. As such they constitute the internal relations of past, present, and future. Together these three constitute the empiric self, both in its impersonal and personal dimensions. However, it must be noted that Buddhi is primarily impersonal though individual. But this Buddhi is a necessary condition for the operation or functioning of Ahaṁkāra and Manas as the structure of tmeporal constitution.

[2]Cataline, F. V., op. cit., p. 60.

how the temporal determinations can emerge from the unity (of pure consciousness) per se. It may be argued that a pre-supposed unity alone is the context in which the change or temporal determination can be grasped and understood. However, Sāṃkhya-Yoga points out that only an unity which has a built-in structure of differentiation can account for temporal performance and temporal change. Prakrti is postulated as the realm of being which has such a structure.[1] This indeed is precisely the point that emerges in our analysis of Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of temporality. Within the Sāṁkhya-Yoga frame of reference the subjectivity as the principle of I-ness is the ground of the ontological distinction of past, present and future (as my past, my present and my future) precisely because this principle has its objective reference point in Prakrti (the world) which is the ground of temporal permanence and change.[2]

The empiric subjectivity is not an a-temporal identity.[3] Nor can it be described as a series of atomistic elements of consciousness which are contained in time. The best way to look at subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure) is to conceive it in its concreteness of the experiential order: it is the structural unity or an identity which holds

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[1]pariṇāminityatā guṇānāṁ, Vyāsa Bhaṣya on Yoga Sutra, op. cit., Sutra 4.33.

[2]See infra note 1, pp. 119-120.

[3]Only Puruṣa as the transcendental subject has an a-temporal identity. A-temporal identity refers to the intrinsic unchangeability characteristic of Puruṣa as the principle that transcends the realm of change and temporality. This may be described as permanence without change, i.e. kutasthanityatā (vide Vyāsa bhāṣya on Yoga-Sūtra, op. cit., Sūtra 4.33).

together the structural whole of temporal becoming. It must not be conceived in substantive terms. Subjectivity is not a substance underlying our experiences in different moments of existence. The substantive existence, the element of constancy and non-temporality belongs to the realm of pure subject or the transcendental consciousness (Puruṣa). Subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure), on the other hand, is continuously on the go. It is the structure of continual unfolding or manifestation of what is unmanifest.

Within the temporal structure, subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure) is not so much a subject present throughout any moment or a sort of substance. For according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga it is a continuous unfoldment or manifestation of that which has a relation of otherness with the transcendental subject as the constant witness of this unfoldment. The subjectivity then, is a kind of structure of temporal experience - the structure of the disclosing of the fact of change and movement within the very being of subjectivity. Thus subjectivity is a self-constituting synthesis of the temporal dimensions, a unification or identity of experience within the flux of that experience itself. It is the self-constituting unity of temporal experience itself.

Pure consciousness or the transcendental subject, however, is separated from this self-constituting unity of temporal experience in a radical way. Puruṣa is not temporal (either as change or as permanence)[1]. It is

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[1]The Sāṁkhya-Yoga makes a distinction between two types of permanence: the absolutely unchanging permanence (the principle of eternality which is essentially non-temporal in the sense that it is not subject to change) and

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immovable constant (kūtastha). It is not affected by past, present and future mode of being, for it is what it is: unaffected, self-identical, unchanged and unmoved.[1] There is a past for a being who is what he is not and is not what he is, i.e. for a being who is in a state of dialectical relation to something which is of the nature of an other to it. This being in dialectical relation of otherness with Purusa is the necessary condition for the possibility of the strange experience of lived time as both unity and disjunction.[2] Pure consciousness or the transcendental subject on the other hand is a unity unto itself, a unity in isolation of its own being.[3]

While this phenomenon of subjectivity in the sense in which it is distinguished from the transcendental subject may be described as a case of identity in difference, the latter, i.e. the transcendental subject may

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the permanence in mutation. Permanence of the Puruṣa falls in the first category. Whereas the permanence of the guṇa which constitutes the essence of Prakṛti falls in the second category:

> Dvayī ceyamnityatā kūtasthanityatā pariṇāminityatā ca. Tatra kūtasthanityatā puruṣasya, pariṇāminityatā guṇānām, Vyāsa Bhāṣya on The Yoga Sūtra, 4.33, op. cit.

[1]Kūtasthanityeṣu svarpuamātra pratiṣtheṣu muktapuruṣa[?]ṣu svarupāstitā,, Ibid.

[2]Past, present and future as temporal determinations of empiric being apply only to Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure. This is the structure of the manifestation of Prakṛti (the unmanifest world) which has a character of permanence in mutation. Thus Buddhi-Ahamkāra structure is the realm of the experience of time as both unity (permanence) and disjunction (change).

[3]See Supra, note 1.

be described as pure identity.[1] The former has a mode of being which contains at the very heart of it elements of dispersion and atomisms.

Subjectivity as the centre of egoity and individuality (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure) is a self-constituting synthesis of the temporal dimensions. It is a no-structure of temporal experience itself. On the contrary, the pure subject or transcendental consciousness is given fully constituted from the very beginning.[2] Puruṣa does not emerge with time; it, rather, exists without beginning beginninglessly as a fully constituted being. More concretely, there never was a moment when it was not there. Not less significant is the fact that it may be discerned as existing in the fullness of its being in every subsequent instants of its existence. Its being contains all the properties that pertain to it in particular instants. It exists with its nature fully determined as already constituted - not just being constituted, i.e. becoming with the passage of time.[3]

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[1]This is a particular kind of bhedābheda which must be distinguished from the Vedāntic conception of identity indifference. The concept is employed here to bring out the fact that this being is also the structure of becoming which accounts for a continued identity through the specificity (vaiśiṣtya) and differentiation (bhedānām pariṇāmāt) that gives rise to the tattvas.

[2]What is the language of Vedānta would be described as bhuta or pariniṣthita vastu - i.e. the accomplished being given in all its fullness. (Vide Śaṁkara's commentary on Brahma Sūtra 1.11).

[3]The language employed here (fully constituted, existing in fullness, fully determined, etc. etc.) must be understood in respect of its negative emphasis - i.e. denying the opposite. It is analogous to descriptive statements about Brahman, like non-duality, etc., whose function as Samkara rightly points out is to negate its opposite. (ananyatvam vyativekeṇa abhāvaḥ).

Subjectivity, on the other hand, refers to the aspect of being that is constituted in a manifold of phases. Thus in the realm of subjectivity one phase of actualization passes into another phase, the two phases not being disjunct and extends continually into further phases of actualization. This continuous passage from potentiality to actuality[1] is an on-going process in and through which the subjectivity as temporal is constituted.

Purusa as the transcendental subject, however, remains self-identical through the constantly arising new instants in which it exists. Subjectivity as being constituted on the basis of the developing phases that are pure activity, is transitory and passes into continual new phases. As such it requires to be grounded in some other being that remains identical despite the passage of time, and which, therefore, surmounts the diversity of constantly emerging new moments and by virtue of this is enduring and permanent. This being is Prakṛti which has the temporal mode of permanence (pariṇāmi nityatā).[2]

Thus temporality of subjectivity implies a secondary mode of being, a fissuration and dispersion taking place at the very heart of it. This fissuration and dispersion can be overcome only in the mode of discriminative awareness (viveka jñāna). Ironically, however, the self-reflecting

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[1]The expression here is used as rough translation of Vyakta and Avyakta in relation to Prakriti, Purusa being outside the point of this polar relation.

[2]See Supra, note 1, p. 119-120.

mode of being leading to discriminative awareness intensifies the problem for the world-involved subject (<u>Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra</u> structure). In the very act of overcoming dispersion the mode of being of the subjectivity comes to be dissolved. To be in the mode of discrimination is also to regain the original ground of subject as principle of pure consciousness.[1]

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[1]It is important to remember that <u>Buddhi</u> as the mode of being of reflection or as the reflecting mode of being is also the locus of discriminative awareness:

saiva ca viśinaṣṭi punaḥ pradhānapuruṣāntaram sūkṣmam,
<u>The Sāṁkhya Kārikā</u>, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., Kārika 37.

PART II

ĀBHIDHARMA BUDDHISM

CHAPTER VI

ĀBHIDHARMIKA BUDDHISM: ITS HISTORICAL AND TEXTUAL SETTING

Schools of Buddhism and the Ābhidharmika Tradition

Traditional Buddhist sources give varying and, at times, conflicting accounts of the sects of Buddhism that emerged during the first phase of its development.[1] Modern Scholars have tried in vain to create a systematic and coherent picture of the internal development of Buddhist tradition in its early stages. It is extremely difficult to discern with any clarity the exact number of schools and their historical and doctrinal interrelationship. This study does not intend to investigate this larger and certianly hisotrically significant question, which lies outside

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[1]For the details of conflicting traditional accounts of early Buddhist sects see Keith, A. B., Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1923, pp. 148-159; Dutt, Nalinaksha, Early History of the Spread of Buddhism and the Buddhist Schools, Calcutta: Oriental Series, 1925; Thomas, E. J., The History of Buddhist Thought, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1933, pp. 27-42; Conze, Edward, Buddhist Thought in India, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962, pp. 119-126; Warder, A. K., Indian Buddhism, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1970, pp. 288-351; In our discussion, we have generally followed the evidences brought in by these scholars which are largely based on the Pali and Sanskrit material. For Tibetan sources, readers may also refer to Taranatha, History of Buddhism in India, (trans.) Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya, Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970; and, Bu-ston, History of Buddhism, (trans.) Obermiller, E., Heidelberg, 1931-32.

the range and scope of the present work. However, leaving the larger historical question aside, we are obligated to define and delimit that area of Buddhism which may be described as Ābhidharmika Buddhism, and to that extent it becomes imperative to address ourselves to the task of delineating the historical and textual context of Ābhidharmika tradition.

According to the Buddhist tradition, three different Buddhist councils took place at different times to settle important questions pertaining to the basic tenets of the order.[1] The primary factor responsible for the rise of different sects of Buddhism may be seen in the context of varying interpretations of the word of the Buddha. All these schools claimed to be true to the original teaching of the Master and claimed themselves to be the true representatives of the doctrine. The oldest Pāli accounts of schism within Buddhist order provide a

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[1]The first Council is reported to have taken place at Rajagaha (modern Rajgrha) just after the demise of Buddha on the issue of Vinaya (the rules of discipline) as laid down by Buddha. The second Council was summoned by the monk Yasa, about a hundred years after Buddha's death, at Vaisali in northern Bihar. This was probably the occasion for the great schism between the Sthaviras and Mahasanghikas, which was to later shape the growth of Mahayana Buddhism in India. The third Council is assigned to the period of Asoka's reign, about two centuries after Buddha's death, the basic issues of controversy being more of doctrinal nature, rather than rules of discipline which was the case in the first two Councils. It seems probable that the division between Therāvādins and Sarvāstivādins may have originated at this Council. Scholars have widely differed both on the fact of the Council as well as what transpired there. Most of the evidences are quite late and sometimes very confusing. See Thomas, E., op. cit., pp. 27-41; also, Keith, op. cit., pp. 148-156.

list of at least eighteen schools.[1] These sources tend to present conflicting accounts of the various doctrinal positions held by each of them.[2] But it is difficult to construct any definite historical or chronological order out of this list. Pāli versions too differ among themselves on the question of the antiquity of one or the other of the schools as indeed they differ from the claims that is made by Sanskrit tradition.

The Pāli sources including Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Katthāvatu, Dīpvaṁsa and Mahāvaṁsa, though differing on details of the schisms, agree in maintaining that the first schism took place during the Council of Vaiśāli, when the Mahāsanghikas seceded from the Therāvādins.[3] From within Mahāsanghikas arose the schools of Gokulikas and Ekabbohārikas. The Gokulikas were further subdivided into Paññativādins and Bāhulikas; and the Ekabbohārikas gave rise to the school of Cetiyavādins. On the other hand, the Therāvāda itself is reported to be subdivided into Mahiṅsāsakas and Vajjiputtakas, as indeed it was on account of their differences

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[1]See The Debates Commentary (Kathāvatthuppakarna-Aṭṭhakatha), (trans.) Law, B. C., London: Oxford University Press, 1940, pp. 2 ff.

[2]Keith, op. cit., p. 148.

[3]The Debate Commentary, op. cit., pp. 2-4.

with the Vajjiputtakas on the important questions of discipline that Mahāsāṅghikās separated. The Vajjiputtakasa gave rise to four branches: Dhammuttariyas, Bhadrayānikas, Channāgarikas and Sammitiyas. Mahiṅsāskas on the other hand were further divided into the Sabbātthivādins and Dhammaguttikas. From within Sabbātthivādin tradition arose the schools of Kassapikas, Sañkāntikas and Suttavādins. This accounts for the original eighteen schools mentioned by Pali sources. Buddhaghosa, however, mentions six more schools.[1]

A Sanskrit tradition also gives a list of eighteen schools. The list is given in Mahāvyutpatti.[2] The text belongs to Sarvastivāda and was probably composed in the fifth or sixth century A.D. But this does not minimise the value of the classifications, as it is quite obvious that it draws upon older materials extant at that time.[3] The arrangement of schools here is not chronological; rather they are grouped under the original schools to which they belonged:

1. Sarvāstivāda: Mūla-Sarvāstivāda, Kāśyapīyas, Mahīśāsakas, Dharmguptas, Bahuśrutīyas, Tāmraśātīyas, Vibhajyavādins.
2. Sammatīyas: Kaurukullakas, Āvantakas, Vātsīputrīyas.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Mahavyutpatti, vide Thomas, E. J., op. cit., pp. 37-41;

[3] Ibid., p. 38.

3. Mahāsanghikas: Pūrvaśailas, Aparaśailas, Haimvatas, Lokkttara-vādins, Prajñaptivādins.

4. Sthaviras: Mahāvihāravāsins, Jetavanīyas, Abhayagirivāsins.

It is extremely difficult to determine much from these names about the doctrinal positions of these schools. Names given are sometimes after the original teacher of the school; sometimes, it applies to the geographical location, and occasionally, to doctrinal allegiance.

It is important to note that, according to Pāli sources, the Sabbāthivādins (Sarvāstivādins) come within the broader group of Therāvādins as opposed to the schools which emerged from the original secession of Mahāsanghikas.[1] The Sanskrit sources also label Vibhājyavādins as a school of Sarvāstivādins,[2] while the Pāli sources consider the Vibhājyavādins to be the precursor of Therāvādins who later came to be known by that name. This shows that initially there was great affinity between Sarvāstivāda and Therāvāda. But there are important differences between the two. Therāvādins, as it is well known, preserved their canon in Pāli. Prof.

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[1] Dīpavaṁsa, vide Keith, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

[2] Mahavyutpatti, vide Thomas, E. J., op. cit., p. 38.

Kern and Rhys Davids[1] among others agree in maintaining that the Pāli canons contain the doctrines of the Sthaviras or Therāvādins. The Therāvādin tradition of Sri Lanka tends to identify them as Vibhajjyavādins.[2] But it seems probable that the Vibhajjavāda was a more comprehensive term and was also applicable to Sarvāstivādins. The Sarvāstivādins later came to be called Vaibhāṣikas on account of their allegiance to Vibhāṣa, a commentary on Jñānaprasthāna, the earliest Abhidharma text.[3] In the words of Yamakami Sogen:

> In later times, the so-called Vaibhāṣikas came to be identified with the Sarvastivadins; and the two names became mutually interchangeable, although, properly speaking, the Sarvāstivādins originally formed a section of the Vaibhāṣikās.[4]

Both Therāvāda and Sarvāstivāda acquired significant place in the early stages of development of Buddhism and their contribution to the propogation and development of Buddhism outside India cannot be underestimated. Though Therāvāda later flourished in the south, there is no doubt that, for

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[1]Kern, H. Manual of Indian Buddhism, Strassburg, 1896; Rhys Davids, T. W., "Schools of Buddhist Beliefs", in Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, 1892, pp. 409-422.

[2]Keith, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

[3]See infra, p. 133.

[4]Sogen, Yamakami, Systems of Buddhist Thought, cf. Banerjee, A.C., op. cit., p. 4.

long, both Therāvāda and Sarvastivada developed in north India at the same time: The Sarvāstivāda was chiefly confined to the western centers of Mathurā, Kāshmir, and Gandhāra, while the Therāvādins operated from Magadha and Kosala, the two earliest centers of Buddhism.

The split between the Sarvāstivāda and Therāvāda (also called Vibhājyavāda) seem to have taken place during the reign of Asoka. "It appears that Asoka sided with the Vibhājyavādins, and that in consequence the Sarvāstivādins went North, and converted Kāshmir, which remained their centre for more than a thousand years".[1] However, the basis of division in the present case was, instead of being the rules of discipline (vinaya), the philosophical or metaphysical stand taken by Sarvāstivādins. Thus Conze rightly observes:

> the split between Sarvāstivādins and Vibhājyavādins was occasioned by the pan-realistic ontological doctrine of Katyāyaniputra, who taught that not only the present, but also past and future events (dharmās) are real.[2]

This indeed is a decisive issue on which the Therāvādins and Sarvāstivādins disagreed fundamentally. It is not surprising that the Abhidharmā texts of both the schools containing their basic philosophical positions, take different stands on important philosophical issues. Conze therefore is probably correct in holding that:

> the Abhidharma books were clearly composed after the third division of the schools. The contents of the

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[1]Conza, Edward, A Short History of Buddhism, Bombay: Chetana Ltd., 1960, p. 20.

[2]Ibid., p. 20. For elucidation of the said ontological doctrine see section VIII, infra, p. 173 ff.

seven Ābhidharma books of Sarvāstivādins differ from those of the seven books of the Therāvādins, who are an offshoot of the Vibhajyavādins.[1]

The Two Ābhidharmic Traditions

For long Buddhist scholarship was led to believe that the original Buddhist canons existed only in Pāli. However, the evidence brought in from Tibetan and Chinese sources, as well as the discovery of manuscript fragments in Eastern Turkey, Nepal and Gilgit, confirmed the existence of Buddhist canons in Sanskrit. It is now well established that Sarvāstivādins used Sanskrit as the medium of their literary activity and that their canon was entirely in Sanskrit. Sarvāstivādins too like Therāvādins divided their canon into three Piṭakas (literally baskets): the Sūtras,[2] the Vinayas, and the Ābhidharmas. Despite some differences in the arrangement and classification of treatment there is substantial similarity between the Pali and Sanskrit Vinaya and Sūtra literature. Scholars, who

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[1] Ibid., p. 21.

[2] In Sarvāstivāda tradition, Sūtras are called Āgamas whereas Pāli tradition uses Nikāya for sūtra piṭaka.

have made comparative study of the two sets of Vinaya and Sutra texts, have noted substantial agreement between the two traditions.[1] However, special significance attaches to the Abhidharma Pitaka because it is precisely here that the differences between the Pali and Sanskrit traditions seem to be remarkable.[2] This difference between the two sets of Abhidharma texts raises an important historical question regarding the relationship between the two traditions. One may legitimately surmise that the Abhidharma texts were composed and compiled at a time when both the traditions had been separated for long. It is quite probable that the two traditions developed their Abhidharma texts independently. However, any definitive statement on this issue will have to wait a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the Abhidharma literature of the two traditions. It will be interesting to investigate if the content or the structure of the texts provide any basis for a reasonable conclusion about the chronological order of the two sets of the Abhidharma texts. Though such an investigation is beyond the scope of this project we will bring in, wherever possible, evidences that may be useful in resolving

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[1]For an excellent discussion or summary of the findings of such comparisons, see, Banarje, A. C., Sarvāstivāda Literature, Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Press, 1957, pp. 18-50. Our own account of Sarvastivadin literature draws heavily upon this work.

[2]See Takakusu J., "The Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins", Journal of Pali Text Society, 14, 1904-05, pp. 67-146; Dutt, N., Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinyana, Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Series, 1930, pp. 5-6; Nyantiloka, Guide Through the Abhidharmmapitaka, Colombo, 1938, pp. 1-2; and, Keith, op. cit., p. 152.

this important historical question.

There are seven Abhidharma texts of Sarvāstivāda school which were originally composed in Sanskrit:

1. The Jñānaprasthānasūtra of Ārya Kātyāyanīputra.
2. The Sangītiparyāya of Mahākauṣṭhila.
3. The Prakaraṇpāda of Sthavira Vasumitra.
4. The Vijñānakāya of Sthavira Devśarmā.
5. The Dhātukāya of Pūrna.
6. The Dharmaskandha of Ārya Śāriputra.
7. The Prajñāptiśāstra of Ārya Maudgalyāyana.

While manuscript fragments of Sutra and Vinaya literature of Sarvastivada have been discovered in Sanskrit originals, no Sanskrit originals of these Abhidharma texts, except fragments of Sangītiparyāya by Mahākauṣṭhila, is available. It is interesting to note that while the whole of Vinaya literature and some other later Abhidharma treatises are found in Tibetan, none of the Sanskrit Abhidharma texts, except the Prajñaptiśāstra of Ārya Maudgalyayana, is available in Tibetan translations.

During the reign of and at the instance of Kaniska of Kusana dynasty, a council of Buddhist monks was called in the first century B.C. At this council, the commentary on Jñānaprasthānaśūtra called Vibhāṣa was composed.[1] It is from this Vibhāṣa that the Vaibhāṣika derive their name.

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[1]Keith, op. cit., p. 155.

Since the Vibhāṣa belongs to this period it is quite safe to conclude that Jñānaprasthāna belonged to a period earlier than first century B.C. Though there is no conclusive evidence to settle the date of this text, there is no doubt that this is the oldest and most important of the seven Abhidharma texts. According to the Chinese sources it was first translated into Chinese by Saṅghdeva and Dharmapriya (Ku Fo-nien) who brought it to China from Kashmir during 4th Century A.D.[1] Hiuen Tsang also translated it in the 7th century A.D.[2] The tradition considers Jañānaprasthāna to be the principal text, while the other six are regarded as supplementary or ancillary. Yaśomitra in his Sphutārthābhidharmakośavyākhyā compares the Jñānaprasthāna with the body of a being and the other six to its legs or Padas.[3] It is this relationship between Jñānaprasthāna and other Abhidharma texts that led Takakusu to suggest that "it stands to the other treatises in such a relation as the Veda to the six Vedāṅgas".[4]

Keith has expressed his doubt about the antiquity of the Abhidharma texts, and is inclined to believe that the entire body of Abhidharma texts belong to a period much later than what is suggested by the traditional

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[1]Nanjio, op. cit., No. 1273.

[2]Ibid., No. 1275.

[3]śāstramiti jñānaprasthānam tasya śarīrabhūtasya ṣaṭ pādāḥ prakaranpādo vijñānakāyo dharmaskandhaḥ prajñāptiśāstram dhātukāyaḥ saṅgītiparyāya iti. Abhidharmakośa-Vyākhyā of Yaśomitra, (ed.) Law, N. N., London: Luzac & Co., 1949, p. 10.

[4]Takakusu, op. cit., p. 74.

sources. According to Keith, we cannot form any "definite idea as to the date of Jñānaprasthāna and its supplements, no faith can be placed on the alleged authors, the titles being manifestly intended to convey the impression of extreme antiquity".[1] The views expressed by Keith on the dates of the text in question contradict the claims of the tradition and echoes an attitude towards tradition best described in Conze's words as "superciliousness that belongs to a phase in the treatment of subject nations which has now passed".[2] We tend to agree with Frauwallener's observation that in the matter of historical research the importance of tradition should not be undermined unless the internal evidence completely contradicts it, or that we have overwhelmingly valid reasons against it.[3] In our opinion, the antiquity of the primary sanskrit Abhidharma texts is beyond doubt and, as we shall show, they are in all probability older than the Pāli Abhidharma texts.

The Saṅgītiparyāya is the first of the six auxiallary texts (pada). The Chinese sources assign the authorship to Śāriputra, but Indian and Tibetan tradition mention Mahākausthila of Sarvāstivāda school as the author of the text.[4] According to Takakusu, there are some points of

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[1]Keith, op. cit., p. 154.

[2]Conze, Edward, Buddhist Thought in India, op. cit., p. 10.

[3]Frauwallener, E.,"On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu," Serie Orientale Roma, 3, 1951, pp. 36-37.

[4]Takakusu, op. cit.

similarities between the Puggalapaññatti, a Pāli Abhidharma text, and the Saṅgītiparayāya.[1] He further suggests that the Saṅgītiparayāya is modelled on the Saṅgīti Sutanta.[2] The Prakaranapāda, the second of the ancillary Abhidharma texts, is attributed to Vasumitra.[3] According to B.C. law, the Prakaranapada is the counterpart of the Vibhangaprakarana of the Pāli Abhidharmapitaka.[4] Nyayantiloka, however, maintains that the Vibhanga bears a closer affinity with Dharmaskandha.[5] The Vijñānakāya is attributed to Devaśarma of Srāvāsti, and is supposed to have been composed during the second hundred years of Buddha's parinirvana.[6] Authorship of the Dhātukāya according to the Chinese source, is attributed to Vasumitra in the 2nd century A.D. Against this Chinese tradition we have the authority of Yaśomitra and Bu-ston who regard Pūrna to be the author of this work.[7] N. Dutt is inclined to give greater weight to the Chinese tradition

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Keith, op. cit., p. 154.

[4] Law, B.C., A History of Pali Literature, Vol. I, p. 340, vide Banerjee, A. C., op. cit., p. 63.

[5] Nayantiloka, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

[6] Banerjee, A. C., op. cit., p. 64.

[7] Nanjio, op. cit., No. 1282.

specially "in view of the fact that this pada (Dhātukāya) is only an enlarged treatment of the topics contained in section 4 of the Prakarnapada of Vasumitra".[1] Poussin is prepared to accept the antiquity of this Abhidharma text and thinks that it, probably, is the source of Pāli Dhātukathā.[2] The Dharmaskandha is attributed to Maudgalyāyana by Chinese tradition, while Yasomitra and Buston mention Sariputra as the author of this work.[3] Takakusu attaches great importance to this text and considers this to be "the most important of the Abhidharma works and the fountainhead of the Sarvāstivāda system.[4] The Prajñaptiśāstra is attributed to Maudgalyāyana, and is the only Abhidharma text which seems to have been translated into Tibetan.[5] It might be construed from this fact that the Prajñānpatiśāstra is, probably, a late text which survived in its original form in Sanskrit, and was available to Buddhist scholars who worked in Tibet during the 7th century when Buddhism was introduced in Tibet.

The Pāli canons of the Therāvādins also contain seven Abhidharma texts. However, the relationship among the Pāli Abhidharma texts is not

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[1] Dutt, N., op. cit., p. 293.

[2] Poussin, La Valee, vide Banerjee, A. C., op. cit., p. 65.

[3] Nanjio, op. cit., No. 1296.

[4] Takakusu, op. cit., pp. 3-12.

[5] Keith, op. cit., p. 154.

one of mutual complementariness, nor do they bear a relationship of primary and secondary texts like the Sanskrit Abhidharma texts.[1] The Pāli Abhidharma texts are:

1. Dhammasangani
2. Vibhanga
3. Puggalapaññatti
4. Yamaka
5. Katthāvatthu
6. Dhātukathā
7. Patthāna

In Pāli Sutta and Vinaya literature there is no reference to Abhidhammapitaka.[2] This has created some question about the authenticity of the tradition which considers the Abhidhammapitaka to be the original words of Buddha. Scholars have widely differed on the date of Abhidhamma texts. Prof. Rhys Davids thinks that in terms of subject matter and the style, the Kathāvatthu belongs to Asokan period.[3] According to Mrs. Rhya Davids, the Dhammasangani is

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[1]See Supra, p. 133 ff.

[2]The Sutta and Vinaya Pitakas do not mention Abhidhammapitaka as a separate pitaka. The division recognized by the Pāli Canons is that of Dhamma, i.e. Sutta, and Vinaya with Matika. It is the Mātika (literally means lists) which probably later, was elaborated into Abhidhamma. According to Keith, the Abhidhamma Pitaka is a work of Vibhajyavādins of Theravāda tradition..."the Abhidhamma Pitaka, as we have it in the Pāli canon, is the definite work of this school, a systematic scholasticism based on the Suttas", Keith, op. cit., p. 153.

[3]Vide, Keith, op. cit., p. 22.

dated back to about 385 B.C. She bases her contention on a comparison of form and content of the Dhammasangani and the Katthāvatthu which is dated back to 247 B.C. Keith however disagrees with this estimate of the date of Abhidhamma Pitaka.[1] He thinks that the texts are quite late, and probably a late addition to the other two Pitikas which definitely are of older origin. We tend to agree with Keith when he observes:

> that the Abhidhamma has no claim to the antiquity asserted for it. This is supported by the undeniable fact that, while the Sutta and Vinaya Pitakas have parallels in other schools, based on a common tradition, the Abhidhamma of the Sarvastivadins, of which we now have information, utterly disagrees with the Pali Abhidhamma.[2]

There is more than one reason to consider Pali Abhidhammas to be later than the Sanskrit Abhidharma texts. First, the earliest archeological evidence that we have about the existence of an Abhidharma text as the third Piṭaka comes from Kausika inscriptions. It is in an inscription belonging to the period of Kusana king Kanishka, we come across the term Tripitaka. But there is no conclusive evidence that the Tripitaka referred to here

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[1]Keith, op. cit., p. 23.

[2]Ibid.

applies to the Pali Canon. On the other hand, we are certain that the Abhidharma texts of Sanskrit tradition belonging to the Sarvāstivādins or the Vaibhāṣikas existed at the time of Kauṣika Council. It is, therefore, conceivable that the term under reference related to Sanskrit Abhidarma.[1] The only available evidence about the existence of Pāli Abhidamma only points to the vogue of the study of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka in Sri Lanka during the third century A.D.[2] It is also fairly certain that Abhidhamma Piṭaka came to be considered authoritative about 5th century A.D. when Buddhaghosa wrote the Atthasalinī, a commentary on the first book of Abhidhamma Piṭaka, the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, and also the Katthāvatthuppakrna-Aṭṭhakathā, a commentary on the Katthavatu. Beyond this, nothing certain can be said about the Pāli Abhidhamma texts.

It is equally important to note that within the Pāli tradition, the relationship between the Milindapañha and the Abhidhamma texts[3] also point to the possibility of the latter being later in chronological order. It has been suggested by some scholars that Milindpañha was originally written in Sanskrit or Prākrit dialect and was later rendered into Pālī. Even if we deny this possibility there is little doubt about its

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[1]Keith, op. cit., p. 23.

[2]Hardy, Eastern Monachism, p. 156, vide Ibid., p. 24.

[3]Milinda's Questions (Vol. I & II), (tr.) Horner, M.A., London: Luzac & Company Ltd., 1964.

northern origin and its possible affinity with the northern Sarvāstivāda tradition. One can take Keith's suggestion about the chronological order of Milindapañha and Abhidhamma texts quite seriously. His contention that the reference in Milindpañaha to Abhidhamma Piṭaka can be discerned only in the passages and sections which are definitely later interpolations or addition[1] is confirmed by Winternitz's excellent analysis of the form and style of this text.[2] T. W. Rhys Davids' contention that at the time of Milindapañha, which can easily be dated between 100 to 200 B.C., all the three Pāli Piṭakas were existent does not stand the text of historical research.

Conze has tried to date the texts of the Sarvāstivāda and the Therāvāda in terms of the traditional account of the separation of the school.[3] According to the Buddhist tradition both the schools separated during Asoka's reign. Conze maintains that the passages in which the texts of Therāvādins and Sarvāstivādins agree almost word by word, we can assume that they were composed at a time preceding the separation of the two schools, which took place during Asoka's rule, i.e. about 250 B.C. Applying this criterion, it may be discerned that both Pāli and Sanskrit versions

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[1]Keith, op. cit., p. 23.

[2]Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, Calcutta: Calcutta University, 19 .

[3]Conze, Edward, Buddhist Thought in India, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

of Sūtra and Nikāya literature antedate the separation of the school. Continuing influence of the common tradition on the two schools is quite possible during the subsequent one hundred years. It is during this period that both the Sanskrit Abhidharma literature and the Pāli Milindapanaha may have been composed. The discongruity between the two Abhidharma literature must have emerged with the passage of time. Employing Conze's criterion, one can see not only the post-Asokan origin of Pāli Abhidhamma literature, but also discern the fact that a time lag existed between it and the time of the separation of the two schools. If the Pāli Abhidharma texts were composed immediately after the separation of the two schools we would expect some similarity between Abhidharma texts of the two traditions. But this is not the case.[1] On the other hand, as it has been mentioned earlier, there is close affinity between the Pāli and Sanskrit Sūtra and Vinaya literature. No such affinity, however, exists in the case of Abhidharma literature.

Takakusu, on the basis of a comparative analysis of the two sets of Abhidharma texts, came to the conclusion that there is no real connection between the two.[2] Nyanatiloka, pursuing the lead provided by Takakusu, concluded that the Sarvāstivādin and Therāvādin Abhidharma texts have considerable dissimilarity, a significant exception being the Dharmaskandha, which seems

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[1]Supra, pp. 143-144.

[2]Takakusu, op. cit.

to have closer affinity with the Pāli Vibhaṅga.[1] N. Dutt too arrived at similar conclusions and suggested that the two schools worked out their Abhidharma texts independently.[2] This contention of Dutt finds support in McGovern's statement that "there is no connection between two sets of works, that the Sarvāstivādin writing were composed by persons (who), it is scarcely possible to conceive, could have seen the Pāli works....."[3]

It is equally important to note that we rarely come across any early Sarvāstivādin work which shows any acquaintance with the Pāli works or takes a stand against Therāvādins.[4] On the other hand, we do have evidences within Pāli Abhidharma, specially Katthāvatu, where Sarvāstivādins are vehemently attacked.[5] All this seems to corroborate our contention that Pāli Abhidhammas are later in origin. However, the present author will like to qualify this by adding that a more thorough comparative analysis of the content and the structure of the two sets of Abhidharmas should be undertaken before the two Abhidharmas can be placed in their proper mutual historical relationship. It is our belief that a more

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[1]Nyanatiloka, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

[2]Dutt, N., Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayāna, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

[3]McGovern, W., A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 17.

[4]Ibid.

[5]See Kathāvatavatthuppakarna-Aṭṭhakathā, op. cit., pp. 52-60.

comprehensive comparative account of the two Abhidharma traditions with special reference to the specific issues that concern them will greatly enrich our understanding of the historical and doctrinal developments of the two traditions on the Indian subcontinent. Till now, no such enterprise, at the scale demanded by the nature and scope of the study, has been undertaken and we anxiously await the results of any such study that might be under progress.[1]

Abhidharma Philosophical Literature and Their Place Within the Tradition

The Ābhidharmakośa[2] of Vasubandhu is the most important text where the basic doctrinal position of Sarvāstivāda is clearly brought out. This is basically a digest of the seven primary Abhidharma texts mentioned earlier. At the time of the composition of the text, the Vaibhāṣika or the

[1]There have been some attempts at a comparative analysis of Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin Ābhidharmika thought. See Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma, Guenther, H. V., Lucknow: Buddha Vihara, 1957, and A Comparative Study of the Abhidharmakośa with Pali Abhidhammapitaka, Choudhary Sukomol, Calcutta University (Ph.D. thesis in progress). Both these studies have concerned themselves primarily with comparing certain themes as expounded in the Ābhidharmakosa of Vasubandhu, on the one hand, and Atthasalini and Kathavatthu on the other. No intensive comparative work on the primary Abhidharmika texts seems to have been undertaken, and the Buddhist scholarship has not gone beyond Takakusu in this matter.

[2]The Sanskrit original of this text was discovered by Rahul Sankrtyayana in a Monastary in Tibet. He brought photo copies of the text which was later published by K. P. Jayswal Research Institute, Patna. All the references in the present work are to Ābhidharmkośam, (ed.), Sastri, Swami Dwarikadas, Varanasi: Baudha Bharati, Vol. I: 1970, Vol. II: 1971, Vol. III: 1972, Vol. IV: 1974.

Sarvāstivādins seem to have a pre-eminent place within Buddhist tradition. In the Kośa itself Vasubandhu claims it to represent the views of the Kashmir Vaibhāṣika.[1] According to Yaśomitra the text is primarily based on the earlier works of Sarvāstivāda, the Jñānaprasthāna, etc., which provided the scriptural basis for its authenticity as a Vaibhāṣika text.[2] The Kośa is primarily expository, and Vasubandhu never takes a partisan stand vis a vis the Vaibhāṣika position enunciated there. But Vasubandhu seems to have been influenced by the Sautrāntika school and in his Bhāṣya on the Kośa he occasionally takes his stand against the Vaibhāṣikas. Sarvāstivādins of the period expressed their unhappiness with Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya and offered rebuttals to Vasubandhu on certain points of controversy between Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrantikas.[3]

For long, the original Sanskrit version of the text was supposed to have been lost to the Sanskrit tradition. However, the text was recently discovered by Rahul Sankrityāyana in Tibet. The text contains 600 Kārikās and has eight chapters or sections on: 1. Dhātus; 2. Indriyas; 3. Lokas; 4. Karmas; 5. Sanuśayas; 6. Āryapudgalas; 7. Jñānas; 8. Samādhis, and a

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[1]Kāśmiravaibhāṣikanitīsiddhaḥ prāyo mayāyaṁ kathito 'bhidharmaḥ. Ibid., 8.40.

[2]Yo'bhidharmo jñānaprasthānādiretasya madiyasya śāstrasyāśrayabhūtaḥ. Tato hyarsadabhidharmadetanmadiyam sastram nirakrstam. Yaśomitra's Sphutārthā, (ed.) Law, N. N., op. cit., p. 11.

[3]See infra, pp. 148-149.

refutation of ātmvāda. Two Chinese translations of the text are available, one by Hiuen Tsang and the other by Paramartha.

Vasubandhu's date has been a subject of great controversy. Takakusu on the basis of Chinese evidence, placed him during 420-500 A.D.[1] But the suggestion has been challenged from many quarters. Frauwallener has suggested that there were two Vasubandhus - first the Stahvira Vasubandhu, the younger brother of Asanga, the Yogacarin, who belonged to 320-380 A.D.; and the second, Ācarya Vasubandhu, who is supposed to have belonged to 400-480 A.D. According to Frauwallener, the first Vasubandhu was originally a Hinyānist Sarvāstivādin who later became converted to Mahāyāna under the influence of his brother Asanga. The second Vasubandhu, according to Frauwallener, was Sautrāntika, and is the author of the Ābhidharmakośa.[2] However, the suggestion of Frauwallener, though quite ingenious, does not seem to carry much weight. His assertion that Vasubandhu, the author of Ābhidharmakośa, belonged to 400-480 A.D. is not corroborated by the strong evidence from Indian sources. Basing his observation on Indian sources Peri has convincingly demonstrated that Vasubandhu must have belonged to early

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[1]Takakusu, "A Study of Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu and the Date of Vasubandhu", Journal of Asiatic Society, London, 1905, pp. 33-53.

[2]Frauwallener, E., On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu, op. cit.

fourth century.[1]

In this connection, we will like to bring one important evidence from the Indian tradition which seems to have escaped the notice of many Buddhologists. The evidence comes from Bāṇa Bhatta's Harṣcaritra belonging to the 7th century. Here we have reference to the fact that Dignaṅga was propogating and defending Vasubandhu's Kosa in various śastrārthas (debates).[2] This shows that Bana Bhatta in 7th century was aware of the traditional legend about Vasubandhu and Dignāṅga. This confirms the traditional Indian belief that Vasubandhu was a predecessor of Dignāṅga. If we accept this evidence then Vasubandhu, the author of the Kośa, could not have belonged to 5th century, as Frauwallener suggests. We tend to agree with Prof. Nakamura's suggestion that Dignāṅga's date should be 400-480 A.D.[3] Vasubandhu, being an older contemporary of Dignāṅga could not have belonged to fifth century, as suggested by Frauwallener.

The whole confusion about the identity and the date of Vasubandhu seems to arise from varying doctrinal positions taken by this philosopher in different works. We can discern three distinct phases in the development

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[1]Peri, N., "A propos de la date de Vasubandhu", Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme - Orient, Paris, 11, 1911, pp. 339-390.

[2]Samarabhārasaṁbhāvanābhiṣekamiva cakār diṅnāgakuṁbhakūtavikatasya bāhuśikharakośasya vāmah pānipallavah. Harsacaritra, quoted by Narendra Deva, Abhidharma Kosa (Hindi), Allahabada: Hindustam Academy, 1958, p. 10.

[3]Nakamura, Hijiona, vide Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, (ed.) Potter, Karl H., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970, p. 51.

of Vasubandhu's own thought. In the first phase he subscribed to Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika thought; the Abhidharmakośa belongs to this period. Second phase is a transitional phase when, still Sautrāntika, he displays Yogācāra leanings. His Karmasiddhi prakarṇa belongs to this transitional period in his intellectual history. And to the final phase belongs the Viṁśatikā and the Triṁsika, where the Mahāyāna influence is present in its full-blown form. Considering his close affiliation with his Yogācārin brother Asaṅga, this gradual movement towards Mahāyāna does not seem to be surprising. It is quite probable that he was an open-minded thinker and that the different works relate to different stages in the intellectual history of this great mind.

The Abhidharma Nyāyānusāra[1] of Saṁghabhadra is another important work where the basic tenents of Sarvāstivāda has been enunciated. Saṁghbhadra was a contemporary of Vasabandhu who disagreed with him on some important points pertaining to his interpretation of the Sarvāstivāda. He noted Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika leanings and attempted to offer a corrective to Vasubandhu wherever he felt that Vasubandhu had contravened the spirit of Vibhāṣa. His Abhidharma Nyāyānusara, also called Nyāyānusarśāstra, is purported to be a critique of Vasubandhu's interpretation of Sarvāstivāda, and, for this very reason, within Buddhist tradition, it was also called the

[1] This work is not available in Sanskrit. All the citations are from fragmentary translations in Schayer, Stanislaw, Contributions to the Problem of Time in Indian Philosophy, Cracovie, 1938. We acknowledge our great indebtedness to this work for making available the relevant materials.

thunderbolt for the Kośa (Kośakarakā).[1] He agreed with Vasubandhu's formulation of Sarvāstivāda in the Abhidharmakośa karika, but differed with Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya on it, where, according to Sāṁghabhadra, Vasubandhu took partisan stand in the Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika debate on issues of fundamental import. The Chinese tradition informs us that Saṁghbhadra intended to discuss his work with Vasubandhu but was prevented by Saṁghabhadra's sudden demise.[2] Vasubandhu, on learning about Saṁghabhadra's work, in recognition of its great merit and non-partisan orientation,called it the treatise in accordance with logical canons (Nyāyānusāraśastra). The text contains references to many old schools and works of early Buddhism and is an useful sourcebook for the study of doctrinal development of early Buddhism.

The Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā[3] by Yaśomitra is another important commentary on Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa. Yaśomitra belonged to the 9th century A.D. His commentary is the only commentorial literature available to us in original Sanskrit. This commentary mentions other two commentaries by Guṇamati and Vasumitra which preceded it. Neither of the

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[1]See Upadhyaya, Baldeo, Bauddha Darsana, Varanasi, 1954, p. 178.

[2]Vide Abhidharmkośa (ed.) Narendra Deva, Allahabada: Hindustani Academi, 1958, p. 8.

[3]There are different editions of this text. All the references in this wrok are from Sphutārthā & Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā of Yaśomitra, (ed.) Law, N. N., London: Luzac & Co., Vol. I, 1949; Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Book Agency, Vol. II, 1957; and (ed.) Shastri, D., Abhidharmakosam, Vol. III, Varanasi: Baudha Bharata, 1972.

two is available to us now.[1] This work is not available in Chinese, though a Tibetan translation by Depal-brtsegs is extant. Being the only Sanskrit commentary on Abhidharmakośa available to us, the importance of this text for Ābhidharmic studies cannot be gainsaid.

In the present work we have used Ābhidharmik Buddhism to connote the school of Buddhist thought whose ideas were systematically expounded in the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu. The school of Buddhism under investigation has generally been described as Sarvāstivāda or Vaibhāṣika. An examination of certain philosophical postulates of this school constitutes the subject matter of this work. However, we define it as Ābhidharmika Buddhism precisely to distinguish it from its diffusion discernible in other schools of Buddhism. The appelation Ābhidharmika Buddhism is indicative of the fact in our treatment of the problem of time we depend on the Vasubandhu's Abhidharma in connection with heavy dependence of the present work on Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and the commentaries thereupon as distinguished from the earlier Sarvāstivāda literature which is lost to the Sanskrit tradition and are mainly preserved only in Chinese translations. It is important to note that Vasubandhu himself mentions the views of Vaibhaṣika and Sarvāstivādin's as that of Ābhidharmika's. It is for the

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[1] guṇamati vasumitrādyaivyārkhyakāraiḥ padārtha-vivṛtirya sukṛtā sābhimata me likhita ca tathāyamartha iti. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 1.

first time in Abhidharmakośa that we find a systematic, concise and coherent exposition of Sarvāstivāda or Vaibhāṣika. Of course, Abhidharmkośa itself is supposed to be based on the primary Abhidharma texts, which as we noted earlier, are lost to the Sanskrit tradition.

Place of Vasubandhu, the author of Abhidharmakośa, within Buddhist tradition is a controversial issue. However, it is now widely recognized on account of the valuable researches of Poussin, Stcherbatsky, Takakushu and Schayer that the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu offers a reliable index to the philosophical postulates of the Sarvāstivāda. In calling Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmika Buddhism we are in the good company of Buddhist scholars like Murti,[1] Conze,[2] and Keith.[3] In the present work we have assumed the validity of the historical researches in Buddhist study on this specific issue.

Our ariticulation of Sarvāstivāda or Ābhidharmika Buddhism zeroes upon the account of the school as presented in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa, his Bhāṣya on it, Saṁghabhadra's commentary on Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa as well as Yaśomitra's Sphutārthā on Abhidharmakośa. In addition, we have

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[1]The first attempt to synthesise the teachings of Buddha was the Ābhidharmika system...'Internal evidence of the Mahayana systems themselves and historical evidence unmistakably point to the Sarvastivada as the matrix from which the Buddhist systems developed as departures and deviations.' Murti, T. R. V., The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970, p. 56.

[2]Conze, Edward, Buddhist Thought in India, op. cit., pp. 120, 130 and 131.

[2]Keith, op. cit., pp. 154-155 and 165-166.

also stepped out of line of self-restriction and have referred to those Buddhist texts which are not basically Ābhidharmika in orientation. The justification for this departure is that in those texts a discussion of Sarvāstivāda position, as articulated in Abhidharmakosa, provides the context of debate with Kamalsila's Panjika on it and the Mādhyamika-karika of Nāgārjuna along with Chandrakirti's Vrtti on it fall in this category.

CHAPTER VII

ĀBHIDHARMA ONTOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF TEMPORALITY

The Ontology of Non-being (Anattā)

Anattā is the Alpha and Omega of Ābhidhhamika Buddhism. Non-substantiality of being, and the essential impermanence and impersonality of the empirical ego constitute the cornerstone of Abhidharmika ontology. The radicality of this ontological perspective built upon what is empirical and is open to reflective verification consists of a concern with the dynamics of change. The phenomenal world, the world that we dwell in and deal with, the world which is the constant reference point for all our thought, actions and feeling is constantly changing. It is not only the world around us, but also the "I", the ego which belongs to the world is subject to incessant change. The ontology of non-being (anattā) is not a mere rejection of the existence of self,[1] as it has been understood by many students of Buddhism; it implies an all embracing world perspective which tends to reject the substantiality of being in any form, material or immaterial. Thematically, it is an extension of the nation of impermanance or anicca which is seen not as a mark (laksana) of being but the very mode of being, an element of

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[1]See Bhattacharya, H.D., "Early Buddhism", in History of Philosophy Eastern and Western (ed.) Radhakrishnan, S., Vol. I, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967, pp. 161-163; Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2, New York: The Macmillan Company, Thomas, E.J., op. cit., pp. 92-106; Keith, op. cit., p. 64.

its very structure.[1]

The significance for early Buddhism of the Anattā doctrine, in its twin aspects of non-substantiality and impermanence, can not be overemphasised. In its specific formulation the Anattā as the assertion of non-egoity remained the central concern of Ābhidharmika Buddhism.[2] Ādhidharmikas have constantly retained the idea of Anatta as enunciated in the other two piṭakas recording basic insights of Buddha into the nature of phenomenal existence.

In the Saṁyukta Nikāya we have the words of Buddha to the effect that that which is embodied is not the self: "rupa is not the self.....whatever form there is--past, future or present, inner or outer gross or subtle, low or exalted, near or far away--all that form is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self."[3]

The same assertion is made with regard to four other aggregates (skandhas) considered constituting the essential core of human existence; the feeling (vedāṇā), perceptions (samjñā), impulses or dispositions (saṁskāra), and, intellect or consciousness (vijñāna). The analysis that is made is to the effect that none of these can be the self; that all these are in reality, not merely in appearance,

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[1] See Murti, T.R.V., op. cit., pp. 69-76.

[2] Conze, op. cit, p. 39 "In its core the mark of not-self is a simple corrolary of the impermanence of everything. There can be no lasting individuality because Skandhas have neither permanence or unity."

[3] Anattā-lakkhana - Sūtta, The Saṁyukta Nikāya 23.59.

Anattā i.e. devoid of self-hood or ego-hood.[1] The same insight underlies the systematic analysis of the idea of satkāyadrṣti, the false view of individuality. The Satkāyadrṣti or the false view of individuality consists in considering the five-skandhas as the self just as one tends to identify the flame of a lamp with the lamp. Satkāyadrṣti consist in viewing self as what owns or possesses the five skandha's, just as one may say that the tree has (possesses) its shadow. The five skandhas may be looked upon as being or residing in the self just as the fragrance resides in the flower. Or alternately the self may be seen as being in the skandhas just as we may speak of a gem in the casket. All these ways of apprehanding the self, according to the anattā doctrine, are essentially erroneous in as much as they tend to identify self with the five skandhas, one way or the another.[2]

While these insights into anatta constitute the basic ontological perspective present in the other two pitakas, Ādhidharma Pitaka makes special effort to work out the implications of the anattā doctrine in terms of their understanding of dharmas. The non-substantiality and the impermanence of the self, is only considered an instance of the lack of substance and permanence characterising all phenomena. This is the original sense of the word. Thus no phenomenon possesses any substantiality or permanence. Phenomena as such are reduced to a mere

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., 3.66; 4.34.

conglomeration of independently existing distinct moments of existence called 'dharmas'. The dharmas are not some transcendent reality behind or beyond the appearance of phenomena; rather they are the only mode of reality, A dharma is 'a truly real event'[1] constituting the irreducible, unique datum of the phenomenal world presented to the reflexive consciousness in the moment of critical awareness. Consciousness itself when objectified, i.e., when it turns to itself in the moment of critical reflexion, it finds itself as nothing but a conglemoration of momentarily existing distinct dharmas without any substantial continuity. Thus the Ābhidharmika Buddhism may be described as:

> a radical pluralism erected on the denial of substance the acceptance of discrete momentary entities. Dharma is the concrete conception in this, as it is in the other systems of Buddhism. Change, becoming, is the central problem here.....The characteristic standpoint of the Abhidharmika system can be expounded as a polemic against substance, the permanent and the universal conceived as real in the systems of the ātma tradition. The real (dharma) is momentary; it is simple, unitary; it is particular, unique.[2]

The Ābhidharmika conception of dharmas as the unique, ultimate and irreducible limit point of existence needs to be distinguished from normal understanding of reality in terms of idealism or realism.

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[1]We use this interpretation of dharma after Conze whose defence of it is extremely convincing. See Conze, op. cit., pp. 92-106. For other interpretations of dharma see Stcherbatsky, the Central Conception of Buddhism, Calcutta: S. Gupta, 1961.

[2]Murti, T.R.V., op. cit., p. 69.

Realism takes commonsense things at their face value and is prepared to grant it a status independent of cognizing consciousness. Idealism, on the other hand, ultimately reduces the elements of existence to a mere ideal construction or manifestation of the cognizing consciousness.[1] Dharma theory, however, transcends the inherent metaphysical constructions incident to a popular understanding of reality by viewing the dharmas as 'real events' perceived by the reflexive consciousness. The dharmas are perceived by the reflexive consciousness as constituting the reality of the common sense-world and also of itself; the specific combinations of these dharmas go into the making of the empirical consciousness or give rise to the variations of empirical consciousness. Thus, dharmas are not real in the sense that they are the objects confronting the subject nor are they ideal in the sense that they are constituted of or produced by the consciousness. Rather, they are the ultimate limit-points of existence which go into making of the phenomenal world that the subject encounters and to which it (the subject) belongs. Thus in Ābhidharmika Buddhism:

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[1]The epistemological distinction of Realism-Idealism is not applicable with respect to our understanding of the philosophical schools under investigation. In sharp reaction to the ontologically oriented speculations of the Upanisads, Buddhism, as it is well known, inaugurates the critical phase of knowledge orientation, thus setting the stage for the later pramaṇavāda. The generality of Buddhist schools, though biased in favour of an idealistic theory of knowledge, include also a pronouncedly "realistic" prediliction for understanding reality without reference to its mind-dependedness, as may be seen, for example, in the case of Sarvāstivāda which is under discussion in this chapter.

> the common sense date are thus retraced to, transformed into or replaced by concepts which are both more intelligible and fundamental. The world therefore is perceived as composed of an unceasing flow of simple ultimates, called dharmas, which can be defined as (1) simple, (2) momentary, (3) impersonal, (4) mutually conditioned events.[1]

Given this understanding of the phenomenal reality and its constitution, our enquiry must next direct itself to the Ābhidharmika understanding of the nature and constitution of consciousness. What are those dharmas, conglomeration of which, tend to give rise to a conception of Self or Person as embodiment of empiric consciousness? If empiric consciousness or person is nothing more than a conglomeration, i.e. only a name for what are momentary and exist only for a limited duration, then how are we to account for the phenomenal continuity in the world?

The Structure of Empiric Consciousness

Ābhidharmikas propose a threefold classification of dharmas which together go to constitute the phenomenon of empiric-consciousness.[2]

A. Five Skandhas: (1) Form, rūpa, is the material essence of the phenomena; (2) Feelings (Vedanā) can be pleasant, unpleasant or neutral; (3) Perceptions (Samjñā) are six corresponding to the six sense organs; (4) Despositions or Impulses (Saṁskāra) are all tendencies, impulses, volitions, strivings, emotions, etc.; (5) Consciousness (Vijnāna) determines and superintendents the other mental skandhas.

B. The Twelve Sense-Fields (Āyatanas): These are: eye; sight-objects; ear; sounds; nose; smell; tongue; taste; body; touchables; mind; mind-objects. Āyatana is used in the sense of āya-dvāra, which literally means the 'door of coming into' or 'the door of arrival'. It can also mean gaining as opposed to vyaya (loosing).

C. The Eighteen Dhātus: These are the six sense-organs, the six sense objects, and the corresponding six sense consciousness.

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[1] Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, op. cit., p. 97.

[2] The following presentation is primarily based on Conze. For detailed analysis of the dharma doctrine of Sarvāstivādins see, Tscherbatsky, T., Central Conception of Buddhism, Calcutta: S. Gupta, 1961.

Person as the empiric consciousness or the subject of the world experience is constituted of five skandhas or constituents. which "define the limits of the basis of grasping after self".[1] Whatever the individual comes to comprehend as constituting self, as the ultimate reference point of his world-experience, whatever he looks at as belonging to or somehow concerning the self, all the facts of experience of individuals and objects in relation to individuals are ultimately traceable to five skandhas. Similarly sense-field (āyatanas) is concerned with the origin of the mental dharmas of 'thought and its concomitants'. The reflective consciousness in its discriminative stance is able to see that thought and its cocomitants are nothing but collocation or conjunction of sense-organs and sense-objects. Thus, as Edward Conze puts it: "The sense-field are the reason (kārana) why mental events originate or take place, and are their birthplace, as the Deccan is the locality where cattle are born."[2] Further elaborating the role of Āyatanas Conze writes:

> It is wrong for me to regard 'my' thoughts as free creations of 'my' self or 'consciousness'. Manifestly they are in bondage of organs and object, which must be in contact for any act of consciousness to arise, and both of which are alien to me, for I cannot claim to have made either my biological constitution, or the objects of my thought. Both are given and imposed upon me.[3]

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[1] Ibid, p. 107.

[2] Ibid, p. 108.

[3] Ibid.

While these observations of Conze regarding the role and place of *Āyatanas* in the Buddhist understanding of the constitution of the phenomenal world are quite perceptive and essentially correct, we tend to disagree with his further observation to the effect that "the subjective components have an overwhelming influence in shaping the appearance of an object, which, as a 'thing in itself', is quite inaccessible".[1] The Ābhidharmika ontology does not resort to the notion of subjective factors shaping the world of phenomena. And, likewise, it does not accept the idea of a 'thing in itself' or 'noumena' which remains inaccessible to us. The Ābhidharmika ontological framework steers clear of these approaches to the reality. *Dharmas*, which are real, are neither a product of or projection of our consciousness which has a free hand in the construction of reality, nor are they the 'things in themselves' of which the phenomenal world is a mere appearance. Rather, *dharmas* are the ultimate constituents that go into the making of the phenomenal reality and are disclosed to us as such only when we acquire a discriminative stance which sets out to see the reality in its 'functional' aspect rather than in substantive terms. *Anattā* is an attestation to the non-substantiality of the reality both as subject and object. Subject and object are essentially placed on the same ontological footing.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

This functional understanding of reality in terms of discrete momentary dharmas, without any substantive support raised some problems in certain areas of early Buddhism. In reaction to the theory of dharmas as proposed by Sarvāstivādins there arose the school of Vatsiputriyas who advocated the reality of Pudgala (person) over and against the reality of impersonal dharmas. Pudgalvādins, who may be described as personalist Buddhists, maintained that the Sarvastivadin explication of the empirical ego in terms of five skandhas etc. suffered from the inexorable difficulty of explaining the continuity on the phenomenal level.[1] If the self were a mere appearance and the phenomenal being a mere conglomeration of incessantly changing dharmas (skandhas, etc.), how are we to account for those aspects of phenomenal existence which implies a continuity through the fleeting moments. The fact of memory, of karmic action and consequent retribution, the idea of agency and the realm of inter-subjective world examplified in the friendly dispositions are some of the reasons proposed by Vatsiputriyas in support of their unequivocal

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[1]For detailed analysis of the Pudgalavāda, see Abhidharmakośam op. cit., Vol. IV, 1973, p. 1189 ff.

assertion of individuality, called Pudgala, which according to Satkari Mukherjee "has the metaphysical virtue of explaining the continuity of the empirical ego to the avoidance of the fallacy of eternal self posited by the heretical thinkers."[1]

Significantly, for the Pudgalvādins, Pudgala as the psycho-physical complex which maintains its identity through the changing moments of empirical existence did not imply positing a self over and against the five skandhas. They seem to be eager to maintain their allegiance to the Anattā doctrine and as such tried to define the relationship of Pudgala to skandhas in a way that would exclude an 'erroneous belief in a self'. Pudgala is neither identical with nor different from the five skandhas.[2] And yet the "Pudgala can be conceived in correlation with the skandhas which have been appropriated at any given time inwardly".[3] According to Pudgalvādins just as fire is always found in correlation with the fuel it burns and on which it thrives, and is never apart from it, by itself, nevertheless, it is real, so does pudgala "manifests itself through the psycho-physical elements, and therefore co-exists with them, not as a separate thing, but as a kind of 'structural unity'."[4]

The position of Pudgalvādins has received favourable treatment

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[1] Mukerjee, Satkari, The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1935, p. 186.

[2] Tattva Samgraha, verses 343-343.

[3] Pratyutpanna-adhyātmika upātta-skandhān upādāya pudgalah prajñapyate. Abhidharma Kośa, 9.233. Vide Conze, Edward, op. cit.

[4] Conze, Edward, Buddhist Thought in India, op. cit., p. 128.

at the hands of some keen students of Buddhism, such as Edward Conze and A.B. Keith. Not only have they considered the pudgalvada as consisting of great philosophical significance, but have also maintained that the notion of Pudgala is in strict accord with the basic formulations of Buddhism. Keith commends the theory of Pudgala in following words:

> Its merits, however, are obvious, it mediates in the best Buddhist manner, between phenomena with a basis and the permanent self of the Brahmanic tradition. It accords also, though the point seems not to have been noted, with the position asserted by Sariputta in his discussions with Sati for there we find that Tathagata is declared neither to be the five aggregates nor to be different from them. In truth the doctrine of the purely phenomenal self was one which presented interminable difficulties.[1]

Edward Conze too finds that the theory of Pudgala was a necessary antidote to the damage caused by the Abhidarmika understanding of self as a mere conglomeration of isolated momentary events or existences called dharmas. Conze maintains that Pudgalvādins corrected the errors of Abhidharmist in at least two significant ways:[2]

1. It was clearly a mistake of lesser minds to deny categorically that the self exists, As the personalists pointed out, it had been said that to say that the self does not exist, in truth and reality (satyatah sthititah), is a wrong view. The Buddha, as a matter of fact, in a famous dialogue with Vatsogotra had refused to commit himself on the question of the existence of the self.

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[1]Keith op. cit., pp. 83-84.

[2]Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, op. cit., p. 25.

> 2. In another respect also the one-sided philosophizing of the Abhidharmist was bound to produce its own opposite....The Abhidharmists by insisting that only isolated monentary events are real, held on to processes to the exclusion of all substance, and gloried in denying the relative permanence of objects as well as their relative unity.[1]

Whether Ābhidharmikas or Pudgalvādins remained true to Buddha's teaching is a purely historical question and lies beyond the scope of this investigation. However, the charge of onesidedness of the theory of Ābhidharmikas and its inadequacy in explaining the facts of phenomenal existence is one that needs careful consideration. Whether the postulation of Pudgala is a necessary pre-requisite for explaining the elements of continuity in the realm of phenomenal existence and whether this postulation of Pudgala is compatible with the Anattā doctrine as indeed the Pudgalvadins claim, are the questions that require our immediate attention.

The irreconcilibility of Anattā doctrine with the postulate of Pudgala has been amply demonstrated by Vasubandhu.[2] Of course Vasubandhu's repudiation of Pudgala as proposed by Vātsīputrīyas is basically from Sautrāntika position. It is in Sautrāntika that the notion of Ego as series of durationless momentary existences crystalizes in its clearest and maturest form. The idea is not consistently worked out in Sarvāstivāda

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Abhidharmkośam, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 1189 ff.

or Therāvāda. But Sautrāntikas, while in general dissociating themselves from Ābhidharmikas, did accept Anattā or non-substantiality of the Ego as the cornerstone of Buddhist thought and took a stand against the Vātsīputrīyas notion of person. In a nutshell the argument against Pudgala takes the following form.

> "...any self (pudgala) which really exists must be something over and above the impermanent factors of empiric individuality. But such a self, which must be uncaused, eternal, and without change, would be without activity or practical efficiency (arthakriyākāritra) which is the essential characteristic of reality...there in the consciousness nothing more than the fact of a series of thought moments which are in causal relation...But there is continuity in the individual though not a self.[1]..

The urge to account for continuity in the phenomenal existence, despite a clear rejection of an abiding self as a substance or a structural unity as person is constantly present in the post-Sarvastivada Buddhist literature. Thus the later Therāvādins proposed a theory of a 'life-continuum' (bhāvānga) which is subconscious and subliminal.[2] The continuity is accounted for by taking recourse to the notion of a subconscious region where the mind is unceasingly functioning as the source of all continuities. Mahāsanghikas too incorporated this idea in their theory of a basic (Mūla) consciousness. Relegating the function of continuity to the realm of this basic consciousness they maintained that

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[1] Keith, op. cit., p. 175.

[2] See Saratchandra, E.R., "Bhavange and the Buddhist psychology of Perception," University of Ceylon Review, I, 1943, pp. 94-102; also by the same author, The Buddhist Psychology of Perception, Ceylon, 1958.

karma matures in the subconscious mind where thought has a definite object.[1] Mahisasika even proposed a distinction between three kinds of skandhas: skandhas which are instantaneous, skandhas which has a span of one life, and skandhas enduring until the Sansāra i.e. realization of Nirvāna.[2] Noticing these tendencies in Ābhidharmika Buddhism. Conze observes:

> Concepts like these were designed to escape from the straight jacket of the Abhidharma, and try to establish the equivalent not only of an empirical but also of true self...All these theoretical constructions are attempts to combine the doctrine of 'not-self' with the almost instinctive belief in a 'self' empirical or true.[3]

One must pause here and consider if Conze is right in maintaining that these notions run counter to the Ābhidharmika anattā doctrine. Are not these tendencies conspicuous in the Ābhidharmika formulations as indeed in other cannonical literature? It seems to us that while Conze is right in noting that these tendencies are efforts to bring Atma doctrine from the backdoor, he is wrong in maintaining that they run counter to the basic tenets of Ābhidharmikas. Our contention is that the tendencies are conspicuously present in the Abhidharmikas too.

The Ābhidharmika Buddhism, far from being a simple and naive

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[1] See Silburn, L., Instant et Course, Paris, 1955, pp. 237-243.

[2] Conze. op. cit., p. 133.

[3] Conze, Ibid., p. 133.

process philosophy, is dialectical in its approach to reality. If it is not strictly a vindication of a theory of reality as pure flux, it is not also correct to say that it affirms the reality of a true abiding self. True, elements of a self-theory are discernible in the Ābhidharmika Buddhism, possibly under the impact of the Sāṁkhyan model or view. What, however, should not be overlooked is the prominent place given alongisde these elements to the pre-Abhidharmika denial of the self in it. Both subject and object, as we already noted, are placed on the same ontological footing. In this respect the Abhidharmika formulations must be differentiated from the Sāṁkhya-yoga, where subject and object are distinguished in terms of Kūtastha (unaffected by change) and Parināmi (the principle of change and movement). We will return to the problem of the relationship between Sāṁkhya-yoga and Abhidharmika Buddhism later. Suffice it to say at this point that the tension of the permanent and the changing, of continuity and discontinuity, of being and becoming is integral to the Ābhidharmika Buddhism.

We have seen that dharmas are ultimate, irreducible units of existence, which can best be described as 'real events'. The term 'dharma' has been often rendered as elements of existence. Such renderings smack of atomism which may be true of Nyāya-Vaiśesika and other such realistic systems, but are alien to the basic ontological perspective of Buddhism. There are good reasons for rendering 'dharma' as 'real events'. While events can be instantaneous, elements cannot. And this instantaneousness or momentariness is constitutive of the very existence of dharmas. The occurence of a certain state of affairs or

of a certain objective situation constitutes an event. The characteristic of event is that they have no duration. This point has already been made in the context of dharmas.

The question is; does the 'coming into being' and the 'passing away' of dharmas as real events imply that the existence of dharmas is 'punctual'? **Is the existence of dharmas punctual?** The existence of dharmas are called punctual only if it were the case that the instants (kṣana) of their 'coming into being' and 'passing away' are but mere "positions" in a one-dimensional temporal continuum. If the instants in question are individual units of time which stand out distinctly in a time-sequence then charge of 'punctuality' of existence of dharma as an actual event does not extend beyond the span of a single concrete now. A dharma having come into being does not endure awaiting to be dislodged by other dharma from being 'actual'. After having occurred once, the said dharma as a real event does somehow belong to the world series (saṁtāna) in which it has occured. But it can be detected exposed only by taking the actual present as our point of departure, because they are limited to one instant of effective existence. The essence of time is only partially revealed in the dharma's present mode of being, i.e. only in the actuality, which distinguishes the present.

The 'actuality' that events of dharmas are suffused with, permeates all events, but more specifically whatever is 'now', and in this respect what is actual for Ābhidharmika transcends the autonomy of an object. Though self-existence is a necessary condition for actuality, it is not sufficient to make something present i.e. actual.

Thus, there are no events in the realm of Nirvāna and Ākāśa (the Asaṁskṛta dharma) precisely because they are non-actual and timeless.

It may be noted that within Ābhidharmic framework the actual is characterized by being directly active, or, expressed differently by action or being operational. The actual may be said to "exist" precisely on account of the fact that it is active i.e. efficient. And it is in terms of this efficiency or activity that it conditions the emergence of what is to follow into being. The ground for the occurence of a causal connection within the compass of a present must be looked for in this function of what is actual.[1]

But a dharma does not cease to be real or does not become unreal when it ceases to be actual by losing its operancy. The relegation of a dharma into the past mode of existence means that the dharma as a real event has ceased to be operative in its immediacy. In other words it is condemned to an 'absence' forever from every new 'present'. And no recollection, not even the most vivid and accurate, can succeed in extracting it from that absence and in making it present again. At the same time a past dharma, although it has ceased to be strictly actual, has not been completely annihilated. It does not break off with each new instant of time, but retains a special mode

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[1] Infra, pp. 197-198.

of being, extending into the continuation of the same process. Thus, according to Ābhidharmika thinkers it is actuality or being operative and not existence that distinguishes the present dharma from the past and the future ones...[1] Neither the past nor the future is an absolute void. That which is past is past by virtue of having been actual. But that dharma which is future has not yet been realized, i.e. lacks actuality.[2]

The transience as a mode of being thus may be seen to be contingent upon a dharma becoming actual and displacing a dharma which was just present, but is no longer present. Transience, above all consists in perpetual transformation of the actuality of something present into that enigmatic "no-longer-being-present-any-more". This perpetual transformation, in which consists the essence of temporality, is ontologically speaking, an imperfection (saṁskṛtatva) which is constitutive of the nature of dharmas. It must be kept in mind, that it is not an accidental feature of the dharmas, brought about by some extraneous considerations. The 'imperfection' relates to the impossibility of persisting in actuality without sliding into the past. This, to some degree, partially discloses the peculiar Ābhidharmika way of accounting for

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

continuity and permanence in the phenomenal world. The logical and semantical difficulties involved in expounding the Buddhist theory of instantaneous reality can be illustrated by the following observations of Frauwallener that:

> the becoming and arising of dharmas is not a real arising and disappearing, but a wandering of always existent entities from one period of time into another, Entities which seem to have newly arisen, in fact wander from the future into the present and when they perish, they are transferred into the past period. In the personal continuity also events do not arise and perish, but the continuity is a stream which flows from the future into the past.[1]

Thus from Abhidharmika's point of view Persons or Pudgala as a specific conglomeration of certain dharmas may undergo change, but the fact of this conglomeration 'once-having-been' and maintaining its 'once-having-been' mode of reality does not undergo complete annihilation. It acquires a somewhat different mode of reality which may provisionally be classified as, retrogressively, derivative mode of being. The pudgala, the existential base of one's having-been conglomeration of psycho-physical skandhas, being radically transcendent in relation to an 'actual' existent conglomeration of psycho-physical skandhas capable of acting in the present, remains in the realm of being because it conditioned and interalia caused the present reality. But the something past remains in existence only as--so to speak--a retrogressively derivative being--namely as secondarily derivative, proceeding,

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[1]Frauwallener, E., Die Philosophie des Buddhisimus, 1956, pp. 140-141, cf. Conze, op. cit., p. 139.

"backwards" from a certain actuality subsequent to it. The present as actual and active is ultimately grounded in the past which has a being characterized by the mode of non-actuality.

We will have occassion to work out the implications of this position in detail in our discussion of Ābhidharmika notion of time and temporality. Suffice it to point out at this juncture that the problem of continuity and persistence is integral to Abhidharma ontology and any suggestion to the contrary stems from a lack of appreciation of the fuller import of Ābhidharmika notion of impermanence and from an underestimation of their concern with the problem of permanence and continuity in the phenomenal existence. A somewhat more detailed investigation of this aspect of Ābhidharmika thought and its realtionship to the Ābhidharmika understanding of time and temporality will be the subject matter of the following section.

CHAPTER VIII

ĀBHIDHARMA CONCEPTION OF TIME AND TEMPORALITY

The Category of Time and the Theory of Dharma as Temporal

It is in early Ābhidharmika literature of Sarvāstivāda that we find the first attempt to understand temporality as a process. The Ābhidharmikas of Sarvāstivāda tradition disregarded the question of the substantive reality of time as a factor in temporal determination. The basic issue for them was not whether Time exists as an independent reality which in conjunction with other realities or events constitute temporal determinations. Their primary concern was to account for the knowledge of things as temporally determined and that they could do by acknowledging the reality of dharmas as past, present and future. Thus Mahāvibhāṣā on Jñānaprasthāna declared that everything is real, the past (atīta) and the future (anāgata) are as much real as the present (prattyutpanna).[1] The theory proposed here does not make any distinction between things in themselves such as past and future matter, and the representations one has of them. It is here that we find the realism

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[1]The reality of past, present and future has been accepted by some Pāli traditions also. Such a view is clearly propounded by Nāgsena in Millindapannaha where he rejects the alternative offered by King Milinda who suggests that only present is real. This point may go in favour of views expressed by some scholars that Millindapannaha is a northern text (belonging to northern school of Buddhism). However, there is one important difference between Sarvāstivāda and the position of Nāgsena. For the Sarvāstivāda the past, present and future cannot be conceived in separation from the entities (dharmas). They are not empty slices of time. Nagsena, however, is prepared to accord them independent status.

of Sarvastivada present in its most undeniably form. It is not the reality of past, present and future as three points of time that is posited by Mahāvibhāṣā; rather, it is the reality of things or dharmas as past, present and future that is admitted here. Time is no factor in the determination of things or dharmas as past, present or future. Rather it is the operation of the Saṇskṛtalakṣṇas of jati, sthiti and jarā that accounts for a dharma being past, present or future. In early Abhidharmic literature we come across an alternative to Kālavādins, when Sarvāstivādins point out that the temporal determinations of things are built into the very structure of the becomingness of a being. Thus Mahāvibhāṣā points out:

> If all the three saṁskṛtalakṣaṇas have not yet been active, the dharma is called future. If one of them has already finished its activity and thus are just active, then the dharma is called present. If they have already finished their activity, the dharma is called past.[1]

It is important to note that early Abhidharmic literature never considered the determination of dharma's temporal quality to be a function of transcendental eternal Time which somehow contains things in three receptacles of time and is responsible for temporal designations of past, present and future. Thus Mahāvibhāṣā clearly rejected the option which would seem to suggest that

> the svabhāva of Time is nitya, but the svabhāva of the saṁskṛtadharmas is anitya. The saṁskṛtadharma wander across the times just as a fruit from one pot to another or as man from one house into another. This is also the

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[1]Mahāvibhāṣā, 394a, cf. Schayer, op. cit., p. 20.

> case with the saṁskṛtadharmas: going out of the future they enter into the present, and they go out of the present and enter into the past.[1]

In this rejection of the receptum notion of Time is implicit the basic Buddhist denial of the substantiality and permanence, a model set by Mahāvibhāṣā which is consistently adhered to by Sarvāstivāda. All Sarvāstivādin statements about the reality of past, present and future must be interpreted in correspondence with this understanding of temporal determinations. It is true that in Ābhidharmic literature we come across Sarvāstivādin statements which state that "dharmas wander across the three Times, that nirvāna lies beyond the three Times; that there exists a Future, a Past, etc..." But all these statements, as Schayer has already noted, are expressed in colloquial sense and must be interpreted as metaphorical statements, rather than literally. Thus in the statement "each dharma exists in the three Times as future, present and past" the term "three times" is "consequently only a synonymous denomination (adhivacana) for Sanskrtadharma."[2] Early Ābhidharmic literature clearly rejected any distinction between a dharma and its temporal determination. Temporal determinations, instead of being a function of an eternal transcendent Time, are built into the very structure of the becomingness of a dharma. Accordingly, they argued that there is no distinction between the temporality of a dharma and its conditionedness (saṁskṛta). What is given as temporal

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[1] Mahāvibhāṣā, 393a, cf. Ibid., p. 15.

[2] Schayer, op. cit., p. 27.

flow is nothing but an incessant flow of conditioned dharmas, apart from which time does not have an independent reality. In other words, time consists of conditional dharmas and conditional dharmas are time, and that the time is that the growth of which consists of the manifestation of samskrta dharmas. The theory, then, considers time as a mere modality of the conditioned dharmas, apart from which it does not have any reality.

Given this understanding of time and temporality in early Ābhidharmic thought one feels intrigued to discover in later Buddhist literature a tendency to describe Sarvāstivādins either as Kālavādin (upholder of the reality of time) or traikālyavādin (upholder of the reality of past, present and future). It is important to remember that for early Abhidharmikas or Sarvāstivādins, time can only be concieved in terms of the functionality of a dharma, apart from which they do not have any independent status. It is not surprising, then that, in their technical discussion of the temporal qualification or determination of dharma, the terms time (kāla) never occurs.

Pāli Abhidharma literature disagrees fundamentally with Sanskrit Ābhidharmic understanding of temporality. Herein we find an extensive refutation of the Sarvāstivādin view that everything exists, understood in the sense that past, present and future equally exist.[1] Their very starting point it seems, therefore, erroneous. However, this fact is immaterial in determining the true import of Therāvādins own exposition. They denied the reality of past and future and came to the conclusion that present alone exists.

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[1]Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa - Aṭṭhakathā, (trans.) Law, B.C., The Debates Commentary, London: Pali Text Society, 1940, p. 52 ff.

The debate between Therāvādins and Sarvāstivādins is presented in Katthāvatu as a debate on the reality status of things existing in past, present and future. The Sarvāstivādins are credited with accepting the existence of all dharma, but not always and everywhere in the same form. The Therāvādins, however, take the Sarvāstivāda on its face value and confront them with the problems inherent in the proposition of sarvam asti. If everything exists then "does the right view (sammaditthi) which looks upon your wrong view (micchāditthi) as wrong exist?"[1] The acceptance of simultaneous existence of the views only points to the contradiction to which everything exists doctrine can lead.

The Therāvādins attack Sarvāstivādins for accepting the existence of past and future dharmas. By equating past and future to present, the Therāvādins propose that the existence of past and future should be predicated in the same way as of the present. This, however, is not admissible to Sarvāstivādins who propose a distinction in the mode of existence of past, present and future dharmas. Therāvādins follow their argument by pointing out that if a rūpa-kandha (material-aggregate) becomes past by giving up its presentness (paccuppanbhāv), then it is also possible to conceive it as giving up its materiality (rūpa-bhāva).[2] Sarvāstivādins reply to this consist in their demonstration of the untenability of Therāvādins argument as outlined above. They point out the lacunae in Therāvādins argument in the following way: let a piece of white cloth be regarded as one

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[1] Ibid., p. 53.

[2] Ibid., p. 54.

inseparable object, when this piece of cloth is coloured, it abandons its whiteness, similarly past dharma gives up its paccupannabhāva (its existence as present).[1] Now can it be said of this piece of cloth that it also gives up its clothliness in abandoning its whiteness when coloured? Therāvādins do not accept the alternative offered here. Accordingly, Sarvāstivādin's position that a rūpa-dharma is changing its temporal qualification does not abandon its materiality on the being of rūpa-dharma. However, Therāvādin is not prepared to give in,and follows his argument in a different way. He points out that if the material aggregate (rūpa-dharma) does not give up its materiality (rūpabhāva), then the rūpa-dharma becomes permanent, eternally existing like nibhāna - a conclusion not acceptable to Sarvastivadins either, for they categorically deny that rupabhāva and nibbanbhāva are identified. Only nibbānabhāva can be eternal, not the rūpa-bhāva.

The debate is carried on in Katthāvatu and Katthāvatu-prakarna Atthakathā further. One specific problem that Therāvādin raises is that whether past (atita) gives up its pastness (atītabhāva)? The Sarvāstivādins answer is negative. They point out that in asserting the existence of atītabhāva, they mean that anāgatabhāva (futurity) and paccupannabhāva (presentness) do not exist in the same way as the atītabhāva. And similarly when they predicate existence of anāgatabhāva, they mean atītabhāva and paccupannabhāva do not exist like anāgatabhāva.[2] Thus Sarvāstivādin specifically deny that a dharma passes from an state into another. This Therāvādin

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[1] Ibid., p. 54.

[2] Ibid., p. 55.

construes to mean that atitabhāva too (the being in the mode of past) acquires a permanence or eternity, and therefore, is subject to the earlier question about its likeness with the nibbana or nibbānabhāva.

Therāvādins come up with another problem which they think that Sarvāstivādins asserting the existence of everything will have to face. They point out the Sarvastivadins will have to accept the existence of past (atīta) and of non-past (navatīta) as well as future (anāgata) and non-future (navanāgata). They argue that:

1. if the existence of past and non-past as also future and non-future is denied then Sarvāstivādins should not assert that past and future exist; and, also
2. if they do not accept the identity of atīta,paccupana and anāgata, they cannot say that atīta and anāgata exist.

The second argument is considered more elaborately, whereby applying the dialectic of this being, that is, this not-being, that is not (hutvā hoti hutvā hoti; na hutvā na hoti, na hutvā na hoti), Theravadins show the untenability of Sarvāstivādins acceptance of temporal distinctions. The Therāvādins emphasise the inter-penetrability of past, present and future and conclude that both past and future can be cognized only as that which is present to the cognizer.[1] This being so only present exists; past and future, if they exist at all, they can exist only as present.

[1]Ibid., p. 57.

The following points emerge from this brief re-capitulation of Sarvāstivādin and Therāvādin debate on the question of temporal qualifications:

1. According to Sarvāstivādin, the past or future, as usually understood, as the two slices of emply time in which dharma reside, do not exist; what we discern is the reality of a dharma which has already past (atīta) as well as that which has not yet come (anāgata);

2. It is wrong to assume that dharmas or Khandhas persist in the past, present and future. What persists may be the bhāva or the mode of being of a dharma which is constantly changing.

However, according to Therāvādins:

1. The mode of being of a thing is not separable from the thing itself, and as such if the bhāva of a dharma or skandha persists through past, present and future, then it is permanent or eternal and possesses same status of reality as the nibbānbhāva. This, of course, would be an heresy unacceptable to Sarvāstivādins;

2. Secondly, for Therāvādins the time distinctions are only conventional without any basis in the reality itself. There is no ontological basis for temporal qualifications, and that past and future can exist only as given in the present. Therefore, present alone exists.

In view of the above articulation of the Sarvāstivāda understanding of temporality, it is surprising to note a tendency among some modern scholars to suggest that Sarvāstivāda contributed to a view of time which conceived time as an ontological reality containing change. Drawing upon Pāli sources, David J. Kalupahana maintains that "the Sarvāstivāda represented a school of realism and.....they upheld the independent reality not only of things, but also of time."[1] John M. Koller agrees with Kalupahana's interpretation of the Sarvāstivāda and maintains that Nāgārjuna's critique of Time[2] is "directed primarily at the Sarvāstivādin, who took time to be an ontological container of change and divided the container into three segments: past, present and future."[3]

In the first place, both Koller and Kalupahana are mistaken in assuming that Nāgārjuna's critique of time is directed against the Sarvāstivāda. There is nothing in Nāgārjuna's kāla parikṣa to substantiate their contention that the view of time criticised by Nāgārjuna is in fact the one held by the Sarvāstivādins.[4] As a matter of fact, it may be gathered from the Candrakirti's Vṛtti on Mulamādhyamakārikā that the target of Nāgārjuna's attack is a certain Kālavādin who does not subscribe to the

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[1]Kalupahana, David J., "The Buddhist Conception of Time and Temporality", Philosophy East and West, Vol. 24, No. 2, April 1974, p. 187.

[2]See Inada, Kenneth K., Nāgārjuna: A Translation of His Mulamādhyamakakārikā, Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970, pp. 117-119.

[3]Koller, John M., "On The Buddhist Views of Devouring Time", Philosophy East and West, Vol. 24, No. 2, April 1974, p. 205.

[4]See Nāgārjuna, op. cit., pp. 117-119.

views of Buddha. The Kalavadin (the upholder of the reality of time) under attack of Nāgārjuna's relentless dialectic refers to Buddha as the teacher of his opponents.[1] It is equally interesting to note that while Nāgārjuna specifically rejects the reality of time, his critique never mentions the concept of dharma that is so central to Sarvāstivāda articulation of the problem.[2]

In arguing that the Sarvāstivādin believed in the reality of time both Koller and Kalupahana seem to be victims of confusing between a view which takes the reality of things or dharmas as past, present and future as the ontological givens and a view which accords time a primary ontological status as the container of things or dharmas. That the Sarvāstivāda position is not the latter will be set forth in the body of the

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[1]See Kanakura, Y., "The Question of Time in Connection of Milindapanhā, Abhidharma and Mādhyamikakārika", Osaki Gakaho, Vol. 115, 1962, pp. 1-17. This is one of the most illuminating papers on the subject. Its special merit consists in its ability to see the question of time as integral to the ontological question. The relationship of Milindapannaha to the Abhidharmika tradition has been well brought out.

[2]It is conceivable that Nāgārjuna would have opposed the Sarvāstivādin articulation of temporality in terms of the svabhāva of a dharma. (See infra, p. 208). But no explicit rejection of Sarvāstivāda can be discerned in the Kālaparīkṣā nor is there any claim that Sarvāstivādins believed in the independent reality status of time. We tend to agree with Shoson Miyamoto when he observes: "Nāgārjuna agreed with the Sarvāstivādins' denial of the existence of time, but opposed their concept of entity-realism (svabhāvavāda). He drew the conclusion of the nonexistence of time from the Madhyamika standpoint of non-substantiality (nihsvabhavāvāda), which was a restatement of the original Buddhist teaching of non-self." Shoson Miyamoto, "Time and Eternity in Buddhism", Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Tokyo: Vol. 7, No. 2, 1959, p. 824.

thesis. It may be noted here that there is no evidence from the Abhidharmika sources to support the contention that the Sarvāstivādins believed in the reality of time. Time as a category is conspicuously absent from the Sarvāstivāda scheme of things. Secondly, as we will show, they are primarily concerned with the reality status of dharmas or elements of existence which are either relegated to a non-actual mode of existence or which are still to achieve actuality. Accordingly, the doctrine is primarily concerned with postulating the reality of dharmas as past, present and future rather than the reality of dharmas in past, present and future as three distinct slices of time which somehow contain these dharmas.

The Sarvāstivāda is an attempt to provide a coherent picture of reality in terms of a whole conceived as a process, and at the same time retaining the uniqueness of the irreducible events which go into the making of the process. In asserting the reality of all (sarvam asti), Sarvāstivāda insisted that dharma is the ultimate constituent of all phenomena, meaning by dharma what is discerned to be existent and real in all the three temporal phases. The reality, as such, of the conglomeration of these dharmas is specifically denied. The basis of this denial is our experience which consists only of a succession of dharmas. There is no warrant from experience to believe that cognition reveals such a thing as a continuing 'being' or 'self', the ultimate reference point being only the discrete dharmas which constitute as such the nature (svabhāva) of reality. Our cognition reveals only the being of dharmas (svabhāva) in the three temporal phases. The existence of reality of dharmas as past, present and

future is present to cognitional experience without any mutual contradiction, experience being itself structured in terms of succession. It is significant that the Sarvāstivāda does not recognize the existence of dharmas in past, present and future moments of time, but recognizes their existence as past, present and future. There is no transcendental or empirical time in which real events may be conceived to take place or reside. Time is not an empty mould in which dharmas are deposited as they arise, stay and pass away. Time conceived as a transcendental background of our cognition or as an over-arching receptum of entities is totally unacceptable to any school of Buddhist thought, Sarvāstivāda being no exception in this regard. The Sarvastivādin's discussions are conducted on the level where the concern is with lived time. The dharmas are temporal in the sense of possessing reality by virtue of their own intrinsic nature in the three modes of temporal existence.

Is There A Pre-Ābhidharmika Notion of Time as Receptum?

Scholars have noted the opaqueness of the course of development that the time conception in early Buddhism followed.[1] But more often than not the time conception in early Buddhism has been misunderstood. Schayer is a case in point. He suggests that the theories of time in pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism tend to look at Time as the great container of all changes, a true reservoire of the changing entities or the phenomena.[2] According to Schayer, though we do not have any direct evidence to the effect that the pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism contributed to the notion of Time as receptum of entities, a close study of some Ābhidharmika passages clearly indicates that this indeed was one of the immediate contexts of the Ābhidharmika enunciation of the notion of three times.[3] In Mahāvibhāṣā, we come across a passage which mentions the ideas contained in the following as an erroneous view to be guarded against:

> The svabhāva of Time is nitya, but the svbhāva of samskṛtdharmas is anitya. The samskṛitdharma wander across the times just as a fruit from one pot to another, or as a man from one house into another. This is also the case with the samskṛtadharmas: going out of the future they enter into the present, and they go out of the

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[1] See Bareau, Andre, "The Notion of Time in Early Buddhism", East and West (Rome), 1943, pp. 353-364.

[2] Schayer, Stainslaw, op. cit., pp. 15-17.

[3] Ibid.

present and enter into the past.[1]

It is important to remember here that *Mahāvibhāṣā* mentions this position as an erroneous view to be guarded against. However, Schayer takes this to be a representative position of early Buddhism and draws the untenable conclusion that this theory of time as reservoire is only a later development of "the more primitive conception of Time as a unique, universal reservoir in which future, present and past entities are placed in layers, one upon another".[2]

However we must not forget the fact that *Mahāvibhāṣā*, traditionally, is assigned to the Buddhist Council held during the reign of Kaniṣka,[3] and one of its specific purposes was to record various alternative Abhidharmika positions and, finally, to evolve a standard Abhidharmika formulation on the fundamental ontological and doctrinal concerns of *Abhidharma*.[4] What Schayer takes to be a reference to some pre-Hinyānistic Buddhist Theory of Time was perhaps one of the current Abhidharmika positions which Mahāvibhāṣa takes to be a wrong interpretation of the true Ābhidharmika understanding of temporal differentiations.

Another evidence that Schayer adduces in support of his contention that pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism proposed a spatial understanding of Time

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[1] *Mahāvibhāṣā*, 393a, cf. *Ibid*., p. 15.

[2] Schayer, *op. cit*., p. 15.

[3] See Warder, A.K., *op. cit*., p. 345-346.

[4] *Ibid*.

as the reservoir of entities comes from the Abhidharmakośa. The Abhidharmkośa mentions a certain version of the traikalyavada which maintains that the actualization in the sense of bringing into present (vartamānikarana) of a future effect consists in 'dislocation' (deśāntarakarsana).[1] Reaffirming his contention that early Buddhism contributed to the reservoir ideal of Time conceived after a spatial understanding of it, Schayer finds that in the pre-Ābhidharmika doctrine, "the theory of spatial dislocation totally fulfils its object, thus corroborating its archaic character".[2]

Schayer has failed to see that the language of reservoir which has been discredited in the Abhidharmakośa is an unique version of the Sarvāstivāda understanding of Time differentiations in terms of "avasthā (states) whose spatial connotation should be taken in its metaphorical sense only. The idea of reservoir that Schayer is so willing to credit to some unknown pre-Ābhidharmika sect is actually a grossly misrepresented version of some Ābhidharmika theories of time differentiations. We will have occassion to refer to these variations of Sarvāstvādin conception of Time.[3] But it must be noted at this point that a reservoir ideal of Time is totally alien to the

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[1]kimidaṁ varttamānīkaraṇaṁ nāma? deśāntarākarṣaṇi ceti Abhidharmakośam, op. cit., p. 817.

[2]Schayer, op. cit., p. 16.

[3]Infra., p. 231 ff.

basic Buddhist ontological framework and it is very implausible to attribute it even to the pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism.

It is not our intention to deny the possibility of a spatial understanding being the context against which the classical Sarvāstivāda formulation of temporality, in terms of "efficiency" (kāritra) as the distinguishing mark of the present, took place.[1] However, it is our contention that the receptum notion of Time, instead of being a remnant of pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism forming the immediate background of the classical Sarvāstivāda enunciation of temporality was, in reality, a misunderstood version of the Ābhidharmika doctrine of temporal differentiation in terms of the avasthās of dharmas. It is this misinterpretation of avasthā theory in terms of reservoir that both the Mahāvibhāṣā and the Abhidharmakośa record as the immediate target of the sarvastivadin's attack.

Refutation of such misinterpretation of avasthā theory became all the more imminent in the later stages of Sarvāstivāda developments. Certain opponents of Sarvāstivāda tended to take a spatial interpretation of temporal differentiation as the most definitive statement of Sarvāstvāda. Thus, Samghabhadra vehemently rejects the following argumentation of an opponent who denies the reality of three temporal differentiation, by alluding to their spatial characteristics:

> Past and future do not really exist because, if they existed, they would resist one another. Indeed, the elements of rūpa must occupy a definite

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[1] Infra. p. 239.

> place. If the already destroyed elements and the elements not yet born existed really then they would resist one another. All rūpa-elements, if they exist, possess impentrability (apratighatva) and whatever does not possess impenetrability is not a rūpa.[1]

This argument also presupposes that past and future are two receptacles of finite volume. However the Abhidharma canons anticipating this problem attempted to resolve this by suggesting that spatialization is not a necessary concomitant of dharmas. Thus Mahāvibhāṣā makes the following point of clarification:

> If a dharma has the nature of rūpa, is it deśāstha (localized or spatialized)? If a dharma is deśāstha, it has necessarily the nature of rūpa; there exists, however, dharmas which have the nature of rūpa and which are not deśāstha, viz, the past and the future rūpas...[2]

This was a conscious effort on the part of the Mahāvibhāṣā thinkers to rectify the damage done by those Ābhidharmikas who tended to look at the temporal differentiations of past, present and future only in terms of the differences of avasthā, of spatial position in one of the three Time-phases.

Moreover, it is our contention that the Ābhidharmikas of Sarvāstivāda tradition, in their formulation of the theory of momentariness, were closer to the legacy of early Buddhism than the Sautrāntikas. Contrary to what Schayer suggests, Early Buddhism in point of fact seems

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[1] Nyāyānusāraśastra of Samghabhadra, 636a, (trans.) Schayer, op. cit., p. 1

[2] Mahāvibhāṣā, 395a, (trans.) Schayer, op. cit., p. 17.

to suggest a relativistic and experiential interpretation of Time.[1]

Early Buddhism avoids the two extremes of considering absolute time as the receptacle of entities and of reducing every form of experience into further indivisible moments. During the early period of Buddhism, the most dominant view of time was the one that recognized a finite segment of time as constituting the core of one's immediate experience.[2] Indeed the acceptance of this finite segment of time as a component of our temporality implied a positing of a certain duration of temporal experience no matter how infinitesimal this duration may be.[3] This stands in glaring contrast with the later Sautrantikas who looked at the moment as irreducible and durationless.[4] Impermanence in Early Buddhism revolved round this element of finitude of existence and was not built upon an idea of durationless momentary existence which indeed received a lion's share in Sautrāntikas. In the Sarvāstivādin's formulation of the problem, which served as the

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[1]See Kahpahana, David J., The Buddhist Conception of Time and Temporality, Philosophy East and West, 24, 2, April 1974, pp. 181-190.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., p. 185.

[4]The Ābhidharmikas classify dharmas as eternal and non-eternal, and ascribe all samskrta dharmas to the later category. But they do not make them strictly momentary. The Sautrāntikas, however, reduce all to a series of moments of coming to be. See Tattvasamgraha for Sautrāntika-Sarvāstivāda debate on the endurance of a moment.

Tattva Samgraha of Śantarakṣita with the commentary of Kamalsila, op. cit. 1822-1833, pp.512-13; also see Keith, op. cit., p. 107; Kalupahana, op. cit., p. 186.

paradigm for all Ābhidharmika formulations, the moment continued to be conceived as a finite segment of time characterized by a certain duration. This finite duration, according to the Sarvāstivāda contains four stages of phenomenalization of a dharma, the production or birth (jati), duration (sthiti), decaying or change (jarā), and the cessation or disappearance (nirodha). This conception of impermanence does not exclude the element of finitude of phenomenal existence and still somehow aims at retaining the element of continuity. And it is precisely in this context that the enigma of Sarvāstivāda becomes all the more acute. The paradox of Sarvāstivāda consists in its concern with an articulation of the process of temporality while at the same time being also concerned with elements that go into the making of this process. Though, methodologically speaking, the distinction between the dynamic and static aspects of reality is always admissible, in the final analysis (looking at in terms of concrete actuality) the seemingly static elements are part of the dynamic nature of things. Such is the predicament that the Sarvāstivāda faces inescapably in its formulation of the problem of temporal existence.

Reality of Past, Present and Future: Arguments From Cognition and Moral Law

The grounds for the reality of dharmas in the past, present and future mode of being are to be discerned within the framework of the empirically and realistically slanted epistemology of Sarvāstivāda. A careful review of the arguments offered by Sarvāstivāda in support of their assertion will serve to highlight the nature of their orientation to knowledge. The empiricistic-realistic approach to cognitional experience and its compatibility with the soteriological goal of realizing freedom (Nirvāna) are reflected in their arguments. The role of epistemology is conceived here, in conformity with the general tenor of Indian Philosophy, as ancillary pursuit in the service of soteriology, and a mutually reinforcing role is assigned to them.[1]

The following arguments are offered by Sarvāstivāda to support their assertion of the reality of dharmas in the three modes of existence. The arguments are present in the Abhidharmakośa, the Sphutārthā as well as in the Tattvasaṁgraha; and they claim to be valid both in terms

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[1] Thus Abhidharmika argued that past and future dharmas are real because Buddha had taught that an enlightened disciple (ārya-śrāvaka) becomes indifferent to the past and future material objects (rūpa) only by concentrating on their rūpas: UKtam hi Bhgavatā atītam ched bhikṣavo rūpaṁ nābhavisyanna śrutavānāryaśrāvakotīte rupenapekṣobhaviṣyat. yasmāttahryastyatītaṁ rūpaṁtasmāccutavānāryaśravakotite rupenapekṣo bhavati. anāgataṁ cedrūpaṁ nābhaviṣyat na śrutavānārya śrāvakaonāgataṁ rūpa nābhyana. ndiṣyat. yasmāttahryastyanāgataṁ rūpam iti vistarah. Abhidharmkośam, 1972 op. cit., p. 804. Also, see Sphutārtha on the above.

of experience and by means of its appeal to scriptural basis.[1]

1. Dvayāśryam ca Vijñāna:[2] According to Ābhidharmikas all cognitions are contingent on two factors:[3] (a) the objective correlate (viṣaya, ālambana) and the (b) cognizing consciousness (citta, vijñāna). While sense experience relates to the cognition or consciousness of the present the mental cognition refers to the past and future objects as well. If past or future objects (viṣaya) were denied reality, then on this basis, argues the Ābhidharmika, there could arise no cognition produced by the coming together of the viṣaya and the citta.

The Ābhidharmika seeks support for this common sense theory from the 'scripture' by referring to the unequivocal statement of Buddha to such effect.[4] The postulation of the existence of real in all the three

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[1] See supra, note 1, page 121 for reference to Buddha's words. The argument offered seeks to establish the reality of the past, present and future dharmas by taking recourse to the testimony of the Master. Thus, appeal is made to the scriptural authority. This is an important element in the argument for it clearly brings out the ultimate soteriological concern that is constantly present.

[2] The Tattvasamgraha of Sāmtarakṣita, op. cit., p. 504.

[3] dvayaṁ pratītya vijñānasyotpadaḥ, ityuktaṁ. dvayaṁ katamat? cakṣū rūpāṇi yāvat manodharmā iti. asati vātītānāgate tadālambanaṁ vijñānaṁ dvayaṁ pratītya na syāt. evam tāvadāgamato'styatītānāgatam. Abhidharmakosam, 1972, op. cit., p. 804.

[4] The vogue of appealing to Buddha vacana for justification of the validity of statement is comparable to the Brhaminical use of śabda pramāṇa (testimony as a valid means of knowledge). Historically, which is prior is very difficult to decide in this particular use, but there is a striking consensus among scholars over the question of the "priority" of the discussion of the "pramāna". At the hands of the Buddhist logicians like Vasubandhu, Dignaga and Dharmkīrti. It was the latter that gave rise to the pre-occupation with pramāna in the different sūtra commentatorial literature in brhaminical Hinduism.

modes is implicit in this contention of the Master and a denial of it will amount to the contradiction of the scripture (āgamaviruddha). The upshot of the argument formulated above is the realistic conviction that whatever causes mental cognition has an objective existence or be objectively real.[1] There is mental cognition of past and future dharmas. The crucial datum, here, on which the Ābhidharmika builds or constructs his theory is the fact of the givenness of past and future dharmas to mental cognition. If they (past and future dharmas) are not objectively real how could there be mental cognition of them. Were they not real "knowledge" of them will not be different from phantasy: their cognition will transpire to be non-cognition. A cognition by definition must have a specific real as its object.[2]

Arguing against the position that cognition is possible without the objective correlate, which is the point of view of Sautrāntika, the Abhidharmika argues: a consciousness (vijñāna) can only be defined qua 'what cognizes' (vijanati vijñānam); if there is no object to be cognized (vijñeya), then it necessarily follows that no consciousness as cognition can exist.

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[1]See Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya on Abhidharmkosa, Karika 24.
sati viṣaye vijñānaṁ pravrtate, nāsati. yadi cātītānāgataṁ na syādasadālambanaṁ vijñānaṁ syāt. tato vijñānameva na syad; ālambanābhāvāt.
The Abhidharmkosam, op. cit., p. 805.

[2]atītājātayor jñānam anyathā'viṣayaṁ bhavet; Tattvasaṁgraha, 1788, op. cit., p. 504. Also see Panjika on it: prativastu vijñāptyātmakaṁ vijñānam, asati ca jñeye na kincid anena jneyam ity avijñānam eva syāt, Ibid., p. 505.

The Sautrāntika alternative is that a consciousness as cognition may be defined just by the mere fact of its being the 'illuminating accompaniment' (bodhānugama) of all cognitions.[1] There is no warrant, according to them, for envoking the object of cognition as part of the definition. To this the Sarvāstivāda answers in the following way: the 'illumination' itself constitutes the objective correlate of consciousness as cognition. Cognition is defined as the coming together of consciousness (vijñāna) and its objective correlate (rūpa, vedana etc.). But the two factors (the subjective vijnana and objective rūpa, vedana etc.), according to the Ābhidharmikas, stand on the same ontological footing in the sense that they are dharmas. As dharmas they carry their 'own nature' (svabhāva). 'Illuminating' element in the cognition is the 'own nature' (svabhāva) consciousness (vijñāna) which consists of the dharma being objectively real. Thus, illuminating accompaniment (bodhānugama) in cognition too is an objective element which has an independent reality as the svabhāva of vijñāna in the three phases of its existence. This is the thesis of the Abhidharmika.

2. Karmātītam Ca Niḥsattvam Katham Phaladmiṣyate:[2] The past karmas, according to the authority of scripture, are assigned retributive power. Accordingly, argues the Abhidharmikas, past, present and future

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[1]Bodhānugatimātreṇa vijñānam iti cocyate; The Tattvasamgraha, 1849, op. cit., p. 518.

[2]Ibid., 1789, p. 504.

alike must possess reality. "The past moral or immoral karmas, like the present ones, are really existent in as much as they, like the latter, become effective at the time of their fruition. If that were not the case, the past moral or immoral (good or bad) karmas would bear fruit in the present."[1] The "causal efficiency" (kāritra) being the criterion of reality, then the past too like the future possessing as they do, as much causal efficiency as the present (this is what is implied in the assignment of retributive power to karmas must also therefore possess a reality of their own. A non-existent past could not be the cause of an effect which has yet to take place in the distant future. Admission of this would imply the denial of the moral law; good or bad acts would not produce their effects. The non-terminable character of the moral and immoral acts is the condition of the moral law being effective. This was the insight of Buddha.

The Sautrāntikas take strong exception to this proposition of Sarvāstivāda. Denying any reality to the past karma as possessing any causal efficiency Santaraksita observes:

> We do not admit that a past moral cause (vipākahetu) gives a retribution (phala): The retribution is granted only as an effect of a whole series of conscious moments (vijñāna-prabandha), so far as it became permeated (vāsita) by the (the moral character of) this (past cause).

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[1] yadi cātītaṁ na syāt śubhāśubhasya karmaṇaḥ phalamyatyāṁ kathaṁ syat. na hi phalotpattikāle vartamāno vipakaheturstīti; The Abhidharmakośam, op. cit., p. 805.

(the whole saṁtāna) having been permeated or perfumed (vāsita) by the past karma becomes capable of producing retribution.[1]

The Sarvāstivādins are not prepared to accept this. They refer to the statement of the great teacher, Buddha: "A karma which is annihilated, reduced to naught and destroyed does not, nevertheless, cease to exist".[2]

Sarvāstivādins refuse to take the Sautrāntika proposition of 'permeation' (vāsita) seriously on the ground that the saṁtāna (continuum) which seems to be perfumed (vāsita) by the vāsanā, cannot be the cause of the production of an effect (phala), because saṁtāna by its definition does not have a causal efficiency (kāritra) of its own. Arguing against the Sarvāstivādin postulation of the reality of past, present and future dharmas, the Sautrāntikas point out that the phala (effect) does originate directly from moral or immoral karma (act). According to the Sautrāntikas the karma leaves its impression on the consciousness-continuum (saṁtāna). Thus permeated or perfumed (vāsita), the phala (effect) takes place in the continuum in its due course.[3]

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[1] vipākahetuḥ phalado nātīto'bhyupagamyate, sadvāsitattu vijñānaprabandhātphalamiṣyate; The Tattvasamgraha, 1850, op. cit., p. 518.

[2] yattarhi lagudasikhīyakān parivrajakān adhikṛtyoktam bhagavatā-yat karmā'bhyatītaṁ kṣīnaṁ niruddhaṁ vigataṁ vipariṇataṁ tad'astīti, kiṁ te tasya karmaṇo bhūtapūrvatvaṁ necchantisma; Abhidharmakośaṁ, op. cit., 1972, p. 812.

[3] .....tatpūrvakāt saṁtānaviśeṣādityātmavādapratiṣedhe sampravedayiṣyāmaḥ.....; Ibid., p. 817.
Also: vāsitam paramparayā phalotpādanasamarthamutpāditam; Panjika by Kamalśila on Tattvasamgraha, op. cit., p. 518.

Against the Sarvāstivādin's position the argument that is urged is as follows: if both past and present exist or are real, then effect too co-exists with the cause (vipāka). What then is the relationship between the two and which of the two should be held responsible for the production (utpādas).[1] The Sarvāstivādin seeks to resolve the problem by asserting that it is the causal efficiency (sāmarthya) of the act of production which is responsible for the actualization of a pre-existent effect (phala). This indeed is what is implied in the assertion that the production takes place in the present. "Causal efficiency" is thus defined in the present context as the "actualization through making present" (vartamānīkarana).[2] Actualization through making present (vartamānīkarana) consists in a mere modification of the temporal mode of past into the present mode of existence.

3. Atītanāgate Jñānam Vibhaktam Yoginām:[3] A final argument for the reality of the dharmas as past, present and future comes from the recognition of the possibility of yogins having the vision of past, present and future. The argument takes for granted the validity of the scriptural

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[1]Abhidharmkośam, op. cit., p. 817; also Sphutārthā on above.

[2]Vartamānikaraṇe tarhi sāmarthyam. Vasubandhu's Bhasya in Abhidharmakośam, op. cit., p. 817; also vartamānikaraṇasāmarthyam iti cet; Tattvasamgrah Panjika, op. cit., p. 516.

[3]Tattvasamgraha, 1789, op. cit., p. 504. The view is assigned to Vasumitra by Kamalśīla in the Tattvasamgraha Panjika. "How can such ideas as one Mandhan Brahmdatta lived, the Chakravartti King Sankha will be the Maitreya Tathāgata etc. (cognized) distinctly by Yogins. (such cognitions) of the past and the future could not be possible (for) there is no distinction among things that are non-existent." Tattvasamgraha Panjika, op. cit., p. 505.

statement that Buddha was omniscient in the sense that he had an intuitive access to the reality in its past, present and future modes. This claim for the intuitive cognitive awareness of the past, present and future implies their intrinsic reality and to question that would amount to the transgression of the truth of the āgamas (scriptures containing the true words of Buddha).[1]

While the position of the Sarvāstivāda regarding the question of time and temporality thus seems clear enough, it does not of course follow that the arguments adduced to vindicate the position are conclusive. In fact, indeed in the way that it is outlined above, it has a circular character, and the opponent, who in this case happens to be the Sautrāntika, does not hesitate to criticise it. What, however, stands underscored in this enterprise, significant from the point of view of what it implies in terms of our understanding of temporality, is the theory of 'causal efficiency' (kārtira), a concept of overwhelming importance to be taken up for discussion in the next chapter.

Both the Sarvāstivāda and Sāmkhya-Yoga argue for the reality of the present as well as the past and the future. Not only is the past as real as the present, but the future also is real awaiting to become the actualized existence. The two traditions seek to support their argument in terms of different ontological bases. The Sāmkhya-Yoga, as it has

[1]For a Sautrāntika critique of the scriptural basis for the reality of past, present and future dharmas, see Tattvasamgraha, 1847-1850, op. cit., pp. 517-518.

been shown, posits a dynamic continuant (parināmi nitya) which admits of being spoken of as the subject which has change as its predicate. This material continuant, also significantly called the material cause (upādāna kārana) provides the scope for one mode to supersede another mode. It is the matrix for the criss-cross and supersession of qualities (guna). Thus is established an ontological ground which makes possible for reality to exist in all times without being unchangingly eternal. The Sarvāstivādin likewise rests his argument for the existence of the future elements which are constitutive of reality in terms of an ontology of a dynamic continuum of reals which may be described as elements existent in their very essence in all times. There is no unitary material cause into which the dharmas merge or from which to emerge. And yet they are in a state of continuum whereby their existence in all times is derived from the continuance of their essence in time.

The two traditions show, despite the differences in language and also the conceptualization of their respective ontological base, profound convergence over the question of the consideration which seem to have weighed in favour of according reality to the future. Both seem to say, in effect, through their varied and similar formulations of the issue, that the essence of the present consists of its being preceded by the past, its essence likewise includes in turn its relation of precedence to the future awaiting actualization. Why do they say this? For both thought systems moral law is a fundamental requirement. Good and bad acts produce the results. Moral and immoral acts (karma) are continuous.

Accordingly, a doctrine of the reality that is in full accord with this requirement must view the present as implying at once the reality of the future as well as the past. If the future is simply nothing, i.e. if the future effects of acts were simply non-existent, it is not conceivable that good acts be done with a view to perpetuation in good results. What is equally inconceivable, the absolute non-existence will come into being. Should it be the case that the future effect lies latently in the material cause so that when it becomes actualized it will not be a case of novel production out of nothing. The good or bad act (karma) is the efficient cause (nimitta kārana) of the appearance of the future effects (sataśca phalasyanimittam vartamānikaraṇe samartham na purva janane).

In strikingly similar manner the Sarvāstivādin also argues: the past acts, moral or immoral like the present ones are really existent and likewise the future acts too exist in their fruition. Instead of employing the language of material cause or efficient cause the Sarvāstivādin employs the "logical" criterion of the real as causal efficiency. We can speak of something as real differently from what is not real only in terms of a difference that it makes (arthakriyā kāritra). To exist can be distinguished from non-existence only in terms of the difference that the former makes. In the Sarvastivādin's language the difference is the production of effect. Employing this criterion he argues that if future dharmas were denied reality status on the mere ground that future does not yet exist, then it would mean the denial of the moral law. According to the principle of moral law (Law of Karma), present acts,

good or bad, produce their future effects. It may thus be seen that in Sarvāstivāda as well as in Sāṃkhya-Yoga traditions, what serves as the primary concern for a doctrine of reality and a consequent theory of time and temporality is the principle of karma.

CHAPTER IX

ĀBHIDHARMIKA CONCEPTION OF KĀRITRA AND TEMPORAL DISTINCTION

The most significant conceptual contribution of Sarvāstivāda to Buddhism is the notion of Kāritra. Kāritra is the mark of actuality (vartamāna). It is that element in the Real which accounts for its "efficiency". The existent in order to be actual must be efficient. Efficiency of the real consists in its capacity to project an effect (phala, kārya). That which is not capable of or does not possess the potency for the projection of kārya is not efficient, and by the same token lacks actuality. This wanting of actuality does not reduce the real to nothingness, or inexistence. Rather actuality is only one element of real, the other being the non-actuality. This non-actuality is the mark of existents or dharmas which are past or future. Dharmas as past and future are real but they are not actual because they are wanting in kāritra (efficiency). This in brief is the upshot of Sarvāstivāda doctrine of Kāritra.

Three Stages in the Development of Kāritra Doctrine

Concept of Kāritra in Mahāvibhāṣā: The earliest formulation of Kāritra as the determinant of temporal distinctions can be discerned in

the Mahāvibhāsā. In this formulation an equation is made between the svalakṣaṇa or svabhāva (the specific mark) of a dharma and its special function (svakriyā, vṛtti, kāritra, svabhāga). This equation is further exemplified in the definitions of the Abhidharma: "the essence of a dharma, its svabhava as definiendum (= lakṣya) is defined by its kāritra (= svakriyā or svalakṣaṇa) as definiens."[1] However, the relationship between the svabhāva and kāritra of a dharma remains enigmatic for the authors of Mahāvibhāṣā, and although, accepting the equation of svabhāva and kāritra of a dharma, Mahāvibhāṣā prefers to be non-committal as to the specific nature of the relationship between the two. Further pressed with the question whether kāritra and svabhāva are the same or different, the Mahāvibhāṣa makes the following point:

> It cannot be said categorically whether they are the same or different. Just as the svabhāva of each śāsrava dharma possesses many lakṣaṇas as anitya etc., and it cannot be said categorically whether

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[1]This double logical and ontological meaning has been discussed by Schayer in Ausgewahlte Kapital aus der Prasannapada (Krakowie, 1931, p. 2) in a remark on Chapter V of the Madhyamakakārika where the problem of the lakṣya and lakṣana is taken up by Nāgārjuna with reference to ākāśa, and its svalakṣana, the anāvaraṇatva (quality of non-veiling). Stcherbatsky has differed with Schayer on this matter and maintains that these discussions do not have anything to do with the problem of dharm-svabhāva and Kāritra. He accuses Schayer of failing to distinguish between lakṣana = svalakṣana and lakṣana = saṁskṛtalakṣaṇā, (See Stecherbatsky, S., "Die drei Richtungen in der philosophie des Buddhismus", Rocznik Orientalistyczny, 10, 1924, p.35). However, it is important to note that from the point of view of Abhidharmikas of Vaibhasika orientation even asaṁskṛtadharmās, e.g. ākāśa also have their svakāritra. See de La Valée Poussin, Documents d'Abhidharma, Bulletin d l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient, Paris, 1, 1931, p. 43.
Also, Schayer, Stanislaw, op. cit., p. 21.

> they are identical with or different from (these lakṣaṇas), such is the case here. Therefore, (the relation between kāritra and svabhāva is not predicable.[1]

However, this unpredicability of the relationship between the two refers only to the conceptual articulation of an ontological fact. While efficiency must be grounded in the real (dharma), and it belongs only to the real, it does not exhaust all the possibilities of the real. Proceeding from this assumption the Mahāvibhāṣā makes causal efficiency (kāritra) the criterion of temporal distinctions:

> On what is based the distinction of Time-epochs? On the kāritra. The saṁskṛta dharmas which do not yet possess the kāritra are called 'future', the saṁskṛta dharmas which just now possess the kāritra are called 'present', the saṁskṛta dharma whose kāritra is already destroyed, are called past. Or: the rūpa, when it does not offer resistance just now, is called present, when it has already ceased to offer resistance, is called past, etc.[2]

Difficulties inherent in this formulation of kāritra as the basis of temporal distinctions are multifareous, and the Sarvāstivāda thinking had to wrestle with the issues of great variety in order to propose a coherent and comprehensive theory of temporal determination. Equation of kāritra with the svabhāva of the dharma and the subsequent description of the relationship as unpredicable involved difficulties that were to be overcome by the later Sarvāstivādins. If the kāritra and the svabhāva of a dharma were identical then, in what sense a dharma is said to come to possess its

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[1] Mahāvibhāṣā, op. cit., 394c, cf. Schayer, op. cit., p. 25.

[2] Mahāvibhāṣā, op. cit., 393c, cf. Schayer, op. cit., p. 22.

kāritra in the present mode of existence.[1] Further, in what sense can a dharma's kāritra may be said to be destroyed (in the past)[2] for the destruction of the dharma's kāritra would amount to annihilation of the dharmasvabhāva and consequently to admitting of the unreality of the dharma (in the past mode of existence). Moreover, if a dharma is considered present only on account of the performance of the special function (kāritra) then we may have difficulty in discerning the status of the being of eye (cakṣu dharma) which does not perform its special function of seeing during slumber or when obstructed by darkness. We cannot deny that cakṣu dharma is present in either of the cases, but then obviously it is not performing its special function. Difficulties inherent in the simple formulation of the kāritra theory in Mahāvibhāṣā prompted the Sarvāstivādins to pursue the analysis of kāritra as the determinant of temporal distinctions further in this direction.

Vasumitra's Conception of Kāritra: Before we turn our attention to the efforts of Sarvāstivadins like Sanghbhadra to offer a more comprehensive analysis of kāritra, we may consider another attempt to define the notion in the context of original Mahāvibhāsā position. Such an attempt was made by Vasumitra. According to this position manifestation of the specific function of dharma A is the activity not of this very dharma, but of other preceding dharmas, say P, Q, R, etc. by which the function of the

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[1]Supra, p. 229.

[2]Supra, p. 229.

dharma A is causally determined. The true activity of a dharma consequently is, its facility of determining other dharmas, i.e. of compelling future dharmas to manifest their special functions. This interpretation of kāritra seems to draw its strength from the well-acknowledged fact that the Ābhidharmikas accepted six different kinds of such determinations: (1) sahabhukāraṇa (simultaneous cause), (2) samanāntarakāraṇa (an immediate cause), (3) sarvatragakāraṇa (an omnipresent cause), (4) vipākakāraṇa (a specific cause), (5) sabhāgakāraṇa (homogeneous cause), (6) adhipatikāraṇa (a general negative cause).[1] Thus, according to this way of looking at the kāritra of a dharma, in the appearance of one specific dharma of, say, sight (cakṣurindriya), the said dharma is (a) the simultaneous determinant of the samskṛtalakṣaṇas, (b) the homogeneous determinant of all the future dharmas of sight which form the continuity (samtatati) of an eye, and, (c) the general negative determination of all other dharmas whose origination it does not hinder. Given this understanding of the operation of causal efficiency of a dharma, the kāritra of a dharma is no more its (svakāritra, svabhāga, etc.) but its hetubhāvasthāna, its phalotpadansāmarthya: its causal function and its facility of producing effects.[2]

This interpretation of kāritra as conceived by Vasumitra anticipates

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[1]Kāraṇ sahabhūśćaiva sabhāgaḥ samprayuktakaḥ sarvatrago vipākākhyaḥ ṣadvidho heturiṣyate. Abhidharmkośam, (1970), op. cit., p. 279. For further discussion of this, see Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya on above as well as Yaśomitra's vyākhyā.

[2]yadhyevam, pratyūtpannasya tatsabhāgasya cakṣuḥ kiṁ kāritram? phaladānapratigraḥ atītānāmapi tarhi sabhāgahetvādināṁ. **Abhidharmakośam**, op. cit., 1974, p. 808.

sôme of the elements of Samghabhadra, but is unable to resolve the difficulties pointed out earlier in our discussion. Indeed, by accepting this interpretation of kāritra, we can explain the present character of eye (cakṣurindriya) even in the state of slumber or under obstruction from darkness. For, in these cases, it performs the function of being the determinant of other dharmas. Here the kāritra of the cakṣu dharma does not consist of its capacity of sight.[1] However, Abhidharma specifically defines kāritra in terms of the svabhāva or svakāritra of dharma, its nature which is sufficient unto itself; any attempt to interpret it relatively to the operations of some causal factors goes against its true import. Moreover, even if we accept that the kāritra of a dharma is defined by its relationship to other dharmas, as indeed the view under consideration does, then we will have to enforce some other restrictions on it, before it can serve the general purpose of defining the temporal distinctions of dharmas. For example, accepting this definition of kāritra in terms of a dharma's relationship to other dharmas, we may face a situation where a past dharma will have to be regarded as present.[2] The karmic retribution becomes ripe only some time after the act has been committed. The karmic cause having ceased in the moment of its appearance, stay and disappearance (utpāda, sthiti and vyaya), the effect

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[1] tatsabhāgasya caksuṣaḥ kim kāritram. yadvi kāritralakṣaṇaṁ svakarma na karoti, tat tatsabhāgaḥ. tasya ca nāstikāritram darśanalakṣanam. kathaṁ tat pratyutpannamityabhiprāyaḥ. phaladānpratigrahaiti. Sphutārthā with Abhidharmakośam, op. cit., 1972, p. 808.

[2] atītānāmapi tarhi sabhāghetvādināṁ phaladānāt karitraprasango'rdhakāritrasya veti lakṣaṇa samkaraḥ. Abhidharmakośaṁ, op. cit. p. 808.

(*phala*) has not arisen yet. Thus the determination of a *dharma* by another *dharma* in this case lasts beyond the moment of the appearance, stay and disappearance of the first. Should we therefore accept that a past continues to be present as long as it has not produced its effect?[1]

Apparently these considerations led to a re-formulation of the Sarvāstivādin position. They accepted the possibility of the realization of the effect of a cause in the same moment in which the cause had previously arisen, stayed and passed away, or in the immediately subsequent moment or in some distant moment in continuum (*saṁtāna*) when the original causal determinant may not be present. Under this scheme the *sahābhukāraṇa* and *samanāntarakāraṇa* belong to the first category of causal operation, *sabhāgakāraṇa* and *sarvatrāgakāraṇa* operate in the second or third manner and the effect of a *vipākakāraṇa* is realized in the third manner.[2]

Samghabhadra on the Concept of Kāritra: A revised version of *kāritra* theory is proposed by Bhadanta Samghbhadra which is in accord with the conception of causal operation just outlined. According to this theory, the *kāritra* of a *dharma* does not consist in a real production of an effect nor is it contingent upon its relationship to another *dharma*. Samghabhadra zealously defends the original position asserting the constancy of the *svabhāva* of a *dharma*, and still accounting for its temporal determination with reference to the operation of *kāritra* of *dharma*.[3] But *kāritra* is

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[1]See *Sphuṭārthā*, *op. cit.*, p. 808.

[2]*Abhidharmkośam*, (1970), *op. cit.*, p. 288 ff.

[3]*Supra*, p. 230.

conceived not as a capacity to produce an effect nor as a causal determinant but as the potency to project an effect (phalākṣepaśakti). It is the presence or absence of this potency of a dharma that determines the presentness, pastness or futurity:

> The kāritra of a dharma is projecting a kārya, not producing it. The past (dharmas) do not possess this potency of projection and therefore cannot possess a kāritra.....kāritra here means vyāpāra, activity or operation, as seeing; (in another words) it is (the special potency) by which the eye is seeing, the ear is hearing, the nose is smelling, the tongue is tasting, etc; it is (further the special potency) by which consciousness (vijñāna) is active as cognizing; (and finally it is special potency) by which visual forms (rūpa) etc. are made objects of the corresponding sense-organs (svendriya gocaratva).
>
> The kāritra of the dharmas means potency (śakti) only of projecting results (phalākṣepa = grahana), not the actual generation (jñāna = dāna). Past causes, (sabhāga) etc. do not possess the potency of projecting results because the projecting takes place only in the state of presence. An (already) projected result is not, on its part, connected with (new potency of) projection, because otherwise a regresus ad infinitum would result. Therefore, no past dharmas can possess a kāritra and hence there is no confusion of time-marks.[1]

In this formulation of the kāritra theory Sāmghabhadra attempts to

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[1]yataḥ samprāptakāritro vartamāna uccyate, uparatakāritro'titaḥ, aprāptkāritro'nāgata ityadhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitāḥ. kiṁ punaratra kāritramabhipretam.....darśanādilakṣaṇo vyāpārah, yatha pancānāṁ caksurādināṁ darśanādikam - yatascaksuḥ paśyati śrotram śṛnoti ghrāṇam jighrati jihvā svādayatītyādivijñānasyāpi vijñātṛtvam vijānātīti kṛtva rūpādīnāmindriyagocaratvam....
dharmānāṁ kāritramucyate phalākṣepaśaktiḥ, natu phalajanaṁ, nacātītānāṁ sabhāgahetvādīnāṁ phalākṣepo'sti, vartamānāvasthāyāmevāksiptatvāt. nacāksiptasyāksepo yukto'navasthāprasangāt. tasmādtītānāṁ na kāritrasambhava iti nāsti lakṣaṇasaṁkara iti. Tattvasamgraha Panjika, op. cit., p. 506.

meet three specific objections raised by Sautrāntikas against Sarvāstivāda conception of kāritra. In order to present the Sautrāntika's objections against kāritra being the basis of temporal differentiation we may refer to its formulation in Tattvasamgraha:

1. If kāritra means vyāpāra, activity or operation of seeing, etc., then how can we account for the eye-fascimile (tatsabhāga-cakṣu) being called present when it is not exercising its function of seeing (darśana).[1]

2. Acceptance of the function of phaladāna as the definiedum of kāritra would entail confusion or co-mingling of the determining characteristics (lakṣaṇasaṁkāra) of the past and the present in the same dharma.[2]

3. If kāritra is conceived as including both phaladāna and phalagrahaṇ then this would imply the semi-presence (ardha-varttamānatva) of the past dharmas as sabhāgahetu or vipākahetu. In the case of sabhāgahetu or vipākahetu at least one of the constituent factors of kāritra (phaladāna and phalagrahaṇa) is present. Consequently, it is past-cum-present - a contingency which is not free from the confusion or co-mingling of the characteristics (lakṣaṇasaṁkara).[3]

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[1]See Abhidharmkośam, op. cit., 1974, p. 808; Sphutartha, op. cit., 1972, p. 808 ; and, Tattvasamgrah Panjika, op. cit., p. 506.

[2]Ibid.

[3]ardhakāritrasya va (prasaṅgah) lakṣaṇasamkarah. Abhidharmkośam, op. cit., p. 808. Also see, Sphutartha, op. cit., 1972, p. 808.

However, in the reformulation of the kāritra theory by Samghabhadra these difficulties are cleverly and adroitly avoided. By defining kāritra as the potency (śakti) only of projecting results (phalākṣepa = grahaṇa)[1] and not the actual generation of the result, Samghabhadra tends to overcome the objections of laksaṇasamkara against the kāritra theory. Samghabhadra avoids the difficulties that plagued Vasumitra's formulation by insisting that kāritra must be defined only as the potency for phalagrahaṇa (also called phalākṣepa, acquisition of effectivity) and that this alone must be regarded as the sole criterion of a dharma being called present. The past dharmas have no such capacity, and therefore they are not even semi-present (ardhavartamāna).[2] To be present is to be vested with the potency for effectivity. The occasional coincidence of the actual generation of effects (phaladāna) with the acquisition of effectivity (phalapratigraha) does not imply a necessary concomitance of the two. The actual generation or production of effect is not the distinctive feature of presentness for it is also discerned in the past dharmas. But the projection of an effect (the act of throwing out) and the potency for this projection can be discerned only in the present.[3] The presence of kāritra and its operation is thus possible only in the present dharmas. This possibility being excluded

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[1]See Supra, p. 234.

[2]See Samghbhadra cited in Tattvasamgrah Panjika, op. cit., p. 506.

[3]Ibid.

from the past, the contingency of the confusion of the temporal characteristic is thus avoided.

Samghabhadra further makes a distinction between sāmarthya and kāritra of a dharma. In his response to the Sautrāntika critique that kārtira cannot be the basis of time-distinctions in dharmas because it involves a confusion or co-mingling of the time-marks (adhvalakṣaṇanam samkāro bahvet), Samghabhadra points out the failure of Sautrāntikas to appreciate the significance of the Sarvāstavādin's understanding of the dharmasvabhāva. There is a distinction between the sāmarthya and kāritra of a dharma. While both of them are śaktis of a dharma they are not identical. While sāmrthya may be obstructed by extraneous circumstances and its operation may be subject to external hinderances kāritra is intrinsically constitutive of the dharmasvabhāva and accordingly it is immune from the obstructions which may hinder the operation of the sāmarthya of a dharma. All the difficulties that the Sautrāntika sees as diminishing the explanatory value of kāritra theory emanate from their failure to appreciate the distinction between the two. As Samghabhadra puts it;

> The śaktis of a dharma are of two kinds: one is called kāritra, the other is called sāmarthya. Kāritra has been defined as a phalākṣepasāmarthya, but kāritra is not always identical with sāmarthya. There exists also a sāmarthya which is different from kāritra. If for example, in darkness the eye sees the rūpas, its sāmarthya is obstructed by an āvaraṇa, but not its kāritra. The darśanasāmarthya is obstructed by the tamas and it is why, in darkness, the eye is not able to perceive the rūpas. But its kāritra (which is identical with) 'projecting an effect' (phalākṣepa) is not obstructed by darkness. The eye is able to project an effect also in darkness.

Apart from the present condition (avasthā), karitra is absent, because it arises only in dependence with the present. (A dharma) the kāritra of which is destroyed, is not absolutely inactive (niṣkriya): when an other svabhāva originates, it may become its determinant. But this (determination) is not kāritra, it is only samarthya. Because (a dharma) can project an effect only when it is present. What is (absolutely) inactive cannot project its special effect (na svaphalam aksipati) and only the projection of a special effect is called kāritra.[1]

[1]Nyāyānusāraśāstra, cf. Schayer, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

Kāritra And The Svabhāva Of Dharma

The relationship of kāritra to the svabhāva of dharma has been problematic within the framework of Sarvāstivāda ontology. Sautrāntika have capitalized upon the ambiguity and mystification that infests the Sarvāstivāda explication of this relationship. Sarvāsitvāda postulates kāritra to be the mark of existent only in the mode of actuality and thereby tries to account for the temporal distinctions of dharma as real in terms of the actual operation of the potency of projection of effectivity (phalākṣepa or phalagrahaṇa) in the present. Sautrāntika, while accepting the proposition that causal efficiency or the capacity for effectivity is the mark of real as present, (arthakriyākāritra), further assert that there is no other way that real can exist. Effectivity or efficiency is the mark of the present and as such real can only be present; past and future lacking such efficiency are devoid of reality. Sautrāntikas reache at this conclusion through a comprehensive critique of the nature of kāritra and its relationship to dharmasvabhāva. Probably Sarvāstivādins too realized the difficulties involved in their formulation of the relationship and consequently settled for the unpredicability of this relationship.[1]

The Sautrāntika raised objections against Sarvāstivāda conception of Kāritra on the ground that it is neither different from nor identical with the dharmasvabhāva and as such it can not be the basis of temporal

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[1]See infra, pp. 246-248.

distinctions. Refusing to accept any other possibility of the relationship between the kāritra and the dharmasvabhāva the Sautrāntika proposes that the acceptance of any of the two alternative by the Vaibhāṣikās would imply consequences that are irreconcilable with the basic tenets of Vaibhāṣika thought. If we accept the substantial difference between the kāritra and the svabhāva of a dharma then we will have to accept the antecedent and subsequent unreality of dharmas because of the fact that kāritra has been accepted to be operative only in the present on account of which alone a dharma is held to be a hetu and saṁskṛta (that which conditions and is conditioned). If on the other hand, kāritra is identical with the svabhāva of a dharma then kāritra too will be permanent and eternal like the dharma and as such it cannot be the basis of temporal distinctions in dharmas. Sāntarakṣita maintains:

> These (sarvāstivādins) will have to admit that kāritra is either different from, or the same as, the dharma. There is no other way in which they can exist. If it is something different from the object, then the past and future states of present dharmas would have to be regarded without any reality, for they are causes and are embellished, and so forth like the kāritra. Otherwise (if they are not different) permanence will follow on account of the ever-presence of the svabhāva of a dharma. Indeed, besides substantial identity there is no other essential mark of permanence.[1]

The Sautrāntika formulates the following critique of kāritra theory:

Considering that the kāritra in question is different from the

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[1] taiḥ kāritramidaṁ dharmādanyattadrūpameva vā, abhyupeyaṁ yadanyā 'sti gatiḥ kācinna vāstavī; Tattvasaṁgraha, op. cit., p. 506.

anyatve vartamānānāṁ prāgūrdhvaṁ va'svabhāvatā hetutvasaṁskṛtatvādeḥ kāritrasyeva gamyatām; Ibid., p. 507.

anyatha nityatāpattiḥ svabhāvāvasthiteḥ sadā naitadrūpātiriktaṁ hi vidyate nityalakṣaṇaṁ; Ibid.

dharma the unreality (nihsvabhāvatā) of the present dharma in its antecedent and subsequent states will have to be accepted. Reason for the subsequent and antecedent unreality of the dharmas as present consist in the fact that being different from the kāritra, it must contain in itself the ground for its phenomenal existence i.e. being a cause and being contingent or imbellished. In either respect the dharma is like kāritra which also functions as cause and is the ground of contingency and which is non-existent in the subsequent and precedent states.[1]

5. If, on the other hand, the present dharma were not unreal (nihsvabhāva) in the past and future states, then all the samskṛta dharmas which are defined as contingent and embellished will have to be regarded as eternal. In other words "if there were no antecedent and no subsequent unreality, then the permanence (nityatā) of all which is contingent (samskṛta) would arise, because the svabhāva of a dharma would continue to be always (sarvadā vyavasthitatvāt). Indeed, apart from the constant reality (sadāsattva) there is no other essential mark of permanence or eternality."[2] But according to Sarvastivada only asamskṛta dharmas are eternal or permanent. The thrust of the Sautrāntika's argument is that the postulation of

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[1]Tattvasamgraha, op. cit., p. 507.

[2]anyathā yadi prāgurdhva ca nihsvabhāvatā na syāttadā sarvasya samskṛtasya nityatā prapnoti, svabhāvasya sarvadā vyavasthitatvāt, na ca sadāsattvavyatirekena nityatvalakṣanamasti; Ibid.

kāritra as different from the dharma implies consequences which are not compatible with the basic tenets of Sarvāstivāda. Moreover, the admission of kāritra as something different from the dharmas will amount to the contradiction of the fundamental thesis of the Buddhist doctrine contained in the declaration of the Buddha: All things (sarvam), Brahmanas, are included in the five skandhas, twelve āyatanas and eighteen dhātus. Thus the reality of a kāritra is obviously rejected by the great teacher.[1]

Sautrāntika then analyses the second alternative that the kāritra is identical with the dharma. Here too the primary concern is to show the incompatibility of the position with the basic tenets of Sarvāstivādins. The strategy employed is to propose two mutually exclusive alternative positions none of which can be acceptable to the opponent. Any other alternative having been excluded the opponents position is rendered redundant.[2]

Sāntarakṣita offers the following arguments against the proposition that kāritra is identical with the dharma:

> If, on the other hand, the kāritra is not different from the dharma, then, being inseparable from the dharma it will be there at all times, just like the nature of the dharma. And therefore the distinctions of Time could not be made on the basis of this (kāritra), for there would be no possibility of distinction between the cessation, attainment or non-attainment of that (kāritra).[3]

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[1]Ibid.

[2]This method of argument is called prasanga and has been extensively employed in the later Buddhist circles, specially by the Madhyamikas.

[3]ananyatve'pi kāritraṁ dharmādvyatirekataḥ svarupamiva dharmasya prasktaṁ sārvakālikam, Tattvasamgraha, op. cit., p. 507.
tatścādhvavibhago'yam tadvaśānnaprakalpyate na hi tasva cyutih prāptiraprāptirvā vibhāgatah, Ibid.

Accepting the non-difference of the *kāritra* from the *dharma* implies its inseparability from the *dharma* just like the *svarupa* of the *dharma*. And in that case *kāritra* would be something existing at all times. Accordingly there cannot be any distinction of times based on *kāritra*: that which has ceased its *kāritra* is 'past', that which has attained its *kāritra* is 'present' and that which has not attained its *kāritra* is the unarrived 'future'. It is only when the distinction of the attaininment and non-attainment of the *kāritra* is made that we can make any distinction of the past, present and future *dharmas*. But however, if *kāritra* is identical with the *dharma* then such distinctions are not possible. Conversely, if *kāritra* is non-different from the *dharma*, the *dharma* too, like the *kāritra*, will have only a reality of the middle point, i.e. of the present only. The *dharma*, being like the *kāritra*, will be devoid of the previous and later states, and as such its total reality will be condensed in the present only.[1] The unreality of the past and future will result.

The Sarvāstivādins are unpurturbed by these *prasangas* proposed by the Sautrāntikas. They maintain that the two *prasangas* which accept only the possibilities of identity or difference of the *kāritra* and *dharma* do not exhaust all the possibilities. The Sarvāstivādins propose another alternative according to which *kāritra* and *dharma* are and are not identical:

> the two *prasangas* do not exhaust all possibilities of the problem. Indeed, besides difference and identity of

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 508.

> kāritra and dharma a third theory is possible according to which kāritra and dharma are and are not identical. This is just our stand-point. We teach that kāritra does not exist independently as something different from the dharma, but we deny that the kāritra is simply identical with the dharma and that it lasts permanently.[1]

The Sarvāstivādins are wary of the prasanga argument on two counts: First, they explicitly maintain that saṁskrta dharmas are not eternal.[2] Eternality or permanence as opposed to the momentary existence is assigned only to asaṁskrta dharmas. Samskrta dharmas are subject to the four marks of impermanence or conditionedness and consequently they are not eternal. Thus the element of eternality presupposed in the aforesaid Sautrāntika argument is misplaced, for they admit all dharmas (except the asaṁskrtas) as subject to the four characteristics of the conditioned, viz. origination, decay, continuity and impermanence (asaṁskrta-lakṣaṇa-yogan na sāsravaprasangaḥ). Thus the prasanga that the non-difference of kāritra with the dharma in the middle moment of present implies eternality of the kāritra is redundant. When dharma itself is not conceived as eternal how can kāritra be eternal? The prasanga in question is misconceived in as much as it is based on the possibility of the eternality of kāritra being intrinsic to the Sarvāstivādin postulation of the identity of kāritra with the dharma. This tacit supposition is necessary for deducing the prasanga formulated by the Sautrāntika. This very starting point is, however, erroneous. The Vaibhāsikas do not teach that kāritra possesses the three times.

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[1] Schayer, op. cit., p. 42.

[2] Supra, p. 175-176.

The other prasanga, as we saw, points out that the kāritra and dharma cannot be different because their difference would imply the unreality (nihsvabhāvtā) of the dharma in its precedent and subsequent states. Other wise, if the unreality of the present dharma in precedent and subsequent states is not accepted then the permanence or eternality of samskrta dharma will have to be accepted. Moreover, the acceptance of kāritra as different from the dharma will amount to the acceptance of the existence of something other than the five skandhas, twelve āyatanas and eighteen dhātus.

The whole prasange is misconceived in as much as it tends to look at kāritra as an entity which is different from the dharma. Differentiation of the kāritra from the dharma past, present and future is based on the functional differentiation of the dharmas as past, present and future. Present dharma is distinguished from the past and future precisely in terms of the operation or actualization of the potency for effectivity. Kāritra in operation and kāritra as a mere potency having-been-realized and to-be-realized are basically functional terms which define the temporal distinctions of dharmas or kāritra. Moreover, Sautrāntikas can bring in the prasanga arguments against the kāritra only because they tend to confuse reality with existent. This becomes all the more apparent when they tend to define permanence in terms of constancy of reality (naca sadāsattvavyatireken nityatvalakṣaṇamasti). Eternality or permanence can only be defined in terms of constant existence (sarvadāstitva) and not in terms of the constancy of reality (sadāsattva). Moreover, the objection that

postulation of kāritra contradicts the fundamental Buddhist doctrine that 'all' means skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus is also off the mark. For according to Sarvāstivādins kāritra is not an entity over and against the reality of the dharma.[1]

Impredicability (anirvacanīyatva) of Kāritra

The Sarvāstivādins are aware of the difficulties involved in their characterization of karitra as the ground or basis of all temporal differentiations. It is the difficulties involved in providing a more intelligible understanding of the relationship between the dharma and the kāritra that led them to describe the relationship as essentially ineffable. The four theories mentioned in the preceding chapters were partial attempts to account for the temporal variations in terms of the identity and difference of the dharmasvabhāva and are only partially able to resolve the issues. However, Sarvāstivādins had already realised the futility of verbal explication of the extremely evasive nature of the relationship of kāritra and svabhāva as early as the Mahāvibhāṣā where the relationship was described as one of identity and difference and consequently beyond the grasp of categories of logical thinking operating in terms of either-or relationship. In Mahāvibhāṣā we come across the following discussion:

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[1]We are not here concerned with the realtive logical adequacy of either of the positions concerned by themselves. What has been attempted here is to vindicate the plausibility of the Sarvāstivāda position.

> Are kāritra and svabhāva the same or are they different: it cannot be said categorically whether they are identical or different. Just as the svabhāva of each sasrvadharma possesses many lakṣaṇas as anitya etc., and it cannot be said categorically whether they are identical with or different from (these lakṣaṇas), such as the case here. Therefore (the relationship) between kāritra and svabhāva is not predicable.[1]

Saṁghabhadra in Nyāyānusārśastra accepts the Mahāvibhāṣā definitions of the relationship and describes them as one of identity and difference and considers them essentially ineffable. Thus he writes:

> the relation between kāritra and svabhāva is, just in the same manner, not accessible to determination as in the case with the relation between the dharmas and the saṁtāna. In one word: kāritra and svabhāva are and are not identical.[2]

Samghabhadra has taken strong exceptions to Sautrāntika's ridicule of the theory of asserting the identity and difference of the kāritra and the dharmasvabhāva.[3] The Sautrāntika's have rejected the doctrine of identity and difference of kāritra and the Svabhāva as not deserving serious consideration. However, Saṁghabhadra, maintaining that the identity and difference of kāritra is not an instance of arbitrariness which can become the caprice of divine beings, not meriting consideration from the point of view of serious reflection.

Quoting from the earlier Pitakas Samghbhadra points out that Buddha Bhagvāna himself has made statements like: Tathāgata is and is not

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[1]Mahāvibhāṣā, 394c, cf. Śchayer, op. cit., p. 25.

[2]Nyāyānusārśāstra, 633a, cf. Schayer, Ibid.; also see Tattvasamgraha Panjika, op. cit., p. 509.

[3]kāritram sarvadā nāsti, sadā dharmaś-ca varṇyate dharmān·nānyac ca kāritraṁ vyaktaṁ devaviceṣṭitam. Tattvasamgrah, op. cit., p. 508; svabhāvah sarvadā cāsti bhāvo nityaśca neṣyate na ca svabhāvād bhavo'nyo vyaktamiśvaraceṣṭitam. Abhidharmkośam, op. cit., p. 811.

lokkottara'; 'the dharmatā of the pratityasamutpāda is and is not nitya'.[1] He asks whether Buddha Bhagvana too be made subject to ridicule for these utterances.

> We accept that dharmas are real always, and at the same time we teach that dharmas are not eternal.....the terms 'eternal' and 'not-eternal' are used here in two different senses.....The dharma lasts eternally but the dharmabhāva changes. When the samskṛtadharmas wander across the Times, they do not lose their svabhāva and the kāritra which arises depends on pratyayās. Immediately after its origination, kāritra disappears. Therefore, we teach: the dharma is eternal but the dharmabhāva is not eternal.[2]

Some Concluding Observations

1. Three distinct phases in the development of the Sarvāstivadin conception of kāritra can be discerned. Earliest version recorded in the Mahāvibhāṣā tends to identify the svabhāva and kāritra of a dharma. Svabhāva of a dharma is defined in terms of its svakāritra. Seeing defines the cakṣu dharma, for it is the special function of the eye, the performance of which constitutes the very essence of the being of the cakṣu-dharma. In the second phase the kāritra came to be understood in terms of phalākṣepa-śakti which included both the moments of phala-grahaṇa and phala-dāna. This formulation of kāritra by Vasumitra was a definite advancement upon the simplicity of the Mahāvibhāṣā which tends to look

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[1] Nyāyānusarśāstra, 633c, cf. Scheyer, op. cit., p. 26.

[2] Ibid.

at kāritra only in terms of the specificity of the svabhāva of dharma. In Vasumitra's formulation of the kāritra theory the twin moment of phaladāna and phalagrahana are conceived as constituting a continuum through which the phalotpādansāmarthya of a dharma operates. Phalotpadansāmarthya as the specific moment which acts as the causal determinant of an other svabhāva of a dharma, as the concomitant factor in the emergence of it, tends to define kāritra not in terms of svakāritra or svabhāga of a dharma. Kāritra here acquires a new meaning when it comes to be understood in terms of its function of concomitant determination of an other svabhāva. Samghbhadra, however, goes beyond Vasumitra when he restricts the kāritra within the limits of a dharma's potency or capacity for the projection or conception (phalākṣepa or phalagrahaṇa) of a phala.

2. In his definition of kāritra Saṁghbhadra excludes the moment of phaladāna (actual production of the effect) and thereby overcomes the objection of lakṣaṇasaṁkaratva brought by Sautrāntikas against the Sarvāstivādin conception of kāritra. His theory also tends to retain the original Mahāvibhāṣā concern with the svabhāva or svakāritra of a dharma and thereby does away with the ontological dispersion that tends to split up internal unity of a dharma by distinguishing between the svabhāva and svakāritra of a dharma. It is the kāritra of a dharma that defines the svabhāva of a dharma in the three modes of its being. The difference between the past, present and future dharma does not consist in the absence or presence of its kāritra which also constitutes its svabhāva. However, the temporal distinctions reflect the state (avasthā) of a kāritra (potency for

effectivity). This potency may either be latent or patent; accordingly it will determine the presentness, pastness or futurity of a dharma.

Thus:

> All samskrtadharmas in the state (avasthā) of phalākṣepa are called present. This state of phalākṣepa is "previously" and "subsequently" inexistent. In accordance (with this previous and subsequent inexistence) the distinction of the three Times is established. Past and Future are real just as the Present. In brief: although the svabhāva of all samskṛta-dharmas remains always the same, yet the 'potencies' are different. In this manner although the svabhāva of (the dharmas) as constituting the three temporal moments is the same, yet, their kāritra is not without differentiation.[1]

It seems to us that the relationship between the dharmasvabhāva and kāritra can only be udnerstood and defined as exemplifying the duality of aspects of the dharmas. Professor Stcherbatsky has tried to define Sarvāstivādin ontology as asserting the duality "of two different planes of two sets of elements".[2] However, we tend to see at Sarvāstivādin ontology as implying only a duality of aspects. To our way of understanding kāritra cannot be considered as supplementing the svabhāva of a dharma; neither can it be considered as the second element or the second nature of the element. It is equally wrong to maintain that kāritra is the dharma itself or the svalaksana of the dharma. Indeed, Samghabhadra takes great pains to reject this theory. Both Tattvasaṁgraha and Nyāyānusāraśastra record Sarvāstivādin's denial of this alternative. The duality of aspects

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Stcherbatsky, Central Conception of Buddhism, op. cit., p. 42.

implied in the Śarvāstivādin ontology of dharmasvabhāva comes out very clearly if we remember that the difference between kāritra of a dharma as the phalākṣepśakti (power of projecting effects) and the svakāritra of dharma, equivalent to the svalakṣaṇa of a dharma consisting both of phaladāna (projecting effect) and phalagrahaṇa (receiving effect), is fundamental. Undermining this fundamental difference will lead to the postulation of total identity or total independence of the dharma and kāritra; either of the two alternatives being unacceptable to the Sarvāstivādins. The only alternative that seems to be admissible within the framework of Sarvāstivādin ontology is the one which looks at the relationship between the essential nature of being and its phenomenal manifestation as one of identity in difference. Indeed phalākṣepaśakti is an accidental characteristic of a dharma, it is only kadācikta (adventitous). But even as kadacikta when it is operative it defines the total being and cannot be conceived in isolation from the being of dharma. It is only when it is not operative, i.e. when it is only a potency, that a conceptual distinction between the two is possible. However, as a potency it does not have an independent status and actuality. Though it is distinctly discernible it is not cognized as different from the dharma. This relationship we prefer to describe one of bhedābheda or identity in difference. Instead of characterizing it as a logically different position, different alike from identity and difference, we prefer to understand this "identity in difference" as implying the inherent character of the dual aspects intrinsic to reality. Thus, the characterization of the relationship as ineffable simply expresses the logical difficulty in expressing the relationship of kāritra and

svabhāva on lines of mere identity and difference.

While Santrakṣita and Kamalśila seem to have realized certain difficulties involved in the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of kāritra, their critique fails to see the real significance of the Sarvāstivāda formulations of the dharmasvabhāva. Dharma for Sarvāstivāda is not an eternal entity as Saṃtrakṣita seems to suggest. As a matter of fact, dharma is neither an entity nor eternal in the usual sense of the term. Sarvāstivāda is an assertion of the reality of all dharmas (sarvam asti), but it is not the assertion of the existence of all dharmas in all times (sarvadā asti) as the Sautrāntikas would like us to believe. Given this understanding of the essential nature of dharma it would be wrong to postulate that dharma or dharmasvabhāva is conceived by Sarvāstivādin to be eternal or permanent. Permanence or substantial identity of dharma in all the three periods of time is not what Sarvāstivāda proposes. A dharma whether past, present or future is essentially momentary (kṣanika). Momentary existence of dharmas as real specific events that go into the making of phenomenal existence at one specific moment of its life history is indubitible. The reality of dharmas as past, present and future cannot be gainsaid. A dharma having lost its existence and actuality as present surely does not lose its reality. Its ongoing influence on the phenomenal existence through vāsanās attests to the continued reality of dharmas as past. An essential overlooking of what may be described as distinction between the existence and reality, or actuality and being of the dharma lies at the basis of the Sautrāntika critique of Sarvāstivāda. The difficulties which, according to Sautrāntika's, beset its conception of dharmas, as formulated by the

Sarvāstivādin, do not seem to be intractable once the significance of the above distinction is grasped. The explanatory value of a similar distinction was seen in an earlier context when we sought to interpret the Sāṁkhya-Yoga distinction of the real and the existent.

PART III

SĀṂKHYA-YOGA AND ĀBHIDHARMA BUDDHISM

IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER X

TEMPORAL BECOMING AND THE REAL: THE ĀBHIDHARMIKA AND SĀṀKHYA-YOGA PERSPECTIVE

In this chapter we will attempt to look at the question of temporal becoming in the context of its relationship to the thing which undergoes change. We will try to show that for both, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Ābhidharma Buddhism, the question of temporal becoming is integral to the question of the reality status of that which undergoes change. However, there are important differences between the two systems' understanding of the dynamism of the temporal process. According to Ābhidharmika, real does not have a mode of being other than the mode of becoming. A dharma is self-subsistent; it carries its own nature (svabhāva). That which 'becomes' changes in its totality. There is no residuum or constancy of a self-identical substance. On the other hand, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the temporal process involves only one aspect of the reality. This, the changing aspect of reality, is called dharma in Sāṁkhya-Yoga terminology. But this does not exhaust the real in its completeness. There is an aspect of real which is constant and self-identical. This is the dharmin, the common referrential content which remains constant through the changing phases of the real. While for Ābhidharma Buddhism temporal becoming exemplifies the constancy of the 'continuum' (saṃtāna), the Sāṃkhya-Yoga speaks of the constancy of the continuant (saṃtānī).

The Ābhidharmika Doctrine of the "Mutual Otherness" (Anyathātva) of Temporal Distinctions

Ābhidharmika sources record as many as four theories of temporality proposed by the Sarvāstivādins. These four variations of Sarvāṣtivādin's account of temporal differentiation are confirmed by different sources and the possibility of their having been proposed by different Sarvāstivādin thinkers at different times cannot be confirmed by any direct evidence drawn from the period. These four teachers probably belong to the period of the Buddhist Council at the time of Kanishka. The Vibhāṣā or Mahāvibhāṣā which is assigned to this period seem to mention these four versions of Sarvāstivāda. It seems reasonable to believe that the name of various teachers came to be associated with the different Sarvāstivāda position about the same time. While the historical question is not our primary concern, it may be of some interest to note that similarity between some of these positions and certain facets of some Buddhist positions mentioned as erroneous views on time by Vibhāṣā is quite striking.[1]

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[1]These four variations of Sarvāstivāda is mentioned in Mahāvibhāṣā, where the other three are rejected in favour of Vasumitra (infra, p.240). See Warder, A. K., op.cit., pp. 346-347. Later we find Vasubandhu echoing this tradition and accepting the Vasumitra's formulation as the best. Thus, trtiyah (Vasumitra's) sobhanah, Abhidharmakośam, op. cit., p. 808. The theories are also mentioned by Yośomitra, the celebrated commentator on Abhidharmakośa as well as by Sāntarakṣita and Kamalśīla in Tattvasamgraha and Tattvasamgraha Panjika respectively. But it is important to note that while the later tradition following Vasabandhu has invariably regarded them as four representative positions within Sarvāstivāda, Mahāvibhāṣa which was composed to settle the controversial issues within Sarvāstivāda tradition explicitly rejected the three in favour of Vasumitra's as the representative doctrine of Sarvāstivāda. See Warder, A. K., op. cit., pp. 346-347.

It seems to us that the congruity between later records reflecting Sarvāstivādin's understanding of temporal differentiation and the earlier records in Mahāvibhāsā is extremely important. It is on the basis of these passages in Mahāvibhāsā that Schayer argued that pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism had a conception of Time as the reservoir or receptum of entities. It is our contention that not only the passages referred to do not belong to pre-Ābhidharmika Buddhism, but also that the conception enunciated there does not involve a reservoir ideal of Time.

The whole confusion specially with reference to Vasumitra, seems to have arisen from the ambiguity of the term avasthā which has both spatial and temporal connotations. Avasthā can be translated both as "a state of affair" or "a time span in the personal history" of an entity. A spatial reading or interpretation of the term avasthā in the passages of Mahāvibhāsā as well as in the context of the theories of the Ābhidharmikas to be considered, seem to have obscured a proper appraisal of Ābhidharmic conception of temporal determinations. It is an uncritical acceptance of the spatial rendering of the term avasthā that prompted Schayer, McDermott and others to suggest that temporal determinations in these four versions of temporality involves a conception of dharma as a free floating entity wandering through the three periods of time. However, a careful reading of the text does not substantiate their conclusion and it becomes clear that such spatial interpretations of avasthā theory seems quite off the mark.

The four theories proposed by these teachers may be looked upon as different ways to account for the fact of continuity (saṁtāna) in the phenomenal world despite it being the case that change is the characteristic

mark. It is a commonplace doctrine shared by the generality of all Buddhist Schools that the phenomenon of change characteristic of existence must be understood as total change. At the same time they also emphasise, in the same breath, the phenomena of continuity in keeping with the foundational insight of Buddha about the causal interconnectedness. To advert to the four theories propounded by the teachers of Sarvāstivāda. The upshot of the theories is: the dharmas, in the process of becoming, maintain their own nature (svabhāva), and changes which characterises existence relates to modes (bhāva) or character (lakṣaṇa) or aspects (avasthā) or relational orientation (anyathānyathika) of the dharmas. The fact of change is acknowledged, but it is not supposed to affect the integrity of the nature of the dharmas. The differences within these theories refer to the specific understanding of change, but the persistence of "own nature" (svabhāva) through the entire spectrum of change is allowed. Change belongs to the very nature of dharmas and yet does not corrode them.

This basic insight is important for a proper appraisal of the Sarvāstivāda understanding of temporal becoming. What follows in the ensuing paragraphs is purported to be a descriptive account of the views of the four Sarvāstivādin thinkers. The exposition of the different theories is followed by a review of the parallelism of ideas in this connection that exists between them and the Sāṁkhya-Yoga thesis, which also, formally stated, accords reality to the substantial permanence of things whose integrity remains unaffected by the modal changes.

Bhāvānyathātva of Dharmatrātā: According to Dharmatrātā, temporal becoming is nothing but transmutation of modes. A dharma acquires the

character of "otherness" (anyathātva) by a change in its modes. It is the differences in modes that constitute the distinguishing mark of a dharma's pastness, presentness and futurity.[1] A dharma remains identical in its own nature (dravyataḥ). Thus, according to Yaśomitra Dharmatrātā prescribes only the otherness of bhāva through the past, future and present mode of coming into existence; there is no otherness of the essence qua substance (dravyataḥ).[2] While Yaśomitra defines bhāva including both the form (ākṛti) and quality (guṇa),[3] Kamalśīla mentions only quality (guṇa) being included under the definition of bhāva.[4] Kamlśīla offers following rendering of Dharmtrātā's argument for bhāvānyathātva:

> When a dharma has entered into its course of actuality (dharmasyadhvasu) there is the ótherness only of bhāva, not of dravya. For example, the substance Gold undergoes several changes in its qualities by virtue of which it comes to be called the 'armlet', 'necklet', 'ear-ring', etc., but there is no change of gold itself. Similarly, the dharma is differentiated in respect of the bhāvas of future etc. (like gold) the dharma, by abandoning its 'future' bhāva, it attains the 'present' bhāva, and by discarding its present bhāva it acquires the past bhāva. And yet there is no otherness of the dravya (of dharma), for there is no absence of the (dharma's) dravya (sarvatra dravyasyavyabhicārāt).[5]

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[1] bhāvānyathiko bhadantadharmtrātaḥ. sa kilahadharmasyādhvasu pravartamānasya bhāvānyathātvaṁ bhavati,.....dharmo'pyanāgatādadhvanaḥ pratyutpannamadhvānamāgacchannānāgatabhāvaṁ jahāti, na drayabhāvam.....Abhidharmakośam, op. cit., pp. 805-806.

[2] atītānāgata-pratyutpannasya bhāvasyānyathātvam bhavati, na dravyānyathātvam; The Sphutārthā, op. cit., p. 805.

[3] yathākramamākṛtiguṇanyathātvajñāpanārtham; Ibid.

[4] kaḥ punarbhāvaste neṣṭaḥ? guṇaviśeṣaḥ, yato'tītādyabhidhānajñānapravṛttiḥ; Tattvasamgrah Panjika, op. cit., p. 504.

[5] Ibid.

Kamalśīla equates dravya with the svabhāva of dharma and its translation as substance is only literal and misses the true import of the figurative use.[1] In Yaśomitra's formulation of the argument the true import of bhāvānyathātva is well articulated. Thus, milk, when transformed into curds, changes its qualities of taste, digestibility, etc., but its rūpa dharma (material nature) remains unchanged.[2] Yaśomitra's formulation of the argument clearly recognizes the continuity of the svabhāva or svalakṣaṇa of dharma, not without, but through the changes in its bhāva. Thus, though bhāvas of dharma undergo change "there is no otherness (temporal distinction) of the svalakṣaṇa of rūpa etc. (dharmas) on account of this (na rūpādi-svalaksanasyanyathātvam)."[3] The bhāva which consists of form (akṛti) and quality (guṇa) passes away, but the rupa dharma (the material nature), in which the bhāvas find their ground, does not cease to be. "Thus, the examples of gold and milk given above refer to the transmutation of form and quality respectively and show the continuity of the rūpa dharma."[4]

Thus Dharmtrātā reduces becoming to bhāva-anyathātva or reciprocal

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[1] Jha seems to have missed this and has made preciesly this mistake. However, the substance language as such is inappropriate to Sarvāstivādins. See Tattvasangraha, (tr.) Jha, Ganganath, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1939, Vol. 2, p. 862.

[2] Sphutārtha in the Abhidharmakośam, 1972, op. cit., p. 806.

[3] Ibid., p. 805.

[4] suvarṇaṁ kṣīraṁ ceti dṛstāntadvayaṁ yathākramamākrti guṇānyathātvajñāpanārtham; Ibid., p. 806.

otherness in the bhāva (manner of being, manifestation or appearance) of a dharma which itself stands spanning the reciprocal distinctions.[1] The changes wrought on dharma are mere epistemological precipitates, its mode of manifestation to consciousness. The problem of temporal evolution is solved by assigning to it a modal status of reality instead of making it intrinsic to it. Accordingly, temporal becoming does not touch the essential core of being.

Laksaṇa-anyathātva of Ghoṣaka: Ghoṣaka accounts for temporal differentiation in terms of the lakṣaṇas (character) of the dharma. There is simultaneity of the lakṣaṇas of past, present and future in each dharma and that a dharma is called past, present or future respectively when one of these lakṣaṇas are patent and other two are latent.[2] According to Ghoṣaka's lakṣana anyathātva:

> when the dharma has entered into its course of existence it is said to be 'past' when it has emerged as vested with the lakṣaṇa of past without however being, at the same time deprived of the lakṣaṇa of the future and the present. The futurity and the presentness (of a dharma) are to be explained the same way (as one may explain a man's not being disinterested in other women even though he is attached to his own. The empirical applicability

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[1]For a modern attempt to look at this doctrine in the light of contemporary logic of de-tensers see McDermott, A. Charles, The Sautrāntika Argument Against the Traikālyavāda, Philosophy East & West, 24.2, April 1974, pp. 193-200.

[2]lakṣaṇānyathiko bhadantaghoṣakah sa kilāha dharmo'dhvasu pravarttamāno'tīto'tītalakṣaṇayuktah; anāgatapratyutpannābhyāmaviyuktah. evam pratyutpanno'pyatītānāgatābhyāmaviyuktaḥ. The Abhidharmkośam, op. cit., 1972, p. 806.

(vyavahāra) (of temporal distinctions) rest on the fact of the acquisition of the character (vṛtti) of the specific lakṣaṇa.[1]

Thus the dharma as essence remains intact while its temporal phases vary on account of the pre-eminence of the specific lakṣaṇa of past, present and future.[2] A dharma, in the course of its existence, is vested with the character of 'past' on account of its pre-eminence; but the temporal phase of past does not totally exclude the phases of present and future. If the future were exclusive of the present and past, it would never become present or past, because what was not can never be (na bhutvā bhavah).[3] Significantly, it is not that the dharmas belong to the three time phases of past, present and future, but the lakṣaṇas of past, present and future belong to dharma itself. The future, the present and the past phases are thus found to co-exist together. The specific nature of the character of past, present and future remain unexplored in the explications of Ghoṣaka's view in the Abhidharma Kośa and the Tattva Saṃgraha. However, we have occasion to dwell upon this in our exposition of the Ābhidharmika notion of Kāritra and its bearing on their understanding of the temporal becoming.

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[1] dharmo'dhvasu vartamāno'tīto'tītalakṣanayukto'nāgatapṛtyutpannābhyāṁ lakṣanābhyāmaviyuktaḥ, yatha puruṣa ekasyāṁ striyāṁ raktaḥ śeṣāsvavirakta evamanāgatapratyutpannāvapi vācye. hyatītādilakṣaṇavṛttilābhāpekṣo vyavahara iti purvakādbhedaḥ. Tattva Saṃgraha Panjika, op. cit., p. 504.

[2] lakṣaṇānyathikasya lakṣaṇavṛttilābhāpekṣo vyavahārah. Sphutārthā, 5.26, op. cit., p. 806.

[3] vartamānam atītānāgatābhyāṁ viyuktaṁ anāgatameva vartamānam, vartamānamevātitaṁ syāt. Ibid.

Suffice it to note here that the alternation in the temporal phases is not attached to the dharma's essence (svabhāva) itself. Rather, change is explained in terms of a dharma's adjuncts.

Anyathā-anyathika of Buddhdeva: The specific purpose of Buddhdeva is to explain the temporal becoming by distinguishing and defining the past, present and future existence of dharma precisely in the context of a dharma and its relationship to other dharmas. Temporal determinations are nothing but the expression of the relationship of one dharma to others. Thus a dharma is called differently as future or present or past with reference to the prior or the posterior dharma.[1] A dharma:

> is called future in relation to the past and the present which are prior to it; it is called present in relation to the past which is prior to it and in relation to the future which is posterior to it; it is called past in relation to the present and the future which are posterior to it.[2]

The case of the same woman being designated as mother in relation to her daughter, and daughter in relation to her mother is an instance in point. As Kamalśila points out:

> Having entered the course of actuality a dharma is called one or the other in accordance with its relation to what has gone before and what is ahead. For example, the same

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[1] anyathānyathiko bhadantabuddhadevaḥ sa kilāh dharmo'dhvasu pravartamānaḥ purvāparampeksayānyo'nya ucyate avasthāntarataḥ, na dravyāntarataḥ. Abhidharmakośam, op. cit., p. 807.

[2] pūrvam-evātītaṁ vartamānaṁ va-pekṣyānāgata iti. purvam vatītam, aparaṁ vā'nāgatam apekṣyā vartmāna iti, aparam-eva vartamānam-ānāgataṁ vā apekṣyātita iti.. Sphutārthā 5.26, op. cit., p. 807.

> women is called 'mother' and 'daughter'. Similarly the usage (of temporal distinctions) is also dependent upon the past and the future (dharmas). A dharma related to an antecednet but without any subsequent is called future; that which has its antecedent as well as its subsequent is called present; that which has only its subsequent but no antecedent moments is called 'past'.[1]

Thus, according to the theory of ananyathātatva temporal determination is explained in terms of the diverse orientational features or relationship of an invariant dharma.

Avasthā-anyathātva of Vasumitra: Most celebrated of the four variations of Sarvāstvāda theories of temporality is attributed to Bhadanta Vasumitra. Vasumitra equates kāritra (causal efficiency) with the avasthā of a dharma and accordingly proposes that dharmas are continuants, the applicability of the temporal phases (avasthā) of 'past','present' and 'future' being due to each dharma's kāritra.[2] Vasumitra maintains:

> A dharma, having entered the course of actuality, it is designated variously according to the variations in avasthā (conditions of states) and not on account of the dravya (or svabhāva). The dravya remains the same in the three time variations. Just as the clay counting piece in an abacus, when placed in the place of units is designated as one, in the place of hundreds is called "hundred" and in the place of thousands is called "thousand", similarly

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[1]dharmo'dhvasu vartamānaḥ purvāparamapekṣyānyonya ucyate iti. yathaikā strī mātā cocyate duhitā ceti. asya pūrvāparāpekso vyavahāraḥ, yasya pūrvamevāsti nāparah so'nāgataḥ, yasya pūrvamasti aparam ca sa vartamānaḥ, yasyāparameva na purvam so'tita. The Tattvasaṁgraha Panjika, op. cit., p. 504.

[2]avasthā'nyathiko bhadantavasumitraḥ.....advānah kāritren vyavasthitāḥ. yadā sa dharmaḥ kāritraṁ na karoti tadā anāgataḥ. yadā karoti tada pratyupannaḥ yadā kṛtva niruddhastadā iti. Abhidharmakośaṁ, op. cit., pp. 806-808.

> a dharma (bhāva), when it is in the state of kāritra, is called present, having ceased its kāritra is called past, and while it has not acquired its kāritra, is called future. Thus the applicability of (time designations) depends on the avasthā (of karitra) just as in the case of abacus.[1]

Thus a dharma is designated as future when it does not exercise its kāritra (causal efficiency); it gets the designation of present when it does exercise the kāritra; and it is designated past when it has already exercised its kāritra. The temporal designation of a dharma then is a derivative of the variations in the states (avasthā) of causal efficiency (kāritra). Variation is only of state not of essence. The dharma acquires different temporal significations only on account of the variations in its kāritra while the svabhāva of dharma does not undergo any change.[2]

A more elaborate treatment of the notion of kāritra and its relationship to the svabhāva (own nature) of the dharma must remain in abeyance at this point. But to anticipate the difficulties that it encounters in the Vasumitra's formulation of it and its further elaboration in a later thinker, Saṁghabhadra, the following may be ovserved: whether the kāritra is defined as the capacity of giving or grasping a result (phala-dāna-grahaṇa) or as the potency to project a result (phalākṣepaśakti), in either way, one can see

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[1]Dharmo'dhvasu varttamāno'vasthāmavasthāṁ prāpyānyo'nyo nirdiśyate'vasthāntarato, na dravyataḥ, dravsya triṣvapi kāleṣvabhinnatvāt. yathā mṛdguḍikā ekaṅke prakṣiptā ekamityucyate, śataṅke śataṁ, sahastrāṅke sahastraṁ, tatha kāritre'vasthito bhāvo varttamānastatah prachyuto'titastadaprāpto'nāgata iti. Tattva Samgrah Panjika, op. cit., p. 504.

[2]See Sphutārthā 5.26, op. cit., p. 808.

it faces some unsourmountable difficulties. If the dharma's functionality (kāritra) is regarded as an aspect of the dharmasvabhāva, distinguishable from dharma, the difficulty in explaining it adequately seems obvious. What is there in the structure of becoming that accounts for the holding of kāritra in abeyance at one time and becoming productive at another? There is again the important question of the relationship between the svabhāva and kāritra of a dharma. Indeed these are the very issues raised in the scathing critique of the thesis of three times (traikālyavāda) by the Sautrāntikas.[1]

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[1]A. Charles McDermott, in his recent article on the question, has offered an excellent summary statement of the Sautrāntika critique of the Kāritra doctrine. He writes: "whether Kāritra be defined as, for example, the capacity of giving or grasping a result (phala-dāna-grahaṇa) or, again, as the potency to project a result (phalākṣepaśakti) insofar as a dharma's functionality is thereby regarded as (1) an aspect of the dharmasvabhāva, distinguishable from the dharma, cogent reasons for that functionality's being held in abeyance at one time, and becoming productive at another, cannot be given. (2) Neither is a halfway house, namely, the theory that the dharmasvābhāva and its kāritra or functionality both are and aren't identical, a congenial resting place.. (3) Nor is there much solace to be derived from the evasive stance that the relationship between svabhāva and kāritra is ineffable. (4) If, finally, a dharma's kāritra is alleged to have a merely nominal existence (prajñaptisat), he will ipso facto have conceded the Sautrāntika's point. McDermott, A. Charles, op. cit., p. 197. While the grasp of the Sautrāntika position reflected in the above passage is beyond doubt, what seems to have been overlooked is the import of Sarvāstivāda ontology and its implications for understanding the Karitra doctrine. Moreover, by bracketing the soteriological question and its bearing on the problem of time, he tends to ignore the true import of the Sarvastivada formulations. As we shall see, the soteriological questions which are integral to the Ābhidharmika formulations have weighed heavily in accepting the reality of dhārma - past, present and future.

The Parallelism of Sarvāstivāda and Sāṁkhya-Yoga Doctrine of Change

The similarity of the Ābhidharmika views of change recorded by Vasubandhu, Yaśomitra and Kamalśīla to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of the problem is too striking to be ignored or even treated casually. In fact, Vasubandhu himself, while expounding the first of the four theories, namely Dharmatrāta's thesis of change as transmutation of modes, labels this view as the Samkhya thesis (Sāṁkhya Pakṣa).[1] Likewise, the second theory, namely that of Ghoṣaka, which conceives change as the transformation of one temporal phase into another (lakṣaṇyathā) bears close affinity with the lakṣaṇapariṇāma of the Yogabhāṣya both in respect of terminology and conception - and also in the manner in which the two notions are illustrated. In the same manner, the theory of change as variation of states (avasthānyathātva) finds its close analogue in the avasthā pariṇāma of Yogabhāṣya, by which is meant changes of states assumed by the underlying substratum and the consequent differences in the values acquired at different moments of existence. Finally, the view of change as temporal relativity associated with the name of Buddhadeva is corroborated in the Yoga thesis and illustration of different dharmas being differently designated with regard to their mutual relative positions while the substratum itself remains non-relative, i.e. constant.

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[1] Abhidharmakośam, op. cit., 1972, p. 807.

It is useful to go into this question of parallelism in some detail and see if it is merely terminological or also conceptual. If latter, we have to face the problem of explaining how the Sāṁkhya-Yoga solution which partakes of the general ātman doctrine of Brahmanical orthodoxy (āstikavāda) could find its place in the heart of Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism. It is by no means suggested that this problem will admit of satisfactory resolution merely by virtue of the fact that it is encountered in the present context. In the light of the unmistakable affinities which exists side by side with the obvious differences the issue may even serve the purpose of re-opening the question of the radical opposition between the two philosophical traditions, at least in the genetical state of their respective development. Maybe, there has been a history of interaction between the two schools that one can discern here, even though from the very nature of the case and the general paucity of historical data one is not able to substantiate it through independent sources.

Let us briefly examine the parallel ideas with respect to each of the four theories. Dharmatrata's doctrine of bhāvānyathātva indeed looks identical with the dharmapariṇāma of Yoga philosophy.[1] What is described as modal transmutation (bhāvānyathātva) by Dharmatrātā is described as formal transmutation (saṁsthāna pariṇāma) by Vacaspati Miśra.[2] Each dharma gives place to the next dharma disappearing meanwhile in the common substratum.

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[1]dharmasya dharmiṇi vartamānsyaṁvādhvasvatītānāgatavartamāneṣu bhāvānyathātvam bhavati, na tu dravyānyathātvam. Yogabhāṣya, op. cit., 3.13, p. 112.

[2]Tattvavaiśāradi of Vācaspati Miśra, on the above, op. cit., p. 113.

While noting the obvious and commonplace similarity one cannot also fail to note the dissimilarity. The Sarvāstivāda speaks of dharmas indeed as discrete elements (dravyas), but which are conditioned (saṃskṛta), subject as they are to origination, decay, continuity and impermanence. The only thing the dharmas seem exempt from passing into non-being; the future is replete with the possibility of all conditioned dharmas, which become present given the assemblage of conditions in its fullness, and in the very next moment passes into the past mode of existence to remain forever as potential of the origination of future dharmas in course of time. Even though, the dharma as discrete element functions, as it were, as its own substratum throughout the three moments of existence in which its modes (bhāva) changes. This distinction in respect of function is intrinsic to the structure of dharmas and in this respect it may be conceptually distinguishable from the Sāṃkhya-Yoga. We, therefore, do not agree with the criticism that there is, here, a distinction "between" the "dharma qua continuant" and the "dharma qua transitory" which is "done explicitly by different names, dharmin and dharma".[1] The Sarvāstivāda terminology of dharma seeks to steer clear of the distinctions of dharmin and dharma and imports in its place the notion of continuum. The Sarvāstivāda strives to verbalize an ontology of particulars that steers clear of a rigid logic of exclusion, dialectic of which leads to the Sautrāntika critique of the

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[1]Tatia, Nathmal, Savāstivāda: The Nava Nalanda Mahavihara Research Publication, Vol. II, Patna: Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, 1960.

theory and also of a logic of inclusion of the kind advocated by the Jainas.[1]

The second theory of laksanānyathātva shifts the burden of change from the modes (bhāvas) to the phases (laksanas) which are temporal and becasue of which the modes may be conceived as changing. It is well known that the Yoga Bhāṣya speaks of the temporal characteristic of a dharma as laksana which accounts for the ontological sequence of change between two different dharmas occurring in succession. The example of the sequence of clay lump and clay jar vis a vis the constant of clay given in Yoga Bhāṣya is a case in point. While clay lump is present, i.e. actual , the clay jar is future, i.e. that which shall arise when the clay lump passes off. This temporal sequence of change is what is described as the sequence of the transmutation of the temporal characteristic (laksana parināma kramā).[2]

The objection of the confusion of times implicit in the thesis of lakṣaṇa parinama is faced by the author of Yoga Bhāṣya in a manner which is similar to the account given by Vasubandhu of Buddhadeva's thesis. The Yogá Bhāṣya resolution of the problem in terms of a constant dharmin which serves as the substratum of varying dharmas also serves to bring out the difference between the two theories of temporal becoming.[3] The Buddhist answer to the problem of co-mingling of times (adhvasaṁkara) is simple.

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[1]The Jaina logic of the manifoldness of the real (anekantavada) asserts, contra the laws of excluded middle and contradiction, that A can be also AB, meaning by B, not -A. For an illuminating account of the Jaina logic of inclusion in its distinct form from the genre of Buddhist schools see Padmarajiah, Y. J., A Comparative Study of Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge, Bombay: Jaina Sahitya Vihara Maudala, 1963, pp. 247 ff.

[2]pindaḥ pracyavate, ghata upajāyata iti dharma pariṇāmakramaḥ, Yoga Bhāṣya, op. cit., 3.15, p. 119.

[3]Ibid.

There is no scope for a simultaneous activation of the three temporal phases in one self-identical state. The temporal phases (lakṣaṇas) of prior, present and posterior occur successively subject to the fulfilment of the conditions of their appearance. The Sarvāstivādin, in terms of his ontology of particulars, does not have to face the problem of the three temporal phases existing together. In sum, we witness again to the same situation of the two theories of temporal becoming appearing terminologically similar and yet standing apart in terms of their ontological implications.

The doctrine of change as temporal relativity (anyathānyathikatva) defines the temporal distinctions in terms of each other. The example of the same woman designated mother in relation to the daughter, and daughter in relation to the mother or sister with reference to the brother and vice versa, illustrates the theory according to which the past, present and future distinctions are purely relational.[1] A possible way of distinguishing between the Sarvāstivādin's version and the version of the Yoga Bhāsya would be with reference to the admission or the non-admission of a common non-relative substratum. What seems to be implied by the example of the same woman being designated differently because of relational differences seem to differ in the two points of view. According to the Yoga Bhāsya it is the identity of the self-same person which makes it not contradictory

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[1]yathā caiktve'pi strī mātā cocyate duhitā ca svasā ceti, Yogabhāṣya, op. cit., 3.13, p. 114.

to speak of the same person in different terms. Likewise, in the case of the temporal distinctions the coincidence of the three times in one time could be explained. But according to the Sarvāstivāda it is not the self identity of a common person but the very matrix of relativity that permits designation of the persons in different terms. Likewise the successive moments of past, present and future are not found all at once and yet their distinction obtains with reference to the very relationality of the prior or the posterior dharma (purvāparamapeksyānyonyaucyate).[1]

The basic difference between the orientation shared by the schools of Buddhism and reflected in the Sarvāstivāda theories considered earlier and the orientation of Hindu thought typified in Sāmkhya-Yoga is obvious. The latter emphasizes substantial continuity to the point of underestimating change as qualified. Nothing can come into being afresh or pass away finally. This is the famous doctrine of identity of the effects with their cause (satkāryavāda). In sharp contrast to this stands the Buddhist thesis of the non-identity of the effect with cause. What is often overlooked in this way of understanding the difference between the two philosophical traditions, and this misunderstanding is prompted by the form of the contrast under which it is contemplated in the Hindu philosophical writings, the emphasis that Buddhism lays on the factor of continuity in causal relation. It is the causally dependent nature of things that constitutes the mark of the real. Keeping in mind this extreme significance of continuity that characterizes change accoridng to the Buddhist understanding we may restate the point at

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[1] Abhidharmakośam, op. cit., 1972, p. 807.

issue between the two traditions, i.e. the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Sarvāstivāda in the following terms. The former advocates a theory of the identity of the continuant (saṁtāni) whereas employing the language of identity the position of Sarvāstivāda may be described as a theory of the identity of continuum (saṁtāna).

From the foregoing account the ontological outlooks of the Sarvāstivāda and Sāṃkhya-Yoga doctrines emerge with clarity in terms both of their similarities and dissimilarities. There is no gainsaying of their convergence in their understanding of the problem of temporality despite their radical opposition as metaphysical systems. The convergence, even after making due allowance to the differences in their respective ontologies of particulars, is so striking that one may expect a similar convergence between the respective soteriologies. To this question we will address ourselves in the final chapter.

A Sautrāntika Critique of Vasumitra's Avasthā Theory

A detailed examination of the Sautrāntikas critique of Sarvāstivāda conception of Kāritra will be undertaken in a separate section. Currently, we will engage ourselves with the Sautrantika's critique of Sarvāstivādin's conception of states (avasthā) of a dharma and its implications for temporal determination. It is our contention that the Sautrāntikā's critique emanates from a rejection of the basic ontological slant of the Sarvāstivāda. There are, surely, difficulties inherent to Sarvāstivādin formulations of the problem and they cannot be gainsaid. But the difficulties involved in the understanding of temporal becoming must be viewed in the context of the wider ontological framework, so that they may appear in the light of their positive significance. The Sarvāstivādin's formulation of temporal distinctions are questioned by the Sautrāntikas. The Sautrāntikās maintain that differentiations of temporal determination on account of avasthās (states or conditions) or 'activity', 'inactivity' 'cessation of activity', etc. implies the continued existence of the self-same dharma in the three states. This self-same dharma in the three states must be undifferentiated (abheda). However, the possibility of the presence of 'activity', 'inactivity', etc. as the characteristic mark of the dharmas in the three states will not be without its difficulty. It amounts to asserting the co-existence of three mutually exclusive qualities in the undifferentiated dharma by which the distinction of successive states of future, past and present is thought to be established.[1] The Sautrāntika

[1] .....kiṁ tadevātītānāgatāvasthamāhosvidanyat. yadi tadeva, kathamekasminnirviśiṣte'sminrūpādike vastunyakriyādayaḥ parasparaviruddhā dharmā yujyante. Tattvasaṁgraha Panjika, op. cit., p. 511.

argues: if, despite the presence of contradictory properties a real be considered to be identical, then all differentiation would disappear and the entire world will collapse into oneness.[1] The Sautrāntika's critique is based on the assumption that the self-same *dharma* passes from one state into another. If what is assumed were the case then surely the critique is valid. The three properties, which account for the temporal differentiations, cannot belong to the same undifferentiated *dharma* without disputing its unity.

It therefore remains to be seen whether this assumption is legitimate. The Sarvāstivāda certainly denies that the *dharma* or the *vastu* is undifferentiated. But what should not be overlooked here is that it also denies that the *dharmas* are identical (*nirviśiṣṭa*). In reality the dharma or vastu in the past, present and future stand differentiated by the difference of abandoning and grasping of causal efficiency (*kāritra*); it is, therefore, not the case that it is strictly undifferentiated.[2] To the question if states are different or non-different from the *svabhāva* (being, reality) of the *dharma*, the answer is that they are not different (*abheda*). If the *dharma* were different from its state (*avasthā*), then, it is inconceivable how even in the present state (*avasthā*) the activity of the being can set in. The *dharma* as such, different from the *avastha* or state, will not be able to act as an active agent; effecient activity (causal efficiency) as it is argued by the Sarvāstivādins, belongs

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[1] yadi hi viruddhadharmādhyāse'pyekatvaṁ syāt, utsannā tarhi bhedavyavasthā, tatasca sarvameva jagadekameva syāt. *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*

only to the present avasthā of the dharma:

> By virtue of the variations undergone in the process of abandoning one state and taking up another, the vastu in the three states is not entirely undifferentiated. If it is so, it is asked: are these states different or non-different (abheda) - why - because, in that case the inactivity of the being would be the consequence. Through positive and negative concomitance (anvaya-vyatirekabhyām), it has been ascertained that causal efficiency belongs only to the states. (Hence, by being different from the states, the vastu could not be an active agent).[1]

Some important observations can be made at this point. It is true that Sarvāstivādins are not quite unequivocal about the exaxt nature of the differentiation of the vastu as reflected in the three states of past, present and future. They do not state clearly whether the differentiation of activity, inactivity, etc. belong to the same vastu which exists as past, present and future, or that the properties of activity, inactivity, etc., are the properties of different vastus existing as past, present and future. Two implications can be drawn from the statement that "by virtue of the variations undergone in the process of abandoning and grasping of the states, the vastu is not conceived to be entirely undifferentiated".:[2]

1. The differentiation is caused in the same vastu on account of abandoning one state and taking up another state.

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[1]athāpyavasthāparityāgaparigrahabhedena bhinnatvādadhvasu vastu na nirviśiṣtamiti kalpate, evamapi kim tā avasthā bhāvādbhinnā āhosvidabhinnā iti vaktavyam...bhidyante bhāvāditi sambandhaḥ. kasmāt, bhāvasyākarttṝtāptitaḥ - akarttṛtvaprasangāt. anvayavyatirekābhyām tāsāmevāvasthānām kāryam prati sāmarthyasiddheḥ. Ibid. p. 511.

[2]See Supra, note, 2, p. 250.

2. The differentiation in different phases of the real consists in the different dharma's state of abandoning the state of kāritra (causal efficiency) and of taking up of kāritra in different moments of time.

The second interpretation of the statement in question seems to be more in conformity with the overall picture of reality assumed in Sarvāstivādin ontology. Accoridng to this picture the state and vastu or dharma are one (abheda). From this it will follow that the vastu in the state of activity is different from the vastu in the state of inactivity. If state and vastu are identical and not different, then definitely the vastu in the state of activity is different from the vastu in the state of inactivity. It is not the same vastu that is both active and inactive in two different moments. Rather in the saṁtāna or the life continuum, one vastu with activity (kāritra) is preceded or succeded by another vastu with activity, or secession of activity. Vastu which is active is both real and existent, but the vastu in the state of 'inactivity' or 'cessation of activity' is real but not existent. The vastu can be existent and non-existent. But it cannot be unreal. Reality (satva) and existence (astitva) are not one and the same thing.[1] Sautrāntika's critique of Sarvāstivāda rests on the confusion of the two which probably has its origin in the Vasubandhu's rendering of Sarvāstivāda (a theory of sarvam asti) as sarvadāstivāda (a theory of sarvadā astitva).

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[1]When we make this statement, it has to be recognized that though the distinction is crucual, it is only implicit in the Sarvāstivāda which does not speak the language of real (sattā) as a constant element which is more concretely applicable to the Brahmnical tradition.

Some Concluding Observations

It is instructive to be reminded that the 'sarvam' has a specific connotation in the Buddhist canonical literature. Sarvam does not include the multiplicity of the phenomenal world as such. Rather, sarvam connotes only the dharmas classified as skandhas, dhatus, and āyatana. It is their conglomeration that constitutes the specific pluralities. "The people are saying 'all'; O Brahman! by all are meant the five skandhas, the twelve āyatanas, the eighteen dhātus".[1] Sarvam connotes the 'dharmas' which alone are real, specific combinations of them constitute the life continuum (saṁtāna). Saṁtāna itself is conceived to be only prajñaptisata or conceptually real. Momentary dharmas carrying their own svabhāva (being) alone are real. These dharmas come and go. Arising into existence they pass away. There is no continued existence of the dharma, and hence the question of the existence or continuity of same dharma in the past, present and future does not arise. Sarvāstivāda is the assertion of the reality of dharmas as past, present and future. It is not a doctrine maintaining the reality of the past, present and the future. Time, apart from the thing or the dharma, does not have any reality. From the Sarvāstivādin point of view "experiential events do not take place or flow in time. Rather, it would be more appropriate to say that events flow as time".[2] Seen from this point of view our awareness of time acquires

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[1] sarvam sarvamiti brāhmaṇa yaduta pancaskandhā dvādaśāyatanāni, aṣṭādaśca bhava. cf. The Tattvasamgraha Panjika, op. cit., p. 507.

[2] Inada, Kenneth K., "Time and Temporality: A Buddhist Approach", Philosophy East & West, 24.2, April 1974, pp. 173.

altogether a new dimension. The emphasis shifts from the static element of existence to the very dynamism of the process. Dynamism itself, however, instead of being only a by-product of the relational thought seeing static elements in a series, is built in the very structure of the becomingness of being.[1] It is in the Ābhidharmika Buddhism that a breakthrough is reached in the Indian speculation of time. It is here that the static concern with the time and its constituents give way to the dynamic concern with the temporality of being, the very structure of the becomingness of reality (dharmadhvasau). Thus what is generally true of Buddhism according is more specifically true of Sarvāstivāda:

> (Here) we are able to appreciate the deeper dimensions of being because now we must focus on the process itself, the becomingness of being. Here the sister concept of temporality seems to appear almost naturally. Temporality at least moves us in the right direction and seems to permit us to have glimpses of what Buddhists call reality. It has a profound meaning in that it runs across but retains or contains the multiple set of conditions and factors at play in the empirical process.[2]

It may not be out of place here to refer to the Sāṃkya-Yoga understanding of process and time and its close similarity with Buddhism. According to Sāṃkhya-Yoga system also dynamism is rooted in the order of being built into it. The concept of Prakṛti connotes allness (sarvam) and, as the dynamic matrix of reality, provides the basis for the temporality of existence. There is however, a difference, and this difference

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[1] See Coomaraswamy, Anada K., Time and Eternity, Switzerland: Artibus Asiae Publishers Ascona, 1941, pp. 58-59.

[2] Inada, Kenneth, op. cit., p. 174.

is by no means viewed an inconsequential (and is in fact the basis on which the two differ in respect of their generic essence). The difference is: what would be considered as belonging to the order of existence and reality alike in Sarvāstivāda would be assigned a reality status different from pure consciousness which in itself is a-temporal. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga however, will concede that it is through the means of focusing on the temporal structure, the becomingness of being, that one can recover or re-gain the separation of pure consciousness.

CHAPTER XI

TRANSCENDENCE AND TEMPORALITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR A SOTERIOLOGY OF THE PRESENT

In this concluding chapter we shall attempt to grasp the significance of reflection as a special mode of being and the central role that it plays in the transcendence of temporality. Herein it will be argued that for both Sāṁkhya-Yogā and the Ābhidharma Buddhism, reflection as a function of consciousness is the structure of the transcendence of temporality. Reflection itself is a temporal act and operates within the confines of the temporal process. But as a function of consciousness, which itself is always given as 'consciousness of', reflection has a built in structure of transcendence whereby it steps out of itself and relates itself to the object of reflection. The transcendence of temporality lies within the compass of reflection in terms precisely of its inherent capacity of stepping outside of itself. Objectification is the primary mode of being of the reflective consciousness. While this seems to be true of the structure of consciousness as part and parcel of temporal mode of being for both Sāṁkhya-Yogā and Ābhidharma Buddhism there is one important difference between the two systems' articulation of the problem. For Sāṁkhya-Yogā, the transcendence of temporality by reflective consciousness (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure) means recovery of the pure or transcendental consciousness conceived as a mode of being — Puruṣa. For Ābhidharma Buddhism, on the other hand, it implies a total extinction or dissolution

of consciousness conceived on the model of a drying-up of a stream or flow. This basic difference emanates from a difference of ontological orientation. However, despite this dissimilarity in their ontological perspectives they share a common trait of Indian soteriologies in emphasizing the possibility of transcendence of the temporal process in and through the moment of 'present'. This aspect of their soteriology we prefer to call "non- eschatological."

Consciousness And Transcendence of Temporality: The Sāṁkhya-Yoga Perspective

We have argued that for the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, 'to be present' is the primary mode of existence of the empiric being. But the empiric being, as the self-constituting synthesis, is also the locus of the ontological relation of the temporal modes of past, present and future. The empiric subject (Buddhi-Ahaṃkāra structure) comprehends past, present and future as distinct and yet not disjoined. By means of such comprehension is provided the order for these moments. It sees them as different but not as disparate. Seeing it thus it also constitutes its orderliness which comes to be grasped as objective time. Thus:

> The continuous flow of these moments, is a sequence (krama). However, there is no real (basis) for the combination of the moments and their sequence . . . (thus), time has no real (objective) existence, it is only creation of buddhi, and follows on account of knowledge by words . . . (However), the moment is objective (it has a basis in the real) and is the basis (a ground) of sequence; the sequence (krama) consists in the continuous (uninterrupted) succession of moments, and it is this that is called time (kāla) by yogins who know time (its real nature).

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1 ... tatpravāhāvicchedastu kramaḥ.ksanatkramayornāsti vastusamāhāra... sa khavalyaṁ vastuśūnyo buddhinirmānaḥ śabdajñānānupatī...kṣanastu vastupatitaḥ kramāvalambī. kramaśca kṣanānantar yātmā.Vyasa Bhāṣya on the Yoga Sūtra, op.cit., 3.52.

Temporal order on the phenomenal level is a conscious creation of the empiric subject (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure). But the temporal flux or the the flow of moments or events is ontologically pre-given in the objective being or the sphere of objectivity (prakrti).[1] Time-order as the principle of continuity is constituted by the empiric subject (Buddhi parikalpita). "As a matter of fact, there is no real aggregation between the moments and their succession. Hence all such divisions of time ..... are purely subjective".[2] Time is nothing but the relational mode of being (sambandhamātropakārī).[3] But in the constitution of the temporal structure, the empiric subject does not act as a principle independent of the objective flow or the flux of moments or events. The empiric subject itself is, out and out, temporal.

How then are we to look at the temporal flow and its relationship to subjectivity as embodiment and the principle of I-ness? It is precisely in the structure of the constitution of subjectivity, i.e. subject as lived and embodied, subject as the centre of I-ness and agent of all activity and willing that the essential structure of temporality, as the unity in difference or the suffusion of fissuration, is manifested. What we see in

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[1]We see therefore that time, space, etc., are the limitations which regulate, modify and determine to a certain extent the varying transformations and changes and the seeming differences of things, though in reality they are all ultimately reducible to the three gunas (the constituents of prakrti) .....Dasgupta, S. N., Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, op. cit., p. 79.

[2]The Tattva Kaumudī by Vacaspati Misra, op. cit., p. 215; also see Dasgupta, S. N., History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., p. 256.

[3]Yuktidīpikā, op. cit., p. 74.

subjectivity is an essential drive, a lived tension and a continuous turning to new events and activities. This is the mode of being of rajas,[1] the element of activity and energy, the life impetus which is continually operating in calling forth to existence that which lies dormant in the future. The constant tension of triguna in the manifestation and non-manifestation of existence mediated by the element of activity is most vividly operative in the structure of subjectivity as temporality. It is in the present that the subject acts and reacts and calls forth what is not present within in the purview of its own field (ksetra). It is not that subjectivity is located in the present through which events pass from the future to the past. Rather, the future becomes the present by the subject's act of making it present (i.e. through the preponderance of (rajas). The subject does not observe the flow of temporal events, (this, of course, is what lies under the purview of Purusa as the transcendental subject, the pure subject of witnessing) it performs it; it is not carried through time, it acts it; it does not have time, it exists temporally. The form, the order and the course of time are the universal and necessary structures of subjectivity (subject as activity). Thus "pure or empty time as such is nothing or is non-existent. It is nothing apart from actions or events that are revealed in experience. If it is anything it is one with them."[2]

For the Sāṁkhya-Yoga the significance of the present is that it is

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[1] Sāṁkhya Pravacana Sūtra, op. cit., 6.50.

[2] Sen, S. K., op. cit., p. 412.

the moment of mutation. And as such it is also the moment of the suffusion of the temporal fissuration.

> In the present there is a single moment and there are no earlier or latter moments. There is no combination of them. But those moments which are past and future are to be explained as inherent in the mutations. Accordingly, the whole world passes through a mutation in a single moment.[1]

The moment of mutation, the present is also the moment of activity for the subject. The subjectivity, as activity, in the present, could not call forth that which is disjunct or independent of it. The suffusion of fissuration is possible only because the subjectivity as present is ontologically related to its past and future mode of being. The subjectivity (Buddhi) then exists as already-having been, presence-to, and being-possible. Over against the past, the subject exists in the present and acts in order to actualize the future.

> Had there been no past (existence of being in its unmanifest form) the existence of the present (existence of being in its manifest form) would have been impossible. And the present contains the future mode of being in its potential form (existence of being in its unmanifest form). Had it not been the case, the future never could come into existence as manifest being.[2]

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[1]Thus, then, the present is but a single moment, there are no 'preceding' or 'succeeding' moments (in it), for there is no combination of these. The past and the future moments are, then, to be explained as inherent in the change (mutation). In that one moment (the present) the whole world experiences change (undergoes mutation). Vyāsa Bhāṣya, op. cit., p. 151.

[2]yadi tu vartamānatvābhāvāt atītānāgatyaḥ saṭtvaṁ hantobhovartamānasyā+pyaphāvo'tītānāgatatvābhāvāt. adhvadharmyaviśiṭatayā tu sattvaṁ trayanamapyavisistamityabhiprayena.....Tattva Vaiśāradī by Vacaspati Misra, op. cit., 4.12.

The fundamental mode of the experience of subjectivity (subject as activity) is temporal. In the present the subject shoves back the former moments and makes present the future ones. This disengagement from one moment (ksana) and a turning toward another is what is given as the primitive phenomenon of succession (krama). A succession of events, however, is not the same thing as a conception or awareness of that succession. It is a pre-thematic mode of subjective being. Due to the process of making present over against 'having already been' (bhūta) and toward 'that which is to come' (bhavisya) life of the subject is lived as temporal flow. We live in a flux because the subjective experience is structured temporally. But the temporal subject is not aware of its temporality; to be aware of its temporality is to be self-aware, i.e. to objectify itself, to step aside and be able to look at itself as a totality, as an ordered whole. In doing this the subject does not act but reflects. This is that mode of being in which the sattva gets preponderance over rajas. Conscious reflection takes the place of purposive activity. Time-awareness emerges through self-conscious reflection upon our presence to and engagement in the world, as 'having already been' (bhūta) toward 'that which is to come' (bhavisya).

Through the complex interrelation of existential and conscious factors, each of the temporal dimensions appear as ordered despite their differences. At the same time, we become aware of the interdependence of each of the dimensions in so far as the conscious acts through which we have access to the past, present and future point beyond themselves to real aspects of a single subjective being.

Self-reflection being the mode of 'objectification' of the self-reflecting self is also the mode of the recovery of the transcendental subject or transcendental consciousness as the formal ontological ground of the self-reflecting self. It is in the mode of reflection that the true dialectical character of the being of the empiric subject (Buddhi) can be grasped. We have already noted this point. However, before bringing out the full implications of the transcendental consciousness let us attempt to grasp the significance for the subject which is essentially temporal.

In and through, reflection the essential structure of temporality as the manifold of subjective experiences discloses itself to the self-reflecting self. The self-reflecting self grasps the essential 'otherness' of the whole world of our ordinary experience. Reflection discovers our empiric existence in the self-reflecting act of subjectivity (being of Buddhi) as the mode of its world-involvement, of its entanglement in everyday situations and projects (adhyavasāya or vyavasāya).[1] As a structure of this 'everydayness' the self-reflecting self comes to discover the structure of temporality, i.e. the order of time, the form of time, etc.

Furthermore, in the reflective mode of being the subject discovers that as subjectivity it is present to various kinds of objects in its phenomenal mode of existence. It discovers that in being present to the world it is out there in the world of its own past and future. Past and future constitute the existential background over and against which

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[1] See Supra, p. 113.

subjectivity as adhyavasāya operates as being present to the world of things which it is actively concerned with and which it uses for its own purpose. Thus, in reflection the subject comes to see that it is absorbed in the objects to which it is present, and thereby it grasps that an aspect of its existence is to be present-to and present alongside of a multitude of objects.

The subject then through reflection discovers the essential mode of being of subjectivity - it discovers as a unity which exists as already-having-been, present to objects of various kinds and as a possibility towards its own future. Through reflection, then, the subject becomes conscious of its own existence as tri-dimensional. Thus in the mode of self-reflection the subject gains access to the structure of temporality vis-a-vis to subjectivity. It becomes aware of its own temporal experience as a lived unity of its own strivings and dispositions. Thus the subject relates to itself as temporal. In the process, the subject sees itself as the principle of I-ness, as the temporal becoming which tends to appropriate the world as its own (Ahaṁkāra).

However, the dialectic of reflection also demands that by the same act that the subject objectifies itself it also comes to grasp its formal grounding in the pure subject or the transcendental consciousness. The dispersion and fissuration of subjectivity also consists in the very ontological structuring of it.[1] While it has its existential ontological

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[1]It is important to remember that subjectivity (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure) has a peculiar ontological character. On the one hand being the realm of embodiment it is related to Prakrti. On the other,

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ground in the world (Prakrti) its formal ontological grounding is in the realm of transcendental consciousness itself. It is precisely this formal ontological grounding in the pure consciousness that constitutes the possibility of transcendence in the mode of self-reflection. The moment of reflection for the empiric subject is also the moment of discriminative awareness (viveka). In the discriminative awareness, the subject discovers not only the essential otherness of its existence as subjectivity, but it also comes to recover its own original mode of being, its own formal ontological grounding in pure consciousness. In this single instance of the being of consdiousness the subject-object distinction is totally obliterated.[1] Here, in the mode of discriminative awareness, the subject is precisely that which is subjectively identical with itself and, therefore, is not an independent object to itself. The Sāmkhya-Yoga "is not concerned at all with the world in itself except so far as it is instrumental in the discrimination of the isolated or pure Purusa."[2] And we may add, here, that the Sāmkhya-Yogā is typical of the entirety of Indian Philosophy in the attitude to the world.

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reflecting the consciousness of Purusa, it seems to take the form of Purusa. Thus empiric subject has a built-in structure of fissuration. Purusa is its formal ontological basis because Buddhi tends to take the form of consciousness that belongs to Purusa. Prakrti, on the other hand, is the existential ontological basis, for subject (Buddhi) is essentially embodiment and operates through Indriyas. See Jayamangalā: .....buddhyādi dvāri bhavati.....śeṣāṇi tu buddhīndriyakarmendriyāṇi dvārāṇi.....trailokyagataṁ puruṣasyārtha sūkṣamasthuḷavisayalakṣanaṁ prakaśyābhivyaktiṁ.....The Jayamangalā, op. cit., p. 42.

[1]Dasgupta, S. N., Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, op. cit., p. 154.

[2]Larson, op. cit., p. 222.

Thus, in the act of reflection we can discern two specific moments; the moment of discovery and the moment of recovery. The first mode of reflection is operative within the framework of otherness, i.e. where consciousness sees itself as something out of itself, as something in and along with the world of objectivities. This is the mode of discovery of the being of the self as not-self. In this discovery of the essential being of the self as not-self (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure), the self comes to constitute itself as of the world. Reflection as discovery (the being of Buddhi) is essentially the mode of the constitution of the self as not-self. Reflection as discovery is the realm of actuality and activity, and as such it belongs to the present for present alone is the moment of activity and actuality. Activity is the mark of otherness of the subject and the object; it is the mode of subjects acting on the object. It is precisely for this reason that reflection as acitivity of discovery is also the mode of the self-transcendence of the reflective self. In reflection as discovery the reflective self turns to itself as an object of reflection.

However, contrasted with this is the mode of reflection as recovery. Reflection as recovery 'isolates itself from the contents of consciousness. It is the mode of the dispossession of the objective contents of reflection founded on ~~or~~ individuality (Ahaṁkāra). Viveka (discrimination) is concomitant with vairagya (dispossession). While reflection as discovery is the structure of the withdrawal of the self into the original mode of its being as pure consciousness. Reflection as recovery is pure contemplation and makes possible the being of consciousness in its pure form. The being of consciousness in its pure form, when seen from the perspective of

temporality, manifest the very characteristics of eternity precisely in the sense of 'non-temporality' (timelessness).[1] It is the dissolution of the inner structure of reflection as activity[2] (an act of the subjectivity) in the present which comprises the past and future as an ontological relation within the structure of subjectivity. Reflection as contemplation is deliverance from activity of the present; the present itself undergoes a metamorphosis in that it comes to be a pure present or a now which is essentially eternity. While the now of the subjectivity as temporality is always fragmentary and incomplete the now of the transcendental subject is essentially limitless in the sense that it is complete. It is infinite presence.

It must, here, be noted that this transcendence of the temporal now is itself a function of the present. The dialectical character of the relationship of the world and consciousness is nowhere more concretely discernible than in the structure of the present. The present which is eminently the moment of world-involvement and subject's activity is also at once the moment of the transcendence of the world of subjectivity. It is in the present that the self-reflecting self undergoes a complete

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[1] Vyāsa Bhāsya on the Yoga Sūtra 4.33, op. cit.

[2] The Sāṁkhya-Yogā looks at reflection as an action and thus extrinsic to the essential being of Purusa as pure consciousness. For the modification of thought called "meditation" is the noblest of all modifications (incident to Soul, or pure Thought, whose blessedness, or state of emancipation, it is to have no modification at all)......meditation cannot belong to Soul essentially, because of the immobility of Soul (Purusa); whereas "meditation" is an effort.....The Sāṁkhya Aphorisms, (trans.) Ballantyne, J. R., op. cit., pp. 218-219.

metamorphosis - it emerges essentially as what it is - as the pure consciousness, bereft of all vicissitudes, dispersions and contradictions of the realm of the objective being (prakrti). It is in this sense, Samkhya-Yoga is a soteriology of the present. Salvation is attained in the present, and thus a soteriology which is non-eschatological. It is not without reason that the system speaks of the contemplation on the 'Moment' as the mode of the being of eternity. In this Moment, the moment of the present on which the reflective self reflects, is also when the whole universe seems to undergo a radical change. This is also the moment of the dawn of discriminative awareness which coincides with the transcending of the realm of temporality (the realm of limited now) into the realm of eternity (the realm of eternal now). The realm of Purusa in isolation from the world of activities is the realm of eternity - it is the mode of the being of Infinitude.

Consciousness and Transcendence of Temporality: The Ābhidharmika Perspective

We will now examine the structure of consciousness (vijñāna) and the pivotal role assigned to it in the Ābhidharmika scheme of things. Contrasted with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga understanding of pure-consciousness in substantive terms the Ābhidharmikas propose a purely functional understanding of consciousness. Emphasis here shifts from the givenness of consciousness as a transcendental condition of all reflection and cognition to the very process of the operation of consciousness, conceived as immanent in the functions of cognition and reflection. Consciousness is not the mode of being of a self-identical self which, essentially, is a-temporal and without differentiation and fissuration. Rather, consciousness (Vijñāna) as a dharma is continually on the go, is never self-identical; and as the structure of becoming and causal conditioning it is essentially temporal.[1] Change, differentiation and fissuration are built into the mode of being of consciousness as a dharma.[2] Temporality, therefore cannot be overcome by consciousness

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[1] Vijñāna is a saṁskrta dharma. By difinition samskrta dharmas are temporal (adhva) and impermanent: ta eva saṁskrtā gatagacchadgamiṣyadbhāvādadhvānaḥ, adyante'nityatayeti vā; Abhidharmakośam, (1970), op.cit. p. 26, adyante'nityatayā bhaksyanta ityadhvāna iti samskrtā evādhvaśabdena bhagvatā deśitāḥ; Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośā Vyākhyā, 1949, op.cit., p. 23.

[2] "saṁskrta dharmas are called temporal (dhva) precisely because change or impermanence (anityata) eats them up." Ibid

as long as it is consciousness. Overcoming of temporality, i.e. transcendence of the realm of temporal existence would imply the overcoming of the fissuration, change and becomingness of consciousness. But since these are structural to consciousness it follows that its transcendence would mean its dissolution. Nirvāna or freedom is not the recovery of an original mode of being of consciousness; it is the dissolution of any mode of being of consciousness. It is extinction of the very structure of the consciousness as flow. Contrast with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga ontology is obvious here.

Phenomenologically speaking, the distinction between the overcoming of temporality in the recovery of consciousness and the dissolution of consciousness is an extremely important distinction. Loosing sight of this distinction will lead to an underestimation of the differences between the basic orientation of the two systems. For both the systems temporality is essentially an imperfection[1] characteristic of the finitude and ought to be overcome in the mode of being of the non-temporal. However; the mode of being of the non-temporal has drastically different implications for the subject as the structure of world involvement. While for Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Subject as pure consciousness retains its individuated identity and is a case of recovering of its original mode of being, for Ābhidharmikas the subject must give

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[1] This is the connotation of the term vikṛti characteristic of the phenomena as modification of Prakrti in Sāṁkhya-Yoga. A similar understanding of phenomena constituted of saṁskṛta dharma is present in the Abhidharma literature.

up its original mode of being and its individuality in order to attain nirvana. Nirvāna, though eternally existent and constantly present, is not an original mode of being that the subject somehow lost and regains. World (samsāra) as the structure of temporal becoming does not share the ontological character of Nirvāna which for the Ābhidharmikas is eternally existent and beyond the operation of the forces of conditionedness (samskrtatva).[1]

It is important to be reminded that for Ābhidharmika Buddhism, Nirvāṇa is not a negative concept; it is not an emptiness either in the form of an ontological nothingness without any substance or a state of being which is rendered non-existant on conceptual analysis.[2]

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1 The question of the existence of Nirvāna as a separate dharma which is not subject to the forces of conditionedness has been a matter of controversy between the Sarvastivādins and the Sautrantikas. While the Sautrantikas deny that Nirvāṇa exists or is real, Sarvashivada affirms it's reality as a separate dharma. For the details of the argument and counterargument, see Abhidharmakośam, 1970, op.cit., pp 318-328. Also see Sphutartha Abhidharmakoṣā Vyākhyā, 1949, op.cit., pp. 145-152.

2 The negativism as a philosophical doctrine (śunyavāda), if at all the ultimate philosophical position, is the one that is associated with Nāgārjuna. This is at least the historical truth even though it is increasingly questioned in modern times. Samkara criticised it as expressly a negative doctrine (See Śamkara's Bhāsya on Brahma Sūtra 2.2.31). The other exponent of negativism as a viable philosophical doctrine is Prajnākaramati, the author of the Panjika on the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Santideva.

As a paradigm of a negativism implying dissolution through conceptual analysis may be cited the Advaita Vedānta, according to which the state of being is rendered in retrospection non-existent by means of conceptual separation of the ground and the superimposed. See Mandana's Brahmasiddhi, Madras: Madras Law Journal Press, 1932, p. 136, ff.

Rather, Nirvāna is a mode of positive being, an eternal existence which is acquired or reached and possessed (prāpti).[1] Nirvāna is eternally existent and as a reality it is posited over and against the reality of temporally determined dharmas. Within the Abhidharmika context it is possible to discern distinction renmiscient of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga categories of permanence (parināmi nityatā) and eternity (kūtastha nityatā). Saṁtāna or the continuum which, theoretically, is never-ending and is in that sense 'permanent' is not, however, a case of overcoming of temporality.[2] Endlessness is not conquering of temporality at all, but rather it is a prolongation or perpetuation of temporality's defect. Saṁtāna (continuum) may be described as having a temporal mode of permanence in the sense that its coming to an end is not part of its meaning as becoming. But this 'permanence' of the continuum can not be ascribed the value of eternity because it is only continuity of imperfection (conditionedness), prolongation of non-perfection. Nirvāna, on the other hand, is described by Ābhidharmika as eternal (nitya) in a non-temporal sense. As dharma or reality Nirvāna is eternity precisely in the sense that it transcends the mode of imperfection or conditionedness (saṁskrtattva). Nirvāna is unconditioned and eternal because it is not subject to the operation of the forces of conditionedness, namely jati, jarā, sthiti etc.[3]

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1 Abhidharmkośam, 1970, op.cit., pp. 23, 211-212, 319.

2 nityaṁ kuśalaṁ cāsti dravyāntaram. tadvisaṁyogascocyate pratisaṁkhyā (=nirvāna) nirodhasceti sarvamevāsamskrtamadravyamiti, Ibid., p. 321.

3 etāni hi saṁskrtasya catvāri laksanāni. yatraitāni bhavanti sa dharmah samskrto laksyate viparyādasamskrtah. Ibid., p. 253.

As the realm of eternity Nirvāṇa is fullness of spiritual being, a completedness which constitutes the horizon into which the individual as subject dissolves. Overcoming of temporality in the present case also is a function of reflection as a mode of the being of the subjectivity as consciousness. As reflection subjectivity is essentially in fellowship with what is contemplated. Reflection as an act of consciousness consists of a fellowship of what is contemplated and what contemplates.[1] Contrasted with Sāṁkhya Yoga, which admits the possibility of consciousness without content, Abhidharma proposes an essential reciprocity of the consciousness and its content.

In this reciprocity of consciousness and content consists the essential imperfection of consciousness (samskrtatva), for consciousness itself is both conditioning and conditioned by other dharmas.[2] Reciprocity and mutual conditioning also implies reciprocal otherness between the two. While the Sāṁkhya-Yoga makes the recognition of this otherness as the very condition for freedom, for the Abhidharmika the

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1 According to Abhidharmkos'a citta, manas and vijñāna are interchangeable terms used for consciousness. Consciousness is always dependent upon what it cognizes: cittaṁ mano'tha vijñānamekārtha paṁcadha, Abhidharmakos'am, 1970, op,cit., p. 208-209, samprayuktakahetustu cittachaittāḥ, Ibid., p. 306; also saman ās'rayo yesāṁ te cittacaitta anyonyaṁ samprayuktakahetuḥ, Ibid., p. 307.

2 Cittacaitah sahāvas'yaṁ sarva samskrtalakṣaṇaih prāptyā, Ibid., p. 185-186.

otherness must be dissolved. However, the dissolution of the otherness does not consist in the discerning of an identity overreaching the different i.e., the consciousness claiming the object or the content of it as its own (such would be a case of invetrate tendency to conceptualize in terms being, the <u>satkāyadṛṣṭi</u>,[1] which Ābhidhārmika rejects.). It consists in the disclaiming of consciousness as well as its content (visamyoga).[2]

Thus the overcoming of temporality, the process of becomingness of the conditioned <u>dharmas</u> (<u>samskṛtattva</u>) is essentially the dissolution of the subjectivity in the mode of otherness. Subjectivity or consciousness which loses the other through which alone could it express itself, loses its subjecthood. Just as the object which become the possession of the consciousness are not mere objects and must be described as that which belongs to the consciousness (<u>caitesika</u>),[3] so the consciousness which is bereft of its content must completely lose its existing character as consciousness.

Thus, within Ābhidhārmika scheme, at least two moments in consciousness can be discerned. Cognition is the mode of claiming of object as other by the subject. Reflection is the mode of disclaiming

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1 See Supra, p. 155.

2 Visaṁyogaḥ kṣayo dhiyā
kṣayaḥ = nirodhaḥ dhi = prajñā . tena pratisaṁkhyānirodho visaṁyoga-phalamityuktaṁ bhavati, Abhidharmkośam, 1970, <u>op.cit</u>., p. 332.

3 See Abhidharmkośam, 1970, kārika 23-33 and bhāṣya on them, Ibid, pp. 186-211.

of this otherness. It is the realization that all dharmas as conditioned are essentially on the same ontological footing. It is the realization that consciousness, as much as its content, is essentially impermanent and conditioned. Reflection as an act of consciousness, then, inevitably brings about as it were a perfect unity of the subject and object, but this unity is nothing other than the abrogation of the subject by its complete annulment. Temporality surely is overcome through the negation of the distinction of the subject and object. But it must not be forgotten that this in turn entails an overcoming of the subjecthood. The eternity of Nirvāna as the stillness of consciousness (sthita) overcomes the flow of temporality through complete extinction of consciousness as the cognitional basis of all temporality. In this lies the dialectical character of consciousness.

There is another implication of this dialectic of consciousness. Consciousness, according to the Ābhidhārmikas, takes the form of the object that it cognizes.[1] Accordingly the consciousness which cognizes Nirvāna must also become of the nature of Nirvāna. Consciousness itself is temporal because it is both conditioning and conditioned. It retains this character of temporality in its encounter with the objects which themselves are temporal and conditioned (saṃskṛta dharma). But in its encounter with that which is unconditioned and beyond the pail of temporality and becomingness, consciousness must of necessity lose its own conditionedness and temporality. In other words it must lose its character of consciousness.

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1 Ibid., p. 208.

Eternity of Nirvāna in the sense of constant presence or 'eternal now', within the grasp of consciousness as reflection, brings out the true soteriological import of Ābhidharmika speculation about the structure of temporal becoming. Here too structural similarity and thematic congruity with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga soteriology are quite prominent. For both the systems salvation is not in future, but it is in the present. It is not to be realized at some distant moment, when the temporal process shall come to an end. The process of temporal becoming as the structure of world participation is a given fact, and as a fact it cannot be annihilated or terminated. It will never come to an end. The process as fact is permanent (in the temporal sense). Its termination is not conceivable. Salvation therefore, of necessity, lies in the present. It is in the temporal present that the Nirvana can be attained. It is the present that constitutes the stepping stone to the 'eternal now.'[8]

The realization of Nirvāna as eternity is possible precisely because it is an existent fact. It is not something previously non-existent which becomes existent in the present. It is eternally present and as such is the very opposite of the temporal now which is constantly moving. But the act of transcendence as an act of consciousness is performed within the compass of this temporal present. It is not without significance that the Buddhist canons exhort the aspirant: "Get ye across this sticky mire, let not the Moment pass (khano ve mā upaccagā), for they shall mourn whose moments past

(khannatītā hi socanti)".[1] Those whose "moment has been caught" (khaṇo vo paṭiladdho) are the fortunate ones, while those "whose moment has past" (Khaṇātītā)[2] are the unfortunate ones. The moment of release is sudden and "contrasts with the length of the Way, the aeonic time that is now and once for all escaped".[3]

Concluding Observations

In this final chapter we offered our interpretation of two systems' articulation of temporality and its implications for consciousness. The thrust of the argument was to bring out the structure of metaphysical transcendentalism as represented in their conception of eternity that the two systems imply. Of pivotal importance both to Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the Ābhidarma Buddhism, was the analysis of the experience of temporality defined as finitude, and to determine whether or not experiencing of temporality necessarily implied positing a transcendental time as the receptum of entities. In other words, is temporality an experience of the flow of entities and events as they are present to consciousness in the original mode of their limitation i.e. finitude, or it is an experience of the flow of entities and events as mediated through a transcendental principle of time? It was our attempt to show that in both the systems temporality

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1 Cited in Coomaraswamy, op.cit., p. 44 (Sn. 333, cf. Dh. 315, Tha. 403, 653, 1005, The. 5, 459.)

2 Ibid., (S. 4, 126).

3 Ibid., p. 45.

is explained in terms of our experience which is radically and essentially a revelation of our immediate contact with the world of dynamic change and flow exemplyfying finitude.

In pursuit of this insight we analyzed the Sāṁkhya-Yoga attempt to ground temporality in subjectivity. Our analysis was primarily an attempt to show that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga does not tend to reduce the experience of temporality to the consciousness of temporality for an atemporal transcendental consciousness. The two were placed in two realms of being, though with a possibility of the dialectical contact between the two. However, the dialectic of contact (samyoga) also implies the loss of the original mode of being of the transcendental consciousness, which can be regained or recovered through the dialectic of reflection, which itself, in the ultimate analysis, is part and parcel of the temporal mode of being. Thus from our point of view, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga's analysis of temporality can be regarded as an argument both directly for the possibility of temporal experience independent of time as a transcendental condition of this experience, and indirectly for the transcendence of temporality in the realm of eternity, which we saw to be the mode of being of Purusa. The important aspect of this argument is the implicit assertion that temporality as the experience of the becomingness of the world as a dynamic flow cannot be reduced to a mere appearance for a transcendental consciousness.

The temporal differentiation is not appearance to the pure subject, but enters into awareness as a specific fact in the life-history of subjectivity as the structure of world-involvement. On

this specific issue we found the basic positions of both the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Abhidharma concurrent. In either case it can be said that any attempt to reduce temporality to appearance in and for atemporal consciousness would be an exercise in futility. For both the systems, experience of temporality for an atemporal consciousness must be ruled out. Both of them seem to agree in maintaining that experience of temporality entails subjectivity immanent to the structure of world-involvement (Buddhi-Ahaṁkāra structure in the case of Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the structure of Skandhas in the case of Ābhidharma Buddhism). Subjectivity as immanent in this structure is always losing its autonomy precisely in the sense that subjectivity as empiric consciousness is inconceivable without the content of consciousness. In the mode of being of subjectivity, the mutual otherness of the subject and object or consciousness and its content is constantly and steadily overcome. It is subject to systematic disappearance. This is what is implied by becoming aware of something. Awareness or experience, then, in a sense, is this very structure of the 'disappearance' of consciousness as consciousness i.e. as entailing the otherness of subject and object. This is the mode of being of empiric consciousness which always is "consciousness of" (citta, Buddhi). Phenomenologically speaking, this structure of 'disappearance' of consciousness discernible in the experience of temporal becoming or temporality also privides the clue for the transcendence of temporality. If empiric consciousness loses itself partially in the experience of temporality, it loses itself completely in the experience of eternity. This is accomplished through

self-reflection or critical reflection as a mode of transcendence which thus seems intrinsic to the very structure of consciousness as reflection.

Thus, above is a generalized picture of this common structure between the two points of view outlined in the course of this study. The constant concern with the analysis of moments in both the systems under investigation may be understood as the exemplification of a soteriology of the present, or what we have termed as the "non-eschatological" soteriology. Sāṁkhya-Yoga, while not accepting the kṣaṇikavāda of Buddhism (the momentary arising and disappearance) accepts the doctrine of the moment (kṣaṇa) over against the more popular Brahmanical doctrine of time (Kāla). Whether the doctrine is originally a Buddhist doctrine or a Brahmnical one is a question that evades any easy solution. We are not quite certain if Stecherbatsky's observation that "the origin of the theory of Instantaneous Being is probably pre-Buddhist"[1] has any positive historical evidence to support it. Nor is there any incontrovertible evidence to substantiate the claim that the Yoga-Bhāṣya in its articulation of the problem of temporality agreed verbatim and accepted the doctrine of the Ābhidharmikas.[2] The historical question of the exact nature and extent of interaction between Sāṁkhya-Yoga

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1 Stcherbatsky, Th., Buddhist Logic, Vol I, The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1932, p. 108.

2 Takagi, S., "A Comparative Study of Time in Yogabhāṣya and Ābhidharma Buddhism", Mikkyo Bunka, Koyosan, 1963, pp. 68-83.

and Ābhidhārmika Buddhism is an important issue demanding further and fuller investigation by the historians of religions. This however, is beyond the scope of the present work. What we have attempted in these pages is to show a significant structural similarity in the articulation of the specific problem. This raises important questions about the philosophical postulates of the two soteriologies. Are the two systems really two distinct and opposed expressions of the philosophical spirit characteristic of the religious philosophies of India, or is it not perhaps the case that despite their differences they also profoundly share some important ontological nuances and stand together in contradistinction only to the "eschatological" soteriologies of Judæo-Christian traditions?

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